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# ***Daily Report***

# **Soviet Union**

FBIS-SOV-88-180  
Friday  
16 September 1988

# Daily Report

## Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-88-180

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16 September 1988

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## Anniversary of Nuclear Risk Centers Marked

### Shevardnadze, Shultz Messages

LD1509165588 Moscow TASS International Service  
in Russian 1615 GMT 15 Sep 88

[Text] Moscow, 15 Sep (TASS)—The Soviet foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state today exchanged brief messages in connection with the anniversary of the signing of the agreement between the USSR and the United States on the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers.

The texts of the messages, transmitted through the centers' communication channels, follows:

Esteemed Mr Secretary of State,

A year has passed since the signing of the agreement on nuclear danger reduction centers. I should like, in this connection, to convey sincere congratulations to you, and to wish the U.S. side a successful continuation of activity in this direction.

Over a short period of time, the agreement has proved its viability and the timeliness of the step undertaken by our countries.

Now, already, when the first practical steps have been taken along the path of actual disarmament, the centers are demonstrating their effectiveness by making a concrete contribution to the implementation of the INF Treaty.

I am convinced that in the future, as new agreements are concluded—primarily a treaty to reduce and limit strategic offensive weapons—the centers could extend their functions, which would promote the success of nuclear disarmament.

For its part, the Soviet Union will make every effort to ensure that the talks on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons under conditions of adherence to the ABM Treaty culminate in a rapid signing of the relevant agreements.

Yours sincerely,

E. Shevardnadze

Dear Mr Minister,

Allow me to convey to you my greetings on the occasion of the first anniversary of the signing of the agreement between the United States of America and the USSR on the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers.

I should also like to express satisfaction at the substantial contribution being made by the U.S. and Soviet nuclear risk reduction centers for the attainment of our common goal—the creation of trust and security. Please accept my

best wishes for further success in the work of the nuclear risk reduction centers in the cause of reducing the possibility of conflict between our two countries.

Sincerely yours,

George P. Shultz

### U.S. Statement Noted

LD1509223788 Moscow TASS in English 1214 GMT  
15 Sep 88

[Text] Washington September 15 TASS—Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze signed the agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centres (NRRRC agreement) in a White House ceremony a year ago.

The agreement marks a practical step forward in the efforts "to reduce the risk of conflict between the superpowers as a result of accident, miscalculation, or misunderstanding," says a White House statement issued here on the occasion of the agreement's first anniversary.

The centres established in Washington and Moscow "provide a direct communications link between the two governments capable of transmitting messages relating to arms control and confidence building," the statement says.

"When the nuclear risk reduction centres began operations in April 1988, the NRRRC agreement called for certain notifications of ballistic missile launches in accordance with the 1971 'accidents measures' agreements and the 1972 agreement on the prevention of incidents on and over the high seas (INCSEA). The entry into force of the INF Treaty and the conclusion of the strategic ballistic missile launch notification agreement at the 1988 Moscow summit broadened and increased the exchanges of information and notification handled by the centres."

The White House statement emphasized that the establishment of the centres "serves a concrete example of our commitment to reduce the risk of conflict."

### Chernyshev on Agreement

LD1409221688 Moscow TASS in English 1629 GMT  
14 Sep 88

[Text] Moscow September 14 TASS—TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev comments:

On September 15, 1987, Eduard Shevardnadze and George Shultz signed in Washington the Soviet-U.S. agreement on setting up nuclear risk reduction centers. These centers operate very actively and extremely successfully in the capitals of the USSR and the United States today.



The centers are the new mechanisms for prompt transmission of notifications about either side's activity in the military field, which can be misinterpreted by the other partner, which in turn could become the cause of an increased nuclear threat. The transmission of this information through the single channel—the created centers—provides additional opportunities for preventing and eliminating dangerous situations. This is why in the preface to the agreement on setting up the centers the sides confirmed the desire to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular, as a result of error, miscalculation, or accident.

The centers now have a special role to play in implementing the Soviet-U.S. Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Since June 1, 1988, when the treaty officially went into effect, the sides have already exchanged over 800 reports related to its fulfillment. One should emphasize that a lot of utterly technical questions naturally arise and will continue to arise in the future as the treaty is implemented: where is some or other batch of missiles sited at present, how the liquidation of missiles, missile operational bases, auxiliary missile facilities, etc is carried out.

The exchange of information, alongside mutual on-site inspections, makes it possible to ensure the parties' confidence that the provisions of the treaty are complied with. By the way, the notifications about the inspections themselves are also transmitted through the centers. One can judge on the size of exchange between Moscow and Washington already by the fact that both sides have some 150 sites to conduct inspections and inspections themselves will run into several hundred.

One would like to note one more important aspect of the agreement on setting up the centers: It foresees an organic link not only with the existing but also future Soviet-American accords on limiting and reducing nuclear armaments. This was reflected in the provision that the list of notifications transmitted through the centers may be altered as relevant new agreements are reached. For instance, the centers can ensure a prompt exchange of important mutual information related to the fulfillment of the future treaty on strategic offensive armaments.

Summing up the results of the already passed period of the centers' operation, one should say that the conclusion of the agreement on forming them was undoubtedly a positive step in the development of Soviet-U.S. relations and in international terms on the whole since the agreed-upon measures to reduce the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear war serve the interests of enhancing security all over the world. The formation of the centers and their operation is a tangible step toward building up mutual trust.

#### Arbatov Comments

LD1609091188 Moscow TASS in English 1411 GMT  
15 Sep 88

[Text] Moscow September 15 TASS—"The creation of nuclear-risk reduction centers in Moscow and Washington has been an important step to reducing the risk of

outbreak of an armed conflict as well as a worthy example of Soviet-American cooperation," said the chief of the Moscow center, Vladimir Medvedev.

The Soviet-American agreement establishing nuclear-risk reduction centers and two protocols to it was signed by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz exactly a year ago.

Over the year Moscow and Washington centers have sent each other several hundred notifications.

"This is an important confidence-building measure," Academician Georgiy Arbatov said in a TASS interview in connection with the anniversary of the agreement's signature.

"But I would like to stress that the nuclear risk-reduction centers by themselves won't remove all the threats. One must be realistic about that," he added.

"There is no doubt that this is a useful measure. But it is important to understand that everything depends on the substance of policies pursued by the sides.

"If our countries follow realistic policies, relations between them will be improving. I personally hope for the better.

"There are serious grounds for this—important agreements between our countries, in the first place the INF Treaty, and historic summits. The significance of confidence-building measures in this context is on the increase as well," Arbatov said.

The nuclear risk-reduction centers are used to transmit notifications of ballistic missile launches if they are made beyond national territory towards the other side.

The centers are used to give notice also of ballistic missile launches posing a threat to shipping or air traffic.

Besides, they play an important role in transmitting information essential to the practical realization of the INF Treaty signed during the Soviet-American summit in Washington in December 1987.

**Nevada Test Shows 'Differences' in U.S. Goals**  
LD1509172588 Moscow TASS in English 1613 GMT  
15 Sep 88

["American Corrtex Registers American 'Violation'"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow September 15 TASS—By TASS military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev:

The recent Soviet-U.S. experiment at the test range in Nevada, THE NEW YORK TIMES writes, has led to unexpected results which called to question the position

of the Reagan administration at the talks on measures to verify compliance with the 1974 threshold treaty on limitation of underground nuclear explosions.

Both Corrtex devices installed at the range, which are favoured by the U.S. as a monitoring technique, showed the yield of the American nuclear explosion, witnessed by Soviet specialists, to be over 150 kilotons, i.e. over the limit which the two countries had pledged to observe. At the same time the Soviet teleseismic monitoring means, which were dismissed by the American specialists as unreliable, showed that the yield of the American explosion was 140 kilotons as planned and that the United States did not violate the threshold test-ban treaty.

The case is one of paradox. Apparently, the Americans were let down by their own technical means, while the Soviet device helped to clear Washington of the possible accusations of violations.

Many American scientists made right conclusions. For example, a Columbia University geological sciences professor, Paul Richards, said that the experiments should prove the reliability of traditional seismic methods, i.e. the methods proposed by the Soviet side.

However, U.S. officials continue to claim that the American monitoring system Corrtex is the more advanced and refuse to acknowledge the fact of violation of the 1974 treaty which has been registered by the same more advanced systems.

This illogical position of Washington is explained by the fact that the Soviet method, in contrast with the American Corrtex system, enables to monitor compliance with the agreement on complete and general prohibition of nuclear tests. As for the Pentagon, it still fears that nuclear tests would be halted and opposes effective practical measures to promote the sides' progress in this direction.

The Nevada experiment has reaffirmed that differences still exist as regards the end goals, pursued by the USSR and USA in conducting experiments to determine the yield of nuclear explosions. The Soviet side regards them as a step towards the complete ban of nuclear explosions while the Americans side only as a measure to monitor the continued nuclear weapons tests.

**IZVESTIYA on Semipalatinsk Experiment**  
*PM1509113388 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian*  
*15 Sep 88 Morning Edition p 4*

[Special correspondent B. Ivanov dispatch: "Explosion for the Sake of Stopping Explosions. IZVESTIYA Special Correspondent Reports From the Area of the Soviet-U.S. Experiment"]

[Text] Semipalatinsk—An explosive device was detonated 14 September exactly on time—0800 hours Moscow time—at the nuclear test range near Semipalatinsk.

The nuclear explosion was observed by Soviet and U.S. measuring instruments; they were set up within the framework of a joint Soviet-U.S. experiment to determine the yield of underground nuclear tests.

The explosive device was placed in a hole at a depth of 642 meters. Monitoring sensors necessary for the hydrodynamic method of monitoring known also as Corrtex were put alongside in a specially bored auxiliary hole. Their readings at the time of the explosion were clearly recorded by a hypersensitive measuring apparatus placed in high-powered trailers 1 km from the test site. The yield of the explosion totaled between 100 and 150 kilotons. The participants in the experiment—Soviet and U.S. specialists, experts, members of the two countries' official delegations, and journalists—felt a tremor shake the earth at the command center 4 km from the epicenter.

Seismic stations on each country's territory also monitored the explosion.

I.M. Palenykh, head of the USSR delegation at the Soviet-U.S. talks on limiting and ultimately stopping nuclear tests, who was at the testing range, talked about the results of the experiment to IZVESTIYA's correspondent.

"From the scientific viewpoint," he said, "both explosions—both the one in Nevada and this one—will provide us with the material that had been lacking for the elaboration of a protocol to the so-called threshold agreements of 1974 and 1976. Now we have to analyze the results of the experiment. A preliminary exchange of 'raw' data will take place immediately after the explosion. Then, 1 month later, a concrete examination of the materials obtained by the specialists is to begin at the Geneva talks. The materials will be analyzed in both countries. Incidentally, scientists involved in the experiment from both the Soviet Union and the United States will also take part in the Geneva talks. Based on this analysis we will determine the scientific and technical criteria for monitoring."

[Ivanov] That is, whether to give preference to the teleseismic or the hydrodynamic method?

[Palenykh] No, not quite, I want to clarify this. It is not a question of choosing between the hydrodynamic and teleseismic methods. On the contrary, it is a question of using all available means at our disposal for monitoring, in other words finding the appropriate balance and a mutually acceptable combination of methods.

It is quite clear, for instance, that we cannot get by without the teleseismic method. Even now what was done in the course of the experiment shows us that this method must play a leading role. Moreover, we will also have to select the aspects of the hydrodynamic method that would be acceptable to the "threshold treaties" of

1974 and 1976. Thus our immediate task now is to elaborate the protocols as quickly as possible, ratify these treaties, and bring them into operation.

[Ivanov] What then?

[Palenykh] The next stage is the further limitation and reduction in the number of tests and in their yield. The point is that the monitoring methods now being elaborated will also be necessary for further steps in this sphere. We are convinced that the rational seeds that we

find as a result of the experiment will also be used for future agreements and accords. But the final aim of this entire process is to secure the complete cessation of nuclear tests.

...The experiment is over. Its final assessment still lies ahead. But the main result is well known—experimental data have confirmed that the technical aspect of monitoring is not an obstacle. The effective and reliable verification [proverka] of the 1974 and 1976 treaties—if they are ratified—is a quite real possibility.

**Soviet Observers Depart for NATO Exercises**

*LD1509194688 Moscow TASS in English 1937 GMT  
15 Sep 88*

[Text] Oslo September 15 TASS—A group of military observers from the USSR and other socialist countries left today for the north of Norway, the site of the NATO Team Work-88 naval and air exercises.

In accordance with the provisions of the document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and at the invitation of Norway's Government they are to visit on September 16-17 the pre-set area and observe the landing on the Norwegian coast of U.S., British and Dutch amphibious troops, 8,400 men in all.

**Foreign Ministry's Gerasimov 15 Sep Briefing**

**Cites Public Opinion Poll**

*LD1509141788 Moscow TASS in English 1313 GMT  
15 Sep 88*

[Text] Moscow September 15 TASS—A group of sociologists of the research centre under the Higher Komsomol School of the Komsomol Central Committee has taken a public opinion poll on the order of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They polled Muscovites on their attitude to the performance of the United Nations Organization. Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited some figures from the public opinion poll at a briefing today.

The public opinion poll covered representatives of the main social and professional groups of Muscovites, a total of 600 people.

It showed that the Moscow residents assessed positively, on the whole, the performance of the United Nations Organization. 73 per cent of the polled agreed that "the U.N. is making a positive contribution to ensuring peace and security of nations", Gennadiy Gerasimov said. Among various types of the activities of the U.N. and other international organizations 53 per cent of the polled gave preference to public health, 52 per cent to politics and 29 per cent to the trade and economic sphere.

The overwhelming majority of the polled (90 per cent) believe that the USSR is making a positive contribution to the U.N. work. 60 per cent of them describe this contribution as "very great". 81 percent of the polled positively assessed the activation of the Soviet Union's participation in the U.N. activities in connection with the restructuring of Soviet foreign policy. The contribution of the United States was described as a smaller one.

**Arms Control, Editorial 'Canard'**

*LD1509183288 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian  
1500 GMT 15 Sep 88*

[Text] Our next news is from Moscow. A press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists on the current international situation was held in our capital today, in the Press Center of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, spoke about the situation in Burma and quoted the data of the sociological survey carried out in the USSR by the Komsomol Central Committee on the activity of the United Nations.

Touching upon recent pronouncements by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, Gennadiy Gerasimov said inter alia:

[Begin Gerasimov recording] On 13 September, Manfred Woerner gave his first public speech in his capacity as NATO secretary general at the session of the so-called Atlantic Council in Washington. The main subject of his speech was: It is necessary to make the Soviet Union sit at the negotiating table on arms control. We would like to remind Mr Woerner that it is not at all necessary to make us sit at the negotiating table on disarmament issues. In our view, the picture is exactly the opposite.

The Soviet Union and the countries of the Warsaw Pact brought forward a proposal to start this process of reducing conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe, to start from exchanging data, then verification [proverka], then elimination of all sorts of possible imbalances, then a very large and radical reduction. And the NATO countries have yet to respond to these proposals. Therefore, it would be better for Mr Woerner to turn to himself and to advise the NATO countries and the organization which is headed by him to sit at the negotiating table. [end recording]

During the press conference, the chief of the Information Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs also spoke about a propagandist canard which appeared recently on the pages of one Indonesian newspaper.

[Begin Gerasimov recording] A sensational report on plundering by the Soviet Union of historical and archeological treasures which are being kept in the national Museum of Afghanistan appeared in the editorial article of the Indonesian newspaper INDONESIA TIMES on 8 September.

I simply recall this to demonstrate that the canards continue to walk about, despite the fact that we are directing our precision fire at them. This theme had already been raised at the briefing on 14 July. We even showed a video produced in Kabul by (Humberto Solemino), an Italian journalist. The fabrications were then exposed of the French LE MONDE and the Italian LA



STAMPA newspapers with regard to the fact that valuable gold was allegedly taken out by a Soviet truck from Afghanistan to Moscow. The filming was carried out in a special depository of the Presidential Palace in Kabul, where the valuables mentioned by the newspapers still remain in carefully guarded safes. The material was also shown on our television program "Vremya," and Italian viewers watched it on the program "Mixer". Unfortunately, it is clear that neither of these films has reached far-away Indonesia. So all that remains is to feel sorry for the ill-informed Indonesian paper which deluded its readers with this editorial article. [end recording]

#### **TASS Roundup of Briefing**

*LD1509151688 Moscow TASS in English 1442 GMT  
15 Sep 88*

[Text] Moscow September 15 TASS—Today's briefing at the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Press Centre started with the showing of a Soviet television interview by Afghan Defence Minister Shahnawaz Tanay.

The Afghan official said that the government troops were prepared to crush the attempts by irreconcilable opposition forces to hinder the implementation of the national reconciliation policy.

The Soviet Union was closely watching the developments in Burma where demonstrations and strikes were held in support of the opposition leaders' demands for forming an interim government which would comprise individuals enjoying popular trust, the Soviet and foreign journalists were told by Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the ministry's Information Directorate.

"We believe that the developments in Burma were exclusively an internal matter of that country. The USSR hopes that national forces will succeed in reaching settlement and attaining national accord."

Gerasimov announced the decision to evacuate members of the families of the staff of the Soviet Embassy and other Soviet institutions in Burma in connection with the latest events in that country.

The missions of the United States, Britain, China, Japan and Australia had taken similar decisions earlier.

On the anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-American agreement on establishing nuclear risk reduction centres in Moscow and Washington, the ministry spokesman expressed the hope that the centres' functions would include in the future control over compliance of the treaty between the two countries on the 50-per cent reduction of strategic offensive arms.

The address by Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, to the European Parliament attested to the PLO leadership's realistic and constructive course, Gerasimov said.

The PLO leadership reaffirmed its sincere striving to achieve a fair settlement of the problem with due account for the interests of all sides.

The Soviet ministry spokesman observed that the visit to the Soviet Union by Ziah Rizwi, general secretary of the Independent Bureau for International Humanitarian Problems [name and title as received], revealed the proximity of the USSR's and the bureau's positions on many aspects of humanitarian cooperation.

Gerasimov denied the newspaper INDONESIA TIMES claims that the Soviet Union was smuggling historical and archeological values from Afghanistan.

"This is yet another hoax designed to cast aspersions on Soviet-Afghan relations," he said.

Asked about Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's forthcoming visit to Denmark, Gerasimov replied that the Soviet official would meet with his Danish counterpart Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, visit the Danish Parliament, and would be received by Queen Margrethe II.

#### **Voss, Delegation Depart for Sofia IPU Meeting**

*LD1609130288 Moscow TASS in English 1143 GMT  
16 Sep 88*

[Text] Moscow September 16 TASS—A delegation from the USSR parliamentary group, led by its deputy chairman, Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet August Voss, today left Moscow for Sofia to attend the 80th conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

At the airport, the delegation was seen off by Aleksey Yeliseyev, deputy chairman of the USSR parliamentary group, and other officials.

#### **UN, Soviet Ecology Officials Hold Briefing**

*LD1509163288 Moscow TASS in English 1518 GMT  
15 Sep 88*

[Text] Moscow September 15 TASS—The top U.N. and Soviet ecology officials have called for broader international cooperation in nature conservation.

Mostafa Tolba, executive director of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), and Fedor Morgun, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Nature Protection, made the call at a meeting with newsmen in the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Press Center.

Tolba told the reporters that an irresponsible attitude to natural resources in any one country could have most unexpected implications even in another continent.

He pointed, by the way of an example, to current drought in the United States, which is, in the opinion of many experts, a result of large-scale tree-felling operations in Equatorial Africa.

On the other hand, abuse of nature, Tolba said, could theoretically cause political problems or even armed conflicts.

If, for instance, a country, he said, was hit for many years by acid rain resulting from a neighboring state's discharges of large amounts of sulfur oxide into the atmosphere, ecology for the former nation could become a matter of national security with all ensuring consequences.

Morgun said what was needed was not only the joint efforts of mankind to stave off the threat of ecological catastrophe in the world but also a matching of economic development plans of all countries with account taken of anthropogenic effects on nature.

He pointed to recent measures in Soviet Central Asia to prevent the Aral Sea from drying out as an example of this kind of integration of ecology and economics.

"This is a time of increased responsibility in economic and political decision-making for the fate of mankind's habitat," Morgun stressed.

#### **Petrovskiy Meets UN Official**

*LD1509163388 Moscow TASS in English 1256 GMT  
15 Sep 88*

[Text] Moscow September 15 TASS—Vladimir Petrovskiy, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, received on September 14 Mostafa Tolba, executive director of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), who is staying in the USSR on an official visit.

They discussed questions connected with international cooperation in the sphere of the protection and improvement of natural environment.

Vladimir Petrovskiy and Mostafa Tolba exchanged views on further steps that could be taken by the world community for warding off the threat of an ecological catastrophe. It was emphasized that, following the solution of military-political problems, the preservation of the natural habitat of man had become the second front of the struggle for survival. The Soviet side pointed out in this connection that the USSR favoured urgent practical steps to be taken by all the countries, both joint and separate ones.

#### **Murakhovskiy Receives UN Official**

*LD1509192888 Moscow TASS in English 1815 GMT  
15 Sep 88*

[Text] Moscow September 15 TASS—Vsevolod Murakhovskiy, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, chairman of the Commission of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers on Environmental Protection and Rational Use of Natural Resources, has received Mostafa K. Tolba, U.N. deputy secretary-general and executive director of the United Nations Environment Programme, UNEP. The guest highly appraised the initiatives and statements by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee on ecological security in the world, expressing full support.

The two men discussed specific issues connected with ways of further enhancing the efficiency of international cooperation to solve the world's long-term and regional urgent problems.

Mostafa Tolba was briefed on the current efforts in the USSR to effect radical restructuring in environmental protection.

The conversation focused on ways of developing cooperation between the USSR State Committee for Nature Conservation and UNEP in the field of environmental protection.

Mostafa Tolba took note of the great contribution made by the Soviet Union to solving nature conservation problems and promote rational use of natural resources.

The conversation had a businesslike, constructive nature and was marked by an atmosphere of mutual understanding.

#### **Soviets Seek Security in Asia-Pacific Region**

*OW1509145388 Moscow International Service  
in Mandarin 1400 GMT 13 Sep 88*

[Solton commentary]

[Text] The Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty is being implemented. While the United States is only destroying its weapons in Western Europe, the Soviet Union is destroying its weapons in both Europe and Asia. The intermediate-range RSD-10 missiles formerly deployed nearly Chita City have been destroyed. Some listeners may ask why the Soviet Union is destroying its missiles in Asia and requesting the United States to take reciprocal action. In this regard, our station commentator Solton comments as follows:

This is because Moscow wants to satisfy the desire of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region and believes that the destruction of Soviet nuclear weapons in Asia is conducive to the consolidation of mutual trust between the Soviet Union and the United States. It seems that the United States should show a corresponding attitude of



restraint in its military activities in this region, but regrettably this is not the case. What is more, U.S. Defense Secretary Carlucci said a few days ago [words indistinct] that the United States will continue to deploy its forces in the Asia-Pacific region. We cannot help asking these questions: Is it necessary to continue to do so? How will these forces be deployed?

Today, U.S. nuclear-arms-carrying fleets are patrolling the Pacific and Indian oceans. Large U.S. military bases exist in countries in these areas. The United States has stationed more than 50,000 troops in Japan, 43,000 in South Korea, and 16,500 in the Philippines. Even in Australia, there are 800 U.S. service members. The major problem is that U.S. nuclear weapons have continued to increase in these areas, posing a threat not only to the Soviet Union but also to (?intermediate-zone) countries which unwittingly may get involved in large-scale military clashes. This is an intolerable state of affairs.

The Soviet Union at the UN General Assembly's third special disarmament meeting proposed that foreign military presence in other countries be eliminated before the year 2000. In our opinion, this could be started by restricting the activities of naval fleets. The Soviet Union also suggested banning or limiting the deployment of nuclear and chemical weapons in foreign countries.

The Soviet-U.S. agreement on destroying two classes of missiles has knocked down the high barrier of distrust between them.

In conclusion, our station observer Solton says: In my opinion, comparatively favorable conditions have also appeared for the solution of other international issues, including the question of consolidating security in the Asia-Pacific region.

**International Press Agency Forum Hears Reports**  
*LD1509094588 Moscow Tass in English 1516 GMT*  
*14 Sep 88*

[Text] Warsaw September 14 TASS—Bogdan Jachacz, president of the Polish Press Agency, opened an annual conference of senior officials of news and press agencies of socialist countries and several developing countries of socialist orientation in Warsaw today.

Mieczyslaw Rakowski, member of the Political Bureau, secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee, welcomed the participants in the conference.

The chairmen-coordinators—Sergey Losev, TASS director-general, and Valentin Falin, chairman of the NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY board, delivered reports.

The conference discusses questions of the more extensive and effective information of the public about the problems of expediting the socio-economic advancement of socialist countries, their joint efforts to promote peace and avert a nuclear holocaust. Speakers make

specific proposals for developing businesslike cooperation, introducing the principles of openness, and improving fundamentally the material and technical supply of the information work on the basis of the latest advances of the scientific and technical revolution.

Attending the conference are senior executives of 6 agencies from 17 countries, representatives of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and Photointernational.

**Petrovskiy Briefs Press on Upcoming UN Session**  
*PM1509100188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian*  
*14 Sep 88 Second Edition p 5*

[N. Prozhogin report on 13 September USSR Foreign Ministry press briefing: "United Nations—Instrument of Peace. At the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center"]

[Text] The processes taking place in the international arena in connection with the emergent awareness of the interdependence of the modern world are also having a positive effect on the United Nations. A press conference yesterday was devoted to the opening of the 43d session of this organization's General Assembly, scheduled for 20 September.

USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.F. Petrovskiy said that the renewal of the United Nations, which has now begun, is a result of the policy of its member states. At the same time, special note was also taken of the positive role of the Nonaligned Movement's member countries.

The USSR is going to the UN General Assembly session with the intention of helping to strengthen the role of the United Nations and, through it, to renew world politics and create a demilitarized, democratically organized international community. The concept of forming an all-embracing system of peace and security approved by the General Assembly last year serves as the guide for this. At this session the group of socialist countries proposes to continue the dialogue on three problems: the primacy of international law, the enhancement of the role of the chief UN organs, and UN peacekeeping operations. Open to all positive ideas, we do not propose draft resolutions in advance, inviting a search for solutions on a basis of unanimity.

It is exceptionally important to reinforce bilateral disarmament efforts with multilateral ones by making use of the positive factors provided by the Third UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament. The hope was expressed that the United States will cease blocking UN efforts in this sphere.

It was pointed out at the press conference that a multi-lateral approach is necessary in the matter of resolving conflict and crisis situations—which has been initiated by the settlement of the Afghan problem. The Geneva agreements on Afghanistan provide for a responsible approach by all the sides which signed them, including

Pakistan, whose position, however, gives rise to concern. It also depends on the resolution of the Afghan question whether it will serve as a positive example in resolving other regional problems.

The General Assembly must also devote paramount attention to questions of ecological safety. The Soviet delegation is ready to cooperate in all areas of UN activity. The majority of the questions being submitted for examination at the session are of topical significance. However, the work of the United Nations in paving the way to a more secure, democratic, humane world free from the nuclear threat is not easy. And this is borne out by certain questions proposed for the agenda, which are plainly meant to provoke confrontation. However, it is now more necessary than ever before to overcome the usual stereotypes and for political leaders to realize the hopelessness of imposing their will on others and of seeking greater security for themselves than for others.

#### **USSR, Ukraine, Belorussia Name UN Groups**

PM1409110788 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
13 Sep 88 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "To the UN General Assembly Session"]

[Text] In connection with the 43d UN General Assembly session due to open 20 September, the USSR Council of Ministers approved the USSR delegation made up of the following: head—E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister; deputy head—V.F. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister; and delegation members—A.M. Belonogov, USSR permanent representative to the United Nations; V.K. Mikuchauskas, Lithuanian SSR foreign minister; and R.S. Ovinnikov, rector of the USSR Foreign Ministry Moscow State Institute of International Relations.

The Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers approved the Ukrainian SSR delegation made up of the following: delegation head—V.A. Kravets, the republic's foreign minister; delegation members—G.I. Udovenko, Ukrainian SSR permanent representative to the United Nations, and V.G. Batyuk, N.P. Makarevich, and V.A. Kryzhanovskiy, chiefs of Ukrainian SSR Foreign Ministry departments.

The Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers ratified a Belorussian SSR delegation made up of the following: delegation head—A.Ye. Gurinovich, the republic's foreign minister; delegation members—L.I. Maksimov, Belorussian SSR permanent representative to the United Nations; F.T. Aleynik, deputy chief of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Foreign Relations Department; A.F. Bondarev, deputy chief of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Administrative Organs Department; and A.A. Mardovich, chief of a Belorussian SSR Foreign Ministry department.

#### **'International Diary': Levin on Disarmament**

LD1409185088 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian  
1645 GMT 13 Sep 88

[From the "International Diary" program, presented by Boris Adrianov]

[Text] A UPI press agency report describes a group of leading research organizations in Western Europe. UPI introduces the compilers of the report as Sovietologists working under the aegis of the European Center of International Relations and Strategy. These Sovietologists, UPI notes, recommend that the governments of West European countries, and I quote: Take very cautious steps in the direction of any new agreements in the sphere of arms control so that the West is not left unprepared for sharp changes in the situation if the USSR resumes a more militant course.

This is what these Sovietologists recommend. How should one construe this? I will ask my colleague Viktor Levin to reply to this question.

[Levin] I will not hide the fact that my first reaction to this report when I heard it was to reject it. Why are you confusing God's gift with an omelette? [sentence as heard] The USSR's domestic policy is our business, and recommendations not to rush into arms limitation appear at the very least a justification for NATO's negative position—for to this day NATO has no clearly defined concept of arms limitation in Europe.

But that, I repeat, was my first reaction—one which I would say stems from tradition. On reflection, I considered that it would be more correct not to denigrate the Sovietologists who drafted the report but to try to analyze their position calmly. After all, abuse will not help, and opinions expressed by specialists on the USSR have a certain influence on public opinion and government circles.

Indeed, these very Sovietologists, to my mind, adhere mainly to outmoded cliches. I will add another quotation to the one my colleague read: If Europe, says the report, can constructively influence the USSR to implement changes in its social and economic policy, such as reducing secrecy within governmental organizations, broader participation in international trade, and greater respect for human rights, then after a few decades it will be possible to conceive of a USSR leadership returning to the policy of ideological and military confrontation characteristic of the cold war era. End of quotation.

We are now critically analyzing all aspects of our past activity, including foreign policy, but clearly it would be valuable if those in Western Europe did so just as deeply and fundamentally. The ideological and military confrontation characteristic of the cold war era is a product of the cold war itself and its origins lie in the policy of the West—a policy of atomic blackmail. I dwell on this question not just to remind you of the truth. Regrettably, one has to

note that the moss-encrusted mentality in the West still exists, and while I am not justifying this fact, I feel that one must not forget it, especially since such a mentality determines subsequent policy. After all, the Sovietologists' recommendations on not rushing into arms limitation today at least fit in with NATO's position.

The talks on limiting armed forces and armaments in central Europe have not moved forward for 14 years, and we have also been drawn into it. There has been no response to the Budapest appeal by the Warsaw Pact states in which it was proposed to reduce the number of Warsaw Pact and NATO forces by 100,000-150,000 over 1-2 years and by more than 1 million on both sides in the early nineties. Finally, although they say there has been progress in establishing a mandate for the talks on reducing armed forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals, there is still no mandate. But the compilers of the report propose—if we are to speak without any diplomacy—drawing things out even further. Otherwise, say they, it is impossible to guarantee that the USSR will finish its restructuring. I cannot say that external factors do not play a role in our domestic policy, but nevertheless, domestic and not foreign policy is the priority in all times and for all peoples. The former also determines our foreign policy.

In the West there are doubts that we will follow the path charted to the end. Well, doubtfulness is not a bad quality. We remember today that even Marx taught us to doubt everything. So, in my view, it is not right to be irritated by the Sovietologists' report. It is useful to think about it instead; to think and understand clearly once more that our international position as well as the reliability of our national security depend on how things go with restructuring and its actual successes.

**Adamishin Addresses Milan Forum on Human Rights**  
*PM1509131788 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian*  
*15 Sep 88 Morning Edition p 4*

[Own correspondent V. Pershin report: "Asserting Human Rights"]

[Text] Rome—Forty years ago, on 10 December 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted a historic document—the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.

The anniversary of that event, which has had an appreciable influence on the development of interstate relations and the strengthening of democratic processes in the international community and in individual countries in the period after World War II, was the theme of the international symposium "Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948-1988" held recently in Milan under the United Nations' auspices.

Taking part in its work were A.L. Adamishin, USSR deputy foreign minister; R. Schifter, U.S. assistant secretary of state for human rights; representatives of a

number of European countries' foreign policy departments and UN nongovernmental organizations and specialized agencies; and J. Martenson, UN under secretary general.

The very fact that this meeting is being held, R. Schifter noted, is evidence of major changes in the international climate and in many states' approaches to the human rights problem. Just 2-3 years ago it would have been hard to imagine the possibility of organizing an event of this kind involving representatives from East and West.

The 40-year history of the declaration has not been easy, but one of its main merits, as speakers stressed, is that the principles enshrined in it have been reflected in individual states' national constitutions and in regional human rights conventions. The main task is to create the conditions for their strict observance.

The participants in the symposium greeted with great attention the speech by A.L. Adamishin, who described the many events which are being conducted in the USSR in connection with the declaration's 40th anniversary and the improvement of Soviet society's democratic system which is being carried out in the framework of the policy of restructuring and glasnost. As the Soviet representative noted, the status of the individual in the modern world is directly dependent on the state of international relations. Therefore, the Soviet Union firmly advocates the earliest peaceful settlement of disputes and regional conflicts.

F. Mezzalama, representative of the Italian Foreign Ministry, also pointed to the close interconnection between the problem of human rights and the character of interstate relations. The facts show, he said, that detente and peace are conducive to the affirmation of human rights.

**Government Greets Foundry Workers' Congress**  
*PM1509080388 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian*  
*13 Sep 88 Second Edition p 1*

[USSR Council of Ministers greetings message: "To the Participants in the 55th International Congress of Foundry Workers"]

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers cordially greets the participants and guests of the 55th International Congress of Foundry Workers gathered for their forum for the second time in Moscow—our country's largest industrial, scientific, and cultural center.

The Soviet Union's foundry workers, who have amassed enormous scientific, technical, and production experience, are worthy partners of their foreign colleagues, and

this is considerably promoted by the economic reform taking place in our country creating favorable opportunities for the organization of joint ventures with foreign firms.

We note with satisfaction that the activity of the International Committee of Foundry Workers' Technical Associations is aimed at further galvanizing and developing international cooperation between foundry specialists in different countries, deepening exchanges of scientific and technical experience, and accelerating progress in foundry production.

The Soviet Government is confident that the 55th International Congress of Foundry Workers will make its contribution to the improvement of mutual understanding and the expansion of scientific and business contacts, and will serve to further develop mutually advantageous cooperation.

We wish the participants and guests of the international congress fruitful work and great successes.

The USSR Council of Ministers



## United States & Canada

### Contradictions Seen in U.S. Military Doctrines *LD1509171288 Moscow TASS in English 1642 GMT 15 Sep 88*

[Text] Moscow September 15 TASS—By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

It has been announced in Washington that the U.S. Air Force has decided to resume work to build a special ground-based emergency radio communications system.

The fact is seemingly insignificant by itself. One is made wary right away, however, by the system's intended purpose, which is to relay commands from the U.S. military-political leadership to strategic offensive forces in a protracted nuclear war.

And this Pentagon decision is not the only proof that the U.S. Armed Forces are being prepared for prolonged nuclear warfare.

But the Soviet and U.S. leaders declared in a joint statement in Geneva in 1985 that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought and that it is important to prevent any war, either nuclear or conventional, between the USSR and the United States.

Those conclusions have been reaffirmed at the subsequent summits in Washington and Moscow.

It would seem that all this is enough reason to believe that the U.S. military-political leadership has taken measures to revise the military doctrine and strategy.

Facts, however, testify to the contrary. THE WASHINGTON POST last April, for instance, published excerpts from a supersecret Pentagon plan setting forth practical guidelines for employing nuclear weapons.

A number of points made there are simply perplexing. These include the provisions that the U.S. nuclear potential should prevail even in a protracted nuclear conflict, that it is essential to minimize damage to the United States and its allies through active and passive means, and that even after such a conflict it is necessary to retain a sufficient amount of nuclear arms.

One is prompted to conclude that the Pentagon plan is fully in contradiction to Soviet-U.S. official documents.

It is clear also that it does not fit into the process of improvement in the Soviet-U.S. relationship.

Despite the conviction formally expressed by the U.S. President that it is impossible to win a nuclear war, the U.S. strategic forces are being geared to achieving such a victory.

This bears out that the Pentagon has not made any changes to its defense guidance documents insisting that the U.S. should be prepared to prevail in a nuclear war.

A question arises, namely: Aren't there currently two opposite, mutually excluding military doctrines in the United States—A widely publicized one meant for propaganda and a top-secret one used for practical guidance in the military buildup?

## China

### More on PRC Plans To Cut Military Spending *PM1509133588 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Sep 88 Second Edition p 5*

[TASS report: "Military Spending Cut"]

[Text] Beijing, 14 Sep—As of 1 January next year the PRC will considerably cut its spending on capital construction in the national defense sphere. This was stated here by Zhao Nangqi, senior spokesman for the People's Liberation Army [PLA]. According to him, the Army is not planning a single major new military project for 1989. Only work to complete construction of a small number of auxiliary or secondary projects, including repairs to airfield runways, will be continued. At the same time, the construction of many previously planned defense projects will be postponed or the appropriations for their creation substantially cut.

According to Zhao Yulian, the senior PLA officer responsible for military capital construction, the PLA has already cut spending on military capital construction by 44 percent—or by 2 billion yuan in monetary terms—in execution of the PRC Central Military Council's 1981 order on "subordinating" the Army to the interests of national economic development. The funds released, ranking military men here state, will be used to build barracks and improve the personnel's living conditions.

## Northeast Asia

### Soviet Official Hints at Better Ties With ROK *SK1609094388 Seoul YONHAP in English 0929 GMT 16 Sep 88*

[Text] Seoul, Sept. 16 (YONHAP)—A senior Soviet official hinted Friday that there may be improvements in the relations between South Korea and socialist countries, saying, "the international society is going toward the detente mood."

Commenting on the recent agreement between South Korea and Hungary to establish permanent missions in each other's capital, Soviet Sports Minister Marat Gramov said the relations between the East and West in international society will be improved.



"A new way of thinking is generating in the international society," said Gramov who came here leading the Soviet delegation to the 24th Seoul Olympic Games. "The international relations are being warmed up," he added.

His remarks came during a news conference at the main press center for the Seoul games.

Gramov seemed to depart from the traditional Soviet position toward the Korean peninsula when he said problems between South and North Korea should be settled by the two countries themselves.

So far, the Soviet Union has backed North Korea's demand that problems on the peninsula be settled in a meeting among three countries concerned—South Korea, North Korea and the United States.

As for what might happen if South and North Korea failed to make efforts themselves to resolve the Korean problems, the Soviet minister, also chairman of the U.S.S.R. Olympic Committee, said, "the problems on the Korean peninsula will not be settled."

Commenting on a recent report that South Korea and the Soviet Union have agreed to hold regular sports exchanges beginning next year, Gramov said, "sports exchanges between the two countries have been held since two years ago, and there will be no difficulty materializing the programs."

"Individual contacts between officials from the two countries' sports ministries and private sports personnel have been made frequently," added Gramov. "There was no official agreement (between Seoul and Moscow) to hold regular sports exchanges, however."

A Korean newspaper reported last month that South Korea's International Olympic Committee (IOC) member Kim Un-yong and a vice Soviet sports minister agreed that the two nations will hold regular sports exchanges beginning next year.

Asked if there were any problems with the IOC, Gramov, who was selected as a new IOC member during the IOC general congress held here from Sept. 13-15, said the decision-making process of the IOC is somewhat "undemocratic."

"I can't understand the basis on which the IOC general congress here selected Norway's Lillehammer as the venue of the 1994 Winter Olympic Games," Gramov said.

**Soviet Olympic Stamp Fails To Mention Seoul**  
*SK1509011588 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English*  
15 Sep 88 p 7

[Text] Moscow (AFP)—The Soviet Union's decision to print commemorative stamps for the Olympic Games without mentioning the host city, Seoul, drew criticism Tuesday in the government newspaper IZVESTIYA.

A letter from a reader in the western city of Kursk asked: "Is it a mistake or a desire to show our attitude to South Korea?" Moscow does not have diplomatic relations with Seoul.

"Whatever our attitude to the South Korean Government's policies, it is not right to be silent on the name of the city welcoming the sportsmen of many countries," the letter's author, G. Kriyuchkov, said.

### Near East & South Asia

**Shevardnadze Receives Pakistani Envoy**  
*LD1509162288 Moscow TASS in English 1608 GMT*  
15 Sep 88

[Text] Moscow September 15 TASS—Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and foreign minister of the USSR, today received the Pakistani ambassador to the Soviet Union, Abdul Sattar, at his request.

The sides discussed issues related to Pakistan's compliance with the Geneva agreements on the Afghan settlement and the present state of Soviet-Pakistani relations.

**PRAVDA on Ziaul Haq's Afghan Policies**  
*PM1509145588 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian*  
15 Sep 88 Second Edition p 4

[V. Shurygin article: "The President's Legacy and the 'Afghan Card.' Islamabad's Policy Is Retarding a Settlement in Afghanistan"]

[Text] The death of Pakistan's former president in an air crash remains a mystery. The causes are becoming clear. The symptoms of the present crisis in Pakistan that took shape as a result of the late president's actions are much clearer and are being discussed very loudly. The Afghan factor is one element. Ziaul Haq allowed Pakistan to be embroiled in very great foreign policy speculation and turned his country into a bridgehead for the undeclared war against Afghanistan unleashed by the forces of imperialism and international reaction.

The gamble the West took on Pakistan is no secret. It was dictated by definite conditions. The fall of the shah's regime in Iran determined the choice by Washington and its NATO allies of Pakistan as the instrument of their policy in southern Asia. But what guided Ziaul Haq to trade national interests? The facts indicate that he was guided solely by a desire to maintain intact and preserve his own dictatorship. U.S. multibillion-dollar military and economic aid, support, and patronage did the trick. It helped the regime to overcome numerous political crises brought about by the virtually incessant mass antigovernment demonstrations throughout the entire 11 years of the president's tenure of office.

Ziaul Haq marked his arrival in leadership by the arrest and then execution of his predecessor Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The shadow of that leader, who was particularly popular in Sind Province, dogged the Pakistani ruler all these years. One of the largest opposition parties—the Pakistan People's Party—is headed by Benazir Bhutto, daughter of the former prime minister.

Pakistanis were virtually deprived of their democratic freedoms and any manifestation of discontent was cruelly suppressed. The head of the regime took 8 years to make up his mind to hold parliamentary elections (he promised to do so 3 months after the coup). They were held only at the beginning of 1985, when martial law was in force, all political activity was banned, and the main opposition leaders were behind bars. Of course, a parliament elected in this way was subservient to the president. Nevertheless, his "love of democracy" proved short-lived. On 29 May this year Ziaul Haq, as the Pakistani press said, carried out a "constitutional coup"—he dismissed the government headed by Mohammad Khan Junejo and dissolved the parliament and the local legislative organs.

It was stated that the government and the parliament were incapable of effectively carrying out the program of "Islamization" given them and of ensuring legality and order in the country. It seems, however, that this was how Ziaul Haq tried to remove obstacles that arose in the way of the military elite continuing unchecked dominance over the country's political and economic life. The point is that the parliament and the government—although they were set up at the will of the dictatorial regime itself—began to increasingly exceed the limits of their prescribed role of democratic camouflage for the military's might. Thus, the government proclaimed that one of its main tasks was to combat corruption in the supreme echelons of power, which threatened unpleasant consequences for many high-ranking military men. It was announced that there were plans to cut defense expenditures by 2.5 percent in the budget for the upcoming fiscal year. This aroused indignation in army circles, which demanded the prime minister's resignation.

Junejo's personal popularity had grown considerably in recent years; he displayed great activeness on questions of implementing domestic and foreign policy and often expressed opinions at odds with the president's viewpoint. It was to a considerable extent owing to the efforts of the former prime minister and then Foreign Minister Nurani that Pakistan agreed to sign the Geneva agreements. By removing these men from their posts, Ziaul Haq, as it were, freed his hands to violate the Geneva accords. The political ballyhoo around these changes and the flouting of international pledges should—by all indications—have helped turn the screws within the country.

Thus, whereas on the one hand involvement in anti-Afghan intrigues held up democratic processes in Pakistan for a long time, on the other the Afghan conflict became a kind of means of survival for the Pakistani

ruling elite. Large amounts of Western military and humanitarian aid to the Afghan rebels and refugees settled in the pockets of the Pakistani military bureaucracy, which engaged in distributing it. It did not want to lose such a source of riches. Hence the desire to prolong the military confrontation in Afghanistan by every possible means.

Western military-economic aid direct to Pakistan—"payment for services rendered" so to speak—is also closely linked with the continuation of subversive actions against Kabul. Obviously, in return for this aid Ziaul Haq was ready to continue to use the country's territory as a bridgehead for aggression against Afghanistan in violation of the Afghan accords.

Right after these agreements came into force, it became clear that Ziaul Haq, the Western press wrote, had no intention of fulfilling his pledges, ceasing interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs, or ensuring Afghan refugees' voluntary and unimpeded return home. Pakistani territory, as before, continued to be used to train armed Afghan opposition bandit units; a stream of weapons convoys crossed the Pakistani-Afghan border, and Pakistani regular troops were even noted infiltrating Afghan border regions to offer aid to the rebels. The creation in Peshawar of the so-called transitional government headed by Ahmad Shah, in which the "intransigent" Afghan opposition leaders have predominant influence, was also a gross violation of the Geneva accords on the part of Pakistan.

Pakistan's former president, the Western press wrote, set himself the task of bringing to power in Kabul "his people" from the extremist wing of the "Peshawar Seven," like G. Hekmatiyar, Y. Khalis, B. Rabbani, and others—the group of Muslim fanatics advocating the establishment in Afghanistan of a state based on the principles of Islamic fundamentalism. This grouping is close in spirit to Ziaul Haq, who considered one of his main tasks to be the "Islamization" of society. Through it he wanted to exercise control over Afghan policy, have his own satellite in the region, and thus strengthen his own positions, especially in connection with the tension in Pakistani-Indian relations.

As is well known, Islamabad and Delhi have a diametrically opposed approach to the Afghan problem. The Indian Government wholly and completely supports the Geneva agreements and advocates their undeviating implementation by all participants, and it views the policy of national reconciliation as a means of stopping the bloodshed and restoring peace on Afghan soil. In one of his speeches Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi expressed concern in connection with Pakistan's desire to undermine the fulfillment of the Geneva agreements. "The Afghan people's right to determine for themselves their fate without any foreign interference must be guaranteed," he said. "Attempts with outside help to

bring a fundamentalist regime to power in Afghanistan will damage the prospects of restoring peace in this country and will create tension in the region."

The cost of this most dangerous game around Afghanistan in which the late Pakistani president was an active participant will obviously be felt for a long time. There is no peace in the region, Pakistan's relations with its neighbors have been upset, and democratic freedoms in the country are stifled.

People in Washington and other NATO capitals are today clearly alarmed about the path that Pakistan's development will take in the coming period. All levers for pressure have been brought to bear on the new Pakistani leadership and in particular on the military to ensure that they continue Ziaul Haq's course of interfering in internal Afghan affairs. "Will Pakistan be able to continue to support the Afghan mujahidin so resolutely?" Jeane Kirkpatrick, former U.S. representative to the United Nations, has asked.

Unfortunately, even today one must note that despite assurances from Pakistan's politicians about their desire to observe the spirit and the letter of the Geneva agreements, that country's territory continues to remain a springboard for interference in Afghan internal affairs. The machine of aggression against the country is still moving along the well-worn rut. Will the new Islamabad leadership have the determination and the will to stop it? Both the future of Pakistan itself and the cause of peace throughout the region depend on the answer to this question.

**Afghan Spokesman Denies Bombing Pakistan**  
LD1509223188 Moscow TASS in English 1049 GMT  
15 Sep 88

[Text] Kabul September 15 TASS—A spokesman for the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs has refuted accusations that Afghan planes bombed populated areas on Pakistani territory. In his statement he described as false the assertions by Pakistani authorities about an alleged Afghan air raid on Nawaki area on September 12, during which two planes were ostensibly shot down.

Islamabad's assertions, the spokesman stated, are designed to deceive the world public. It is not fortuitous that these are timed for the recently concluded non-aligned foreign ministers' conference in Nicosia and the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly. By accusing Afghanistan the Pakistani authorities seek to divert the attention of both the international community and the people of their own country from Pakistani violations of the Geneva accords.

Meanwhile the Afghan Government has handed over to the U.N. observer mission in Kabul already the 81st note with proofs of 468 specific instances of violation by Pakistan of the accords signed in Geneva.

The spokesman for the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs drew the attention to a report in the Pakistani newspaper MUSLIM which said that the inhabitants of the villages which had been allegedly bombed did not confirm the falling of two planes. Indirectly, the falsity of Islamabad's assertions also manifests itself in Pakistan's refusal to agree to the setting up of a special commission consisting of representatives of the four countries that signed the Geneva accords, the commission which could objectively evaluate the rumours being played up by the Pakistani side about air raids. The statement emphasises that the slanderous campaign should be discontinued because it makes for the maintenance of tension in the region.

Islamabad's assertions about violations of Pakistan's air space by Afghan planes are a sheer invention. Major-General Amir Hamza, chief of staff of the Afghan Air Force, said in an interview with a TASS correspondent. Recently Pakistani authorities moved on to the tactic of groundlessly accusing Afghanistan of "interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan". However, the accusations are not confirmed by facts.

The general refuted the rumours which are being intensively spread by Western mass media about an alleged bombing of the city of Spin Buldak in Qandahar Province by Afghan aircraft and as a result of which more than 500 people were ostensibly killed.

We never deliver bombing strikes at those places where civilian population live, Amir Hamza said. Our targets are areas of concentration of intransigent opposition groups, and their bases with weapons by means of which the extremists are busy undermining the peaceful life of Afghan people.

**'Fabrications' on Afghan Bombings Rebutted**  
PM1509093988 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
14 Sep 88 Second Edition p 5

[Vadim Okulov "Viewpoint": "Words and Facts"]

[Text] Kabul—The implementation of the accords on the political settlement around Afghanistan started 4 months ago. How are they being fulfilled? The answer is quite clear. The USSR and Afghanistan are following the agreement to the letter and leave no doubt that they will continue to do so. Half of the Soviet troops have already left Afghanistan, as laid down in Geneva.

Pakistan is approaching the fulfillment of the accords in a different way. Its desire, despite the letter and spirit of the Geneva agreement, to continue to interfere in Afghanistan's internal affairs—to the point of foisting a regime on the neighboring country which suits Islamabad—is becoming increasingly obvious to world public opinion. Its unlawful claims are backed by equally unlawful deeds.

Afghan antigovernment groupings continue to maintain their headquarters, training centers, and bases on Pakistani territory. A kind of "transitional government" has also been formed there. The flow of weapons and combat ammunition sent from Pakistani depots to Afghan opposition units operating on Afghan territory has sharply increased. In particular, these units obtain Stinger anti-aircraft missiles from Pakistan, and also long-range rockets with which they shell Kabul and other Afghan cities. There is increased involvement in combat operations on the rebel side by officers and men of the Pakistani armed forces.

In recent months Pakistan has breached the Geneva accords more than 430 times. The Afghan side has already sent about 80 complaints to the UN Mission of Good Offices setting out instances in which the Pakistani authorities have blatantly ignored pledges made by them. It is impossible to conceal them. For this reason Islamabad and Washington have deemed it necessary to set up a propaganda smokescreen: In contempt of the Geneva accords they are trying to accuse...the Soviet Union and Afghanistan!

Fabrications have been published that Afghan military aircraft have allegedly bombed Pakistani villages. Confusing the invented "details," representatives of the Pakistani leadership are trying to convince the world community of the "authenticity" of the obvious lie. Yakub Khan, leader of Pakistan's foreign policy department, regaled the Nicosia conference of nonaligned countries' foreign ministers with blatant attacks on Afghanistan. Nor has the absence of proof of the accusations leveled at Afghanistan been any obstacle to U.S. State Department representatives' taking the initiative in creating an anti-Afghan commotion.

Meanwhile, the situation on the Afghan-Pakistani border is the opposite of what Pakistan is trying to depict. It is precisely Pakistani Air Force aircraft that have long been in the habit of violating Afghan airspace. On 30 March 1987 this ended in tragedy. Two Pakistani fighters shot down an AN-26 Afghan passenger airliner over the Tsamkani area in Khowst District. Forty passengers and crew members died.

And here are facts from the recent past: On 31 August an Afghan Air Force trainer, which had been flying near the border, was shot down by a Pakistani "air-to-air" missile and fell in Afghan territory in the Asmar region. On 6 September a Pakistani Air Force reconnaissance aircraft violated Afghan airspace in the same area. On 7 September two Pakistani F-16's invaded the Afghan skies in Konarha Province.

In 1987 there were 38 such violations of Afghan airspace by the Pakistanis, Lieutenant General Abdul Qader, commander in chief of the Afghan Air Defense Forces, told me. This year 12 such incidents were recorded. As regards the fabrications about bombings by our aircraft,

the general noted, they are completely false. Not a single Afghan Air Force aircraft has even been given the task of bombing Pakistani territory.

The Pakistani authorities' aims are clear: to distract world public opinion from their continuing attempts to undermine the Geneva agreements, agreements which they continue to assert they are observing. A few days ago the acting Pakistani President Ghulam Ishaq Khan said, in particular, that Pakistan "sincerely put its signature to the Geneva accords and is fulfilling them just as sincerely." But these facts create doubts about the sincerity of the Pakistani leader's words.

#### **Committee Formed for Release of POW's**

*LD1509222488 Moscow World Service in English  
2050 GMT 15 Sep 88*

[Excerpts] The Soviet public lately founded a coordination committee for the release of the Soviet soldiers taken prisoner in Afghanistan. [passage omitted] We now bring you the gist of an appeal issued by the committee. [passage omitted]

The coordination committee is ready to contact those organizations that have Soviet soldiers in their custody. All those who want to take part in achieving this humane goal are invited to write to: Lenin Avenue 42, Moscow 117119, the USSR. [passage omitted]

The committee asks everybody who is listening to this program, if you have any opportunity to render assistance to Soviet prisoners of war, don't miss the chance to display humanism and clemency. Despite all the differences in citizenship, outlook, and faith, each individual is entitled to humane treatment no matter in what situation he or she is now. Besides, the committee asks all of Radio Moscow listeners if they ever have a chance to tell Soviet prisoners of war that in keeping with a statement by the USSR prosecutor general, none of them will be persecuted in any way after return home. Even those who have committed grave crimes against their country will be pardoned for the paramount reasons of socialist humanism.

We remind all those who want and can help us that the address to write to is: the Coordination Committee for the Release of Soviet Soldiers Taken Prisoner in Afghanistan, Lenin Avenue 42, Moscow 117119, USSR—or to Radio Moscow, Moscow, the USSR.

#### **Afghanistan's Wakil Assesses Nonaligned Meeting**

*LD1509201588 Moscow TASS in English 1956 GMT  
15 Sep 88*

[Text] Kabul September 15 TASS—Foreign Minister of the Republic of Afghanistan 'Abdul Wakil has highly assessed the results of the recent Nicosia conference of foreign ministers of non-aligned countries.



Upon his arrival in Kabul he underlined in a BAKHTAR interview that the participants in the Nicosia meeting had unanimously supported the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan.

The foreign ministers of the non-aligned countries recognized the agreements reached in Geneva as the evidence of efficiency of the U.N. activities in maintaining peace and consolidating international security, 'Abdul Wakil said. Meanwhile, said the Afghan foreign minister, Pakistan tried to darken the atmosphere of the conference with slanderous accusations against the Republic of Afghanistan. But the speech made by the Pakistani representative, did not attract the attention of the participants.

'Abdul Wakil said that in Nicosia he had a talk with Diego Cordovez, who participated in the conference as the foreign minister of Ecuador. At the meeting 'Abdul Wakil drew Diego Cordovez's attention to facts of Pakistan's continuing interference in Afghanistan's affairs and the Pakistani side's gross violation of the Geneva agreements.

The ministers of the two countries also discussed some questions pertaining to the need for an early attainment of peace in Afghanistan.

**Cordovez Holds News Conference on Afghanistan**  
*LD1509205188 Moscow TASS in English 1943 GMT*  
15 Sep 88

[Text] New York September 15 TASS—The Geneva agreements on political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan have given rise to hopes for peace in that region. This was stated at a press conference here today by Diego Cordovez, a special representative of the U.N. secretary general on situation relating to Afghanistan.

He specially noted the Soviet Union's and Afghanistan's honest and scrupulous compliance with the letter and the spirit of the Geneva agreements. The withdrawal of Soviet troops, he said, is going on, as has been stipulated by the Geneva agreements, "and even faster". He said he received assurances from the Soviet side that the troop withdrawal would continue strictly according to schedule. According to Diego Cordovez, this provides evidence that the Geneva agreements are being put into life "in the spirit of confidence, goodwill and in the most serious way."

The Afghans are tired of war, he said, and the armed confrontation will take place until an internal settlement is reached in the Republic of Afghanistan. This cannot but be the cause of profound regret. "Therefore the Afghan question should be resolved exclusively through peace means," said the special representative of the U.N. secretary general.

Meanwhile Diego Cordovez admitted that the situation in the Afghan-Pakistani frontier remained disquiet.

**Vorontsov Receives Iraqi Ambassador 12 Sep**  
*LD1209232988 Moscow TASS in English 1641 GMT*  
12 Sep 88

[Text] Moscow September 12 TASS—Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov today received Sa'd 'Abd al-Majid al-Faysal, Iraqi ambassador to the USSR, at the latter's request.

During their friendly conversation they thoroughly examined the situation at Iran-Iran talks in Geneva.

They discussed also other issues of mutual interest.

**Vorontsov Meets With Visiting Syrian Official**  
*LD1509200688 Moscow TASS in English 1725 GMT*  
15 Sep 88

[Text] Moscow September 15 TASS—Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov and Syrian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Nasir Qaddur today thoroughly discussed issues of the Middle East situation.

They expressed the view that the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict was ever more contradicting positive changes taking place in the world's political atmosphere.

The sides backed more vigorous efforts in favour of starting practical preparations for and convocation of an international conference on the Middle East.

They discussed ways of attaining as soon as possible a political settlement in Afghanistan on the basis of the strict observance by all sides—not only Afghanistan and the Soviet Union—of the corresponding Geneva agreements.

The diplomats expressed satisfaction with the advancement of Soviet-Syrian relations.

**Further on Dobrynin Talk With Ba'th Official**  
*PM1509105988 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian*  
15 Sep 88 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "In a Friendly Atmosphere"]

[Text] On 14 September A.F. Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, had a meeting with 'Abdallah al-Ahmar, deputy general secretary of Syria's Ba'th Party, who is passing through Moscow on his way home.

During the talks, which were held in a warm and friendly atmosphere, there was an exchange of information on the activities of the CPSU and the Ba'th Party, and questions of Soviet-Syrian relations and some problems of the contemporary international situation were discussed.



'Abdallah al-Ahmar pointed out that people in Syria are following with great interest and attention the restructuring processes in the USSR, which are also having a great positive influence on international life, and rate highly the CPSU's dynamic foreign policy and the Soviet peace initiatives.

It was pointed out during a discussion of the situation in the Near East that the persistence of the conflict there is becoming increasingly intolerable day by day. This is convincingly borne out by the Palestinians' numerous courageous actions against the Israeli occupation. The positive trends in the world, which are gathering momentum, are conducive to the search for a just Near East settlement. The representatives of the CPSU and the Ba'th Party advocated increasing the international community's collective efforts to establish lasting peace in that region on the basis of a balance of all the sides' interests. The path to such a peace could be opened up by an international conference with full powers, and the task of convening it is becoming increasingly urgent.

The participants in the talks voiced satisfaction with the high level of Soviet-Syrian relations in various spheres and of the friendly ties between the CPSU and the Ba'th Party and confirmed their parties' desire to further develop them.

Present at the talks were R. Akhtarini, member of the Ba'th Party Regional Command; N. Qaddur, Syrian minister of state for foreign affairs; and, 'I. al-Na'ib, Syrian ambassador to the USSR.

**Paper Denies New Soviet Base at Tartus**  
*PM1609084988 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 15 Sep 88 First Edition p 3*

[Article by Colonel Yu. Soldatenko under the rubric "International Notes": "They Have Become Entangled in Their Lies..."]

[Text] The history of American journalism contains a description of a very notable incident. At a Pentagon press conference, a meticulous correspondent so deluged a U.S. assistant secretary of defense, A. Sylvester, with "awkward" questions that the military department spokesman, losing all restraint, barked: "If you think any official in the United States has any intention of telling you the truth, you're simply a fool."

To all appearances some people have not in fact benefited from the lesson described above. How else to assess the following assertion, which appeared in THE NEW YORK TIMES recently: "Administration officials have announced that the Soviet Union is constructing a new base for its warships in the Mediterranean by expanding the military installations it uses on the Syrian seaboard. Officials in the White House, the State Department, and the Defense Department have expressed concern at the

construction being carried out in the region of Tartus, stating that it coincides with the activation of Russian naval operations in the region."

Need it be particularly stressed that this is just the latest slanderous fabrication against the USSR. Nonetheless, THE NEW YORK TIMES stories were immediately the focus of a flurry of propaganda in the United States. It is above all conservative circles which are exploiting them mercilessly. However, in stating their "concern" over the Soviet leadership's alleged plans to step up its military presence in the Mediterranean region, official White House spokesmen like M. Fitzwater are at the same time disowning authorship of these "facts." They say they do not have detailed information about the purpose of the establishments which are being installed at the port of Tartus.

So who is deceiving whom in the United States? Are officials deceiving the press or is the press deceiving the officials?

Let us be frank, by embarking on an anti-Soviet path both have put themselves in an unenviable position. Judge for yourselves.

First, there can be no talk of any Soviet naval base, still less of its construction. Since May 1988 a material and technical supply point for Soviet warships and auxiliary vessels has been functioning in the region of the Syrian port of Tartus. The material and technical supply point includes two tenders and two storehouses on dry land with the materials necessary for the preventive repair of ships.

Second, the farfetched nature of claims that there is "an activation of Russian naval operations in the region" is borne out more than eloquently by comparing the USSR and U.S. naval forces now in the Mediterranean.

Here is their correlation as of 15 September 1988:

|                   | USSR | United States                                               |
|-------------------|------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
| Warships          | 5    | 17<br>(including the aircraft carrier<br>"John F. Kennedy") |
| Auxiliary vessels | 6    | 17                                                          |

Third, the Soviet material and technical supply point in the region of the Syrian port of Tartus is the only one in the Mediterranean where Soviet warships can go for preventive maintenance and for the crews to rest. USSR Navy ships make business visits to the Syrian port on the same basis as they do to ports in a number of other Mediterranean states.

About 40 different naval bases and naval basing points, airfields, control, communications, and rear services establishments, and so forth over which the United

States has full control are put into operation in the interests of the U.S. naval forces in this region. Thus for instance the Rota naval base on Spain's Atlantic coast in the immediate vicinity of the Strait of Gibraltar supplies a base for ships of all classes. Its equipped dock frontage is 2.2 km long. And the La Maddalena base point on the Italian island of Santo Stefano (at the northern extreme of Sardinia) provides basing for a tender and multipurpose submarines.

In addition to their own bases, the ships of the U.S. 6th Fleet may use under contract the installations of national naval bases and naval base points in Italy (Naples, Gaeta, and Catania), Greece (Soudha), and Spain (Cartagena). At these bases U.S. seamen have their own stores of material and technical supplies, ammunition, and fuel and lubricants. An agreement on "strategic cooperation" with Israel has given U.S. ships the right to use Israel's naval bases (Haifa and Elat) while an agreement with Morocco (1982) has given them the right to use the port of Tangier. Recently U.S. Navy ships from groups in the Mediterranean have begun to make regular use of Turkish naval bases and ports in Istanbul, Izmir, Iskenderun, and Adana, the Egyptian naval base at Alexandria, the Italian port of Cagliari, and the French port of Villefranche.

Those are the facts. They attest more than eloquently to the activation of naval forces in the Mediterranean. But not by the Soviet Union—only the United States. Truly, they see the mote in someone else's eye but do not notice the beam in their own!

As for the Soviet Union, it steers an unvarying course toward the normalization of the situation in the Mediterranean and its transformation into a zone of stable peace, good-neighborliness, and cooperation. On the basis of the previously accumulated potential of peace proposals, the USSR has already put forward a number of initiatives aimed at reducing the level of military confrontation in the region. It has suggested extending the coordinated confidence-building measures to the Mediterranean and reducing the armed forces there, withdrawing ships carrying nuclear weapons, and renouncing the siting of these weapons on the territories of Mediterranean countries. The Soviet Union is prepared to go even further: to withdraw its Navy from the Mediterranean if, of course, the United States does the same thing.

However, as is well known, every time certain circles in the United States have hastened not only to decline the Soviet proposals on the Mediterranean but at the same time to distort their essence. This time, too, after THE NEW YORK TIMES publication, the lies about "the Soviet naval base under construction in Syria" have been zealously raised onto the propaganda shield by the leaders of the Republican candidate's election campaign. In the estimation of U.S. political specialists, this is the falsehood conservative circles are trying to use to back up their demand for the "resurrection" of the U.S.

Armed Forces' combat might and on its basis to launch an active campaign about the allegedly not declining but constantly increasing "Soviet military threat" and to use this sensational "argument" in the election polemic with the Democrats on U.S. national security issues.

Here, to all appearances, no one is interested in the degree of truth of the "facts" cited.

**Israeli Communist Party Group Visits 6-15 Sep**  
*LD1609090688 Moscow TASS in English 1423 GMT*  
*15 Sep 88*

[Text] Moscow September 15 TASS—A delegation of the Israeli Communist Party activists stayed in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee between September 6 and 15. It had talks at the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party and the Leninigrad regional committee of the CPSU and meetings with work collectives, during which delegation members familiarized themselves with implementation of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and of the 19th all-union party conference.

Israeli Communists displayed great interest in the process of revolutionary restructuring in all spheres of Soviet society, which is in progress under the leadership of the CPSU, and pointed to its importance to the cause of peace, national and social liberation of nations.

**Supreme Soviet Appoints New Ambassador to India**  
*LD0909204688 Moscow TASS in English 1453 GMT*  
*9 Sep 88*

[Text] Moscow September 9 TASS—The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet has appointed Viktor Isakov the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the USSR to the Republic of India.

Viktor Isakov was born in 1932. He is candidate of science (history). Upon graduating from the Moscow State Institute for International Relations in 1956, he has been working in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1963-1967 he was the third secretary, second secretary at the Embassy of the USSR to the United States, in 1967-1971—second secretary, first secretary, and counsellor of the Department for the USA of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1971-1977—counsellor at the Embassy of the USSR to the USA, in 1977-1983—head of a sector, and deputy head of the Department of the USA for the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1983-1986 minister-counsellor at the Embassy of the USSR to the USA, and from 1986-1988—the ambassador of the USSR to Brazil.

The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet relieved Vasilii Rykov of the duties of the ambassador of the USSR to the Republic of India owing to his retirement on pension.

## East Europe

### Further Reportage on Zaykov Visit to Bulgaria

#### Visits Computer Plant

LD1509164488 Moscow Television Service in Russian  
1700 GMT 14 Sep 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Lev Nikolayevich Zaykov's working visit to the People's Republic of Bulgaria is continuing. Our correspondent D. Golovanov reports:

A significant step forward has been taken in recent years in Bulgaria's electronics sector, in scientists' designs, and in the output of industrial production in this sphere, which determines scientific and technical progress, not only within the framework of the socialist community, but on the world market as well. Today, Lev Nikolayevich Zaykov spent several hours in the central institute for computer equipment and technology and at the combine producing this equipment. A new supercomputer, capable of performing 1,000 million operations per second, is being developed in the institute jointly with Soviet scientists and specialists. Fulfillment of the comprehensive program of scientific and technical cooperation among the CEMA countries in this sphere is acquiring a genuinely international character. For example, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union are participating in the development of a supercomputer.

Cooperation between the capital cities of the two fraternal countries, Moscow and Sofia, is being filled with new content. Today, Lev Nikolayevich Zaykov and Ivan Panev, first secretary of the Sofia BCP City Committee signed an agreement which consolidates and develops concrete matters connected with cooperation between city, rayon, and obshchina party organizations, councils, and labor collectives.

Lev Nikolayevich Zaykov today also acquainted himself with the activity of a Soviet-Bulgarian scientific and production association for producing vegetables in hot-houses. The center of this association is the town of Pazardzhik, situated just over 100 kilometers from Sofia. The first produce—tomatoes, fresh cucumbers, and red peppers—will soon be picked. They will be dispatched to our country in the winter.

#### PRAVDA Reviews Visit

PM1509150588 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
15 Sep 88 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Strengthening Friendship. L.N. Zaykov's Stay in Bulgaria"]

[Text] Sofia, 14 Sep—The working visit to Bulgaria by L.N. Zaykov, member of the Politburo, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and first secretary of Moscow CPSU Gorkom, is continuing.

The main event today was the signing of an agreement to further develop cooperation between Moscow and Sofia party, soviet, trade union, and youth organizations and labor collectives, and also a plan for cooperation between the capitals' party organizations for 1988-1989. These documents reflect the desire of the CPSU and the BCP and the two capitals' party committees to persistently seek out and implement new forms for efficient interaction in all spheres of life during society's revolutionary restructuring.

The agreement aims to assist in every way possible the mutual study and utilization of progressive experience, uniting efforts to resolve the most important tasks of the two capitals' socioeconomic development.

The businesslike, specific character of cooperation is determined by the fact that the document foresees not only close interaction between party, soviet, and economic organs at the rayon-municipality level, but also between related enterprises, regardless of their territorial affiliation. L.N. Zaykov and I. Panev, first secretary of the Sofia BCP City Committee, signed the agreement.

G. Filipov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the BCP Central Committee, and V.V. Sharapov, Soviet ambassador to Bulgaria, attended the ceremony.

The CPSU Central Committee secretary visited the Central Institute of Computer Equipment and Technology—the leading organization for research and development in the "Information and Communications Systems" economic association. Ts. Tsonev, general director, and I. Tenev, chairman of the "Elektronika" association, talked about the tasks being resolved by the collective, which in 2 decades has progressed from creating the simplest electronic calculators to developing and producing high-performance fourth-generation computers.

The Soviet guest asked about the advantages of the team organization of scientific labor, the new economic mechanism, the scale of the institute's cooperation with its Soviet partners, and its participation in the fraternal countries' joint work to develop electronics and information technology. It was stressed that strengthening interaction in this sphere is one of the important levers in raising the national economy's efficiency. Attention was drawn to the necessity of stepping up joint work to develop microelectronics.

L.N. Zaykov acquainted himself with models of new equipment. Conversations in shops with workers, engineers, and production leaders touched on an entire range of questions connected with further developing both countries' interaction in the most important area of scientific and technical progress. Particular attention was given to specific measures to overcome everything hampering the partnership's further development.

A dinner was given on behalf of Sofia BCP City Committee.

On the same day L.N. Zaykov went to Plovdiv. Flowers were laid here at the "Alesha" monument and the monument to the heroes of the national liberation movement and the antifascist struggle who died for their country's freedom and happiness.

#### Interview With BCP Paper

AU1509101188 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO  
in Bulgarian 14 Sep 88 p 6

[Interview with Lev Zaykov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and first secretary of the CPSU Moscow Gorkom, by Antoniya Mechkova and Petur Punchev, RABOTNICHESKO DELO correspondents, in Sofia on 13 September: "Our Present Efforts Aim At Tomorrow's Successes"]

[Text] [Question] Lev Nikolayevich, this is now the second day we have been accompanying you wherever you go, and we still have not found time for an interview. You yourself said that "we are constantly pressed for time." Why is this? Is the organization bad or is there too much work?

[Zaykov] I can answer your question in the following manner: The tasks posed by restructuring encompass all areas, including the party and state leadership. When I was preparing for my visit to Bulgaria I expected that there would be many issues to discuss. However, now I understand that there are more than I had expected. The time we have is too short for coping with all the issues that are emerging and awaiting a solution. Therefore, we are constantly pressed for time on this visit to Bulgaria. It is not the organization—it is very good and earns only gratitude toward the hosts.

[Question] Evidently you are not visiting Bulgaria for the first time....

[Zaykov] Unfortunately—for the first time.

[Question] What are your impressions of the people you have met so far?

[Zaykov] While this is my first visit to Bulgaria, it is not the first time that I have met Bulgarians. I have known many of your party and state leaders for a long time. We have worked together for many years. My meetings with the citizens of Sofia during the last 2 days—at the Sofia BCP City Committee, the party committee in Serdika District, the Vulcho Ivanov plant, and the Central Department Store—were interesting and left me with a positive impression.

[Question] Your visit is still just beginning. You are still to travel throughout the country. Nevertheless, does the answer to the question of where the successes of cooperation between our capital cities end, and where what we have still not succeeded in achieving begins, become clearer with every passing day?

[Zaykov] It is characteristic and pleasing that our cooperation is changing quickly in a positive direction. When restructuring began we had only the basic outlines of development. Today, however, we can see that the way they are being implemented in life is identical. I shall repeat, we are happy with this fact.

I am saying this in a general manner. If I were to be more specific I would say that within the framework of the socialist community we are also striving toward such mutual understanding and identity of methods of management as could enrich our relations, not only in the political but also in the economic area. When I say "an identical system of management," I do not mean "unification" [unifikatsiya]. On the contrary: We think that our goal is clear; however, the roads to this goal must be selected by each country, according to local conditions and historical traditions.

You are asking me what we have not succeeded in achieving yet? Do the existing eight joint Bulgarian-Soviet enterprises represent the limit of our possibilities? Does their work correspond to the requirements of the time? The answer is, no, despite the fact that this is undoubtedly a promising form of cooperation. Direct relations are another weak area. We must seek mutually beneficial contacts and deliveries more frequently, and utilize the existing possibilities. Since we cannot produce everything, we must carefully divide the work....

[Question] But such a division and specialization used to exist until now within the CEMA framework....

[Zaykov] Yes, this is so. Many correct decisions have been adopted in the past. However, they have been badly implemented. This is where I see one of the main tasks of restructuring—we must not only adopt good decisions; the main thing is that our deeds coincide with our words.

[Question] Where is one to look for this guarantee of this unity of word and deed?

[Zaykov] In incorporating all people in implementing the changes. Restructuring is not only the cause of the higher party and state leadership. It is a universal cause. Therefore, whenever we give rights to the collectives we in fact expect greater responsibility from them. If the collective is responsible it means that each of its members is responsible. This is the guarantee—the personal interest and responsibility and their coincidence with the interests of society.

[Question] Lev Nikolayevich, two last questions, linked by the fact that they both refer to the future.... The first: What do you expect from this visit to Bulgaria and how will it contribute to expanding cooperation between Moscow and Sofia? The second: How do you see the Soviet capital at the beginning of the 21st century?



[Zaykov] Difficult questions.... First, we are working out very specific measures, which are reflected in the agreement which we will sign tomorrow (editorial note—today). Their goal is to significantly improve relations between collectives, brigades, and working people from Moscow and Sofia. In other words, we are going back to what I have already said: The simple man must be attracted to the planning and implementing of important deeds. The agreement will provide for this. One of its main goals is to affect people at every level: labor collectives, and party, Komsomol, and public organizations. Your second question requires a detailed answer, however, I shall try to answer it briefly. If you are trying to imagine something you must have a specific approach to its implementation. The general plan on developing Moscow and the Moscow region until the year 2010 represents our approach. The "Progress '95" program is the basis of this plan. One of its multiple goals is to fully solve the housing problem and sharply improve supply—in short, to improve the standard of living. Furthermore, Moscow will greet the new century with a renovated city center. Moscow at the beginning of the 21st century is in the center of our care, problems, and plans. I am sure that we shall manage, because all citizens of Moscow will be incorporated in the implementation of this enterprise.

[Question] Thank you, Lev Nikolayevich, for your kindness in answering our questions.

**Poland's Urban: U.S. 'Pressure' Ineffective**  
PM1509142188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
15 Sep 88 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Preventing Interference"]

[Text] Warsaw, 14 Sep—At a press conference held here J. Urban, Polish Government press spokesman, stated that the government side is prepared for "roundtable" talks with representatives of the broadest public circles, including those holding different views. The inviolability of the socialist nature of Poland's development is the limit of compromise for the authorities. Realism, restraint, respect for law and order, and trust in partners are the conditions for the success of the "roundtable." However, meetings between a number of informal groups were held in Gdansk 10-11 September and resolutions were adopted which, in particular, contain the demand to immediately legalize the banned trade union "Solidarity."

J. Urban expressed the hope that extremists would not manage to hamper the "roundtable" talks.

The Polish Government press spokesman dwelt on a report broadcast by the BBC and a number of news agencies. According to a statement by J. Onyszkiewicz, a former "Solidarity" figure, President Reagan had promised at a meeting with him that the United States would continue to pressure the Polish Government in order to persuade it to establish "genuine dialogue" with society's representatives.

We do not know, the Polish Government press spokesman noted, whether Onyszkiewicz made the statement on his own or whether he was authorized by the U.S. President to publicize the fact that U.S. policy with regard to Poland had veered toward pressure—that is, interference in Poland's internal affairs. The fact is that Onyszkiewicz's statement has not been refuted by U.S. spokesmen. No pressure on Poland has been or will be effective. We are awaiting explanations from the U.S. authorities, J. Urban said.

**Polish Interparty Commission Urges 'Compromise'**  
PM1509103388 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
14 Sep 88 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Considering the People's Interests"]

[Text] Warsaw, 13 Sep—The participants in a session of the Central Commission for collaboration between the PZPR, the United Peasant Party [ZSL], and the Democratic Party [SD] decided to continue joint efforts aimed at overcoming the crisis phenomena and accelerating and deepening the reforms in Poland. Representatives of the public organizations who signed the Declaration on the Creation of the Patriotic Movement For National Rebirth [PRON] in 1983 also took part in the session.

The session was attended by W. Jaruzelski, first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee; T.W. Mlynczak, chairman of the SD Central Committee; J. Dobraczynski, chairman of the PRON Provisional National Council; and other prominent public figures from the country.

The August outburst of conflicts under conditions of the crisis situation in the country clearly showed the need to seek a broader agreement, a PRON Executive Committee appeal stresses. The talks held recently aimed at organizing a roundtable meeting made it possible to accelerate the recuperative process and this opportunity must not be missed. The document adopted calls for reason, patience, and readiness to compromise and support for proposals which take into consideration the needs of the people and the state.

## West Europe

**Austrian Vice Chancellor Concludes Visit**

**Talks With Gromyko**  
PM1509104388 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
14 Sep 88 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Visitors to the Kremlin"]

[Text] On 13 September A.A. Gromyko received Alois Mock, vice chancellor and foreign minister of Austria, who is in Moscow for an official visit at the Soviet Government's invitation, at the Kremlin.

Welcoming the guest, A.A. Gromyko stated that the Austrian vice chancellor's visit to the Soviet Union confirms the two countries' striving to further develop Soviet-Austrian relations and strengthen mutual understanding and cooperation.

For his part the guest noted that Austria, as a country geographically located between the two blocs—the Warsaw Pact and NATO, has a special interest in the process of detente and the reduction of tension which is going on in the world. Austrian neutrality remains a stabilizing factor in Europe. Under conditions of intensifying East-West cooperation, Austria's potential is increasing, and this is already being clearly felt in practice. For example, the vice chancellor has been accompanied on his trip to Moscow by more than 30 representatives of Austrian business circles, who are not only holding talks on contacts in the hope of actual results right now, but are also looking to the future, when the prospects for collaboration will undoubtedly broaden.

The Austrian chancellor is due to visit the Soviet Union in 4 weeks. During an interview, a correspondent asked the vice chancellor: "Is it not soon for the chancellor to be visiting Moscow?" The vice chancellor replied: "No, it is not; there is much to be resolved in our relations and cooperation can continue to develop in direct conversations between the leaders." The guest stated that he is very satisfied with his visit to the Soviet Union. Agreement has been reached on many points during the talks. Austrian-Soviet cooperation is developing and the divergences are not being dramatized.

A.A. Gromyko stressed that the present state of Soviet-Austrian relations, their stability, and the ongoing character of diverse ties are the natural outcome of the two peoples' mutual striving for cooperation. The Soviet Union would like this to continue in the future and friendship to prevail in relations between the two states and peoples. The USSR respects the country's neutral status, which is based on the State Treaty on the restoration of an independent and democratic Austria.

The Soviet side values all the positive things done by Austria since the conclusion of the treaty, and it has done quite a lot.

Neutral states are an important factor which must be taken into account both in the European and world arenas. We should like this situation to continue unchanged in the future. As a rule it is neutral countries that are chosen as a venue for talks on the major questions of world politics. This is true of Switzerland and we would like it to be said equally of Austria.

Special emphasis was placed on the talks that Austria is holding with the EEC. On the Soviet leadership's behalf, the sincere wish was expressed that friendly Austria be reliably protected against any attempts to jeopardize its neutral status and sovereignty and that it continue to be a politically independent, active, and respected state.

A. Mock said that the State Treaty and the law on the country's permanent neutrality are in his view the political legacy of Chancellor Julius Raab. But that is a legacy not only for the present day. Austria will continue to act from a position of permanent neutrality in the future, which means that it is committed to observing the treaties that have been concluded. The vice chancellor considers the consistency and predictability of Austrian foreign policy to be the country's important achievement and tries to separate those elements of policy which are permanent from those which may change.

The guest said that in his view, the Swiss consider the important aspects of neutrality to be keeping calm and sitting quietly. Austria has its own view of what is important. For example, it participates vigorously in UN peace-keeping actions and wants Vienna to be the venue for various international forums increasingly often. In particular, the Austrian capital has now offered itself as the venue for two important international conferences in the future: those on confidence-building measures and on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe (the 23-state conference). At the same time, of course, neutral Austria has a realistic approach to everything. It is clear that these conferences are not expected to achieve accords in the immediate future. But the reality of the disarmament process is demonstrated by the conclusion of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles.

The vice chancellor went on to dwell on specific spheres of Austrian-Soviet cooperation where accords have already been reached or whose actual terms are in the discussion stage.

The interlocutors noted that the USSR and Austrian positions are either close or coincide on virtually the whole range of international problems. The two countries are united in their desire to eliminate the threat of war, halt the arms race, and focus efforts on the solution of the tasks of international development, creative construction, and the prevention of environmental catastrophe.

Dwelling on the problem of the significance of neutral countries in the modern world, A.A. Gromyko stated that their influence must be taken into account, first and foremost in Europe. Outside the continent the group of nonaligned countries has become a major force. The coordination of the actions of neutral and nonaligned countries, or "N plus N" as they are now usually known in diplomatic language, can only increase their influence in the struggle for peace and the relaxation of tension.

There are European questions, of course, and there are Asian questions. But in addition there are global interests which concern everyone—primarily the problem of averting a nuclear war. It cannot be divided into "continental compartments." That problem must make one see the community of aims of all peoples and all countries, which have one great home—the earth.

The Austrian vice chancellor agreed with that viewpoint.

A.A. Gromyko stressed that the Soviet Union appreciates Austria's initiative in offering Vienna as the venue for two important European conferences. This increases the country's political capital.

The conversation passed in a friendly, frank atmosphere.

Present at the conversation were G.S. Tarazevich, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; A.G. Kovalev, USSR first deputy foreign minister; G.S. Shikin, USSR ambassador to Austria; Emil Staffelmayer, chief of the vice chancellor's office, and Herbert Grubmayer, Austrian ambassador to the USSR.

**Sees Kamentsev, Katushev**  
*PM1509083988 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian*  
*14 Sep 88 Second Edition p 4*

[TASS report: "Strengthening Cooperation"]

[Text] On 13 September V.M. Kamentsev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, received A. Mock, vice chancellor and foreign minister of the Republic of Austria, and the persons accompanying him. The guest is on an official visit to our country at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

Questions of the state of trade, economic, scientific, and technical cooperation between the USSR and Austria were discussed during the talks. The sides expressed confidence that the two countries' economic ties have good prospects for development, particularly on the basis of new forms of economic cooperation.

A. Mock had talks with K.F. Katushev, USSR minister of foreign economic relations.

In the afternoon the Austrian vice chancellor and foreign minister visited the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Concluding his stay in Moscow, the guest met with Soviet and foreign journalists at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center. The purpose of my visit, he said, was to expand Austrian-Soviet ties in all spheres. The friendly and constructive talks held with Soviet officials revealed agreement on many issues, and we did not dramatize the differences where they existed.

A. Mock pointed out that Austria's permanent neutrality is not only an important element of the post-World War II order in Europe, but also provides more opportunities for dialogue in the new age of growing East-West cooperation.

The guest emphasized that the reforms in the USSR in the process of restructuring open up new prospects for the development of Austrian-Soviet trade relations. He declared that Austria is interested, in particular, in deepening scientific cooperation, including in the sphere of space research.

Speaking about the Austrian Government's policy on the continent, A. Mock pointed to his country's desire to maintain good relations with its East European neighbors.

In the evening A. Mock left for Leningrad.

He was seen off at the airport by E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister; G.S. Shikin, USSR ambassador to the Republic of Austria; and other officials.

The send-off party included H. Grubmayer, Austrian ambassador to the USSR.

The Austrian vice chancellor and foreign minister arrived in Leningrad the same day.

**Ends Leningrad Visit, Departs**  
*LD1509145388 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian*  
*1400 GMT 15 Sep 88*

[Text] Alois Mock, Austrian vice chancellor and foreign minister, has finished his visit to Leningrad. He was in our country on an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government. In Leningrad, Mock toured the Lenin Memorial Museum in Smolnyy and visited other monuments. Today the guest left for home.

**Austrian Views on EEC, Soviet Ties Noted**  
*PM1509094988 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*  
*in Russian 14 Sep 88 p 9*

[Article by special correspondent Valeriy Gorbunov: "LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Report": "New Tunes in Old Vienna"]

[Text] Vienna, Moscow—A routine government session was under way in the old Vienna palace on Ballhaus Square. Soviet journalists joined a lively group of representatives of the local press. After the session Federal Chancellor F. Vranitzky was expected to give his traditional press conference. The head of government kindly agreed to say a few words about Austrian-Soviet relations.

As is known, Austria is part of the OECD, whose members have for many years now maintained the most intensive trade and economic contacts with CEMA countries and in particular with the Soviet Union. We are very interested in the continued development of these relations, which form an important component of our foreign and foreign economic policy. At present a

number of important joint projects are at the stage of practical implementation. I have in mind the agreement on expanding the capacities of the enterprises in Zhlobin and a number of others.

Recalling last year's visit to Austria of the head of the Soviet Government N. Ryzhkov, the chancellor announced the upcoming visit to the USSR of Vice Chancellor Alois Mock.

I am also planning to visit your country this year, F. Vranitzky said. Describing mutual contacts as "important, useful, and pleasant," he expressed the view that good prospects exist for the further development of relations between the two countries....

...In Austria, in the plains of the Danube basin and the spurs of the Eastern Alps there live 7.5 million people, which is approximately the same as the population of Moscow alone. The clear preponderance of women (there are 113 women per 100 men) has not affected the dynamism of the national character. Austria is a country of energetic, enterprising people, a highly developed country, an industrial country with a productive agriculture and a growing service sector.

Austria is at present in some respects living through a critical moment in its history. The famous Vienna waltzes cannot drown out the noisy tunes of the political orchestra: A heated debate is under way in the country about the possibility of joining the "Common Market."

Naturally, during personal encounters with the leaders of the main parties in Austria we wanted to obtain first-hand information, so to speak, on topics of interest to us. An opportunity arose during a conversation with Vice Chancellor A. Mock. We put the following question to him: Is not the planned entry into the "Common Market" in contradiction with Austria's traditional policy of permanent neutrality? Dwelling in detail on the economic advantages which membership in the EEC, in his view, will bring for the country, the vice chancellor claimed that Austria's role as a bridge between East and West would increase rather than decrease in the new conditions.

In the light of the latest steps in the development of relations between the USSR and the United States, and as a result of the reforms carried out in the country by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, he said, the potential for such collaboration is increasing still further and cooperation is becoming even more flexible. Among "interesting" projects, A. Mock cited the planned flight of an Austrian cosmonaut on a Soviet spacecraft.

Speaking about the country's foreign policy, the vice chancellor cited the successful functioning of Austrian neutrality over the past 30 years, but he was asked:

Can past experience as such, even if it is successful, be regarded as a reliable guarantee for the future?

The vice chancellor replied:

It is possible that the mistakes we have managed to avoid in the past are lying in wait for us just around the corner. However, we will seek to continue in the future to combine active international cooperation with the policy of permanent neutrality.

Well, Austria is at a crossroads. We were able to convince ourselves of this after meetings with both politicians and leaders of Austrian industry—Mr Kehrer, secretary general of the Economic Chamber, which comprises more than 200,000 local firms; Mr W. Wolfsberger, president of the board of the Austrian Siemens company; and the leaders of a management school which is going all-out to instruct its pupils in the new rules of the game in line with "Common Market" conditions....

Much remains unclear.... The words of the vice chancellor come to mind: If the condition stipulating the preservation of permanent Austrian neutrality is not met on entry into the EEC, the entry will not take place. Time will tell what course events will take. At the moment, however, even scaling Austria's highest mountain, the Grossglockner, it is difficult to see what is in store for Austria around the "all-European" corner. The reason for this is by no means the insufficient height of this mountain (3,797 m), but the complexity of the tight knot of problems relating to European integration within the framework of the "Common Market."

...Welcoming the visit to our country of Vice Chancellor Alois Mock, we express the hope that it will serve the positive aims of the further development of Soviet-Austrian relations and the common cause of reinforcing the climate of peaceful cooperation and good-neighbornliness in Europe.

#### Further on Visit by Finland's Holkeri

##### Meeting With Gromyko

PM1509101788 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
14 Sep 88 Second Edition pp 1, 4

[TASS report: "Visitors to the Kremlin"]

[Text] A.A. Gromyko received Finnish Prime Minister Harri Holkeri, who is visiting the Soviet Union, in the Kremlin on 13 September.

At the suggestion of the high-ranking guest, the interlocutors examined key international questions relating both to Soviet-Finnish cooperation and to the world situation.

At the start of the conversation, A.A. Gromyko welcomed Finland's prime minister as the representative of a friendly neighboring state—Soviet people and the Finns look one another right in the eye, if one can say so, across the border.



Mutual satisfaction was expressed with the current state of relations between the two countries and with the accumulated capital of mutual trust and good-neighborliness which is constantly growing on the basis of the 1948 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid. Both sides noted that, like Finland, the Soviet Union firmly intends to support good ideas based on its concern to further strengthen and enrich Soviet-Finnish collaboration founded on equitable partnership and consideration for one another's interests.

A.A. Gromyko noted that a glance at the map charting the whole of the long Soviet-Finnish border is enough to conclude that the Soviet Union and Finland cannot and must not carry out any policy other than that of peace and good-neighborliness. For his part, the Finnish prime minister gave assurances that his state continues the same line of good relations in its foreign policy.

The good tradition of personal contacts at the level of the countries' political leaders was assessed highly. This tradition is deeply embedded in Soviet-Finnish ties and makes it possible to hold mutually beneficial confidential dialogue. It was stressed that fresh ideas and approaches—whose implementation helps enrich the entire complex of contacts between the two countries—are invariably born as a result of meetings between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Finland's President M. Koivisto.

At the request of his interlocutor, A.A. Gromyko dwelt on Soviet-U.S. relations and their prospects. The point of the Soviet course in this direction is to do everything to develop contacts with the United States both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis. However, there are bilateral problems that are closely intertwined with the interests of many countries. The main one here is nuclear disarmament. Experience shows that this is difficult to secure. This is a stump that cannot be cut just by picking up an ax and bringing it down—that kind of thing does not happen. At present it looks as though the problem will be resolved during the period of complex bilateral talks now being held in Geneva. The USSR will not cease for a day its efforts on behalf of nuclear disarmament, and it wants Finland to be aware of this.

There is a difficult situation in the United States now: This is so because of the coming change in the country's leadership. But whoever comes to power—a Republican or a representative of the Democratic Party—Soviet policy on the question of complete nuclear disarmament will not change. I would like to think that people in the United States will also act from a standpoint of reason and undeviating advance progress this goal through talks.

The USSR is conducting dialogue with the United States, but this does not mean that the significance of European problems is thus belittled. We are striving to implement the idea of building a "common European home," A.A. Gromyko stressed. We can live side by side

and shake our fists at one another across the border, but we are opposed to that. The USSR in fact advocates developing relations with European countries, and a major part of its European policy is devoted to this. Its Warsaw Pact allies also act in this fashion.

A.A. Gromyko: For instance, ecological problems require collective efforts from the states of the entire continent and compel Europeans to think seriously about cooperating in the sphere of environmental conservation. I would like the USSR and Finland to feel close to one another in this respect.

H. Holkeri: For us Europe is a special continent, if only because wherever we go from Finland we always start by entering Europe.

The interlocutors expressed consonant thoughts on the need to deepen political, economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation in Europe, which would facilitate the resolution of problems troubling this continent and overcome barriers and obstacles that still exist and create an artificial division between states.

A.A. Gromyko noted that Soviet-Finnish cooperation acts as an important factor for peace and stability in the north of Europe. It has already become an inalienable link in the incipient process of improving the international situation. Moreover, it constitutes a direct contribution to the formation of an all-embracing system of European security.

Then the visitor talked about how Finland is taking part in the all-European process and is cooperating with CEMA and the Common Market.

The Soviet side assessed trends taking place in Western Europe. Of course, West European states are willing to decide how and why they must cooperate. But the USSR advocates that their actions promote ideas of peace and that these actions be carried out with consideration for the interests of all European states. No one in this home must be forgotten.

A.A. Gromyko briefed Finland's prime minister on how the vast restructuring is going in the USSR. In this connection special attention was drawn to the prospects opening up for Soviet-Finnish cooperation, for a more extensive and active quest for new forms of cooperation, and for introducing unusual methods and means of stimulating bilateral ties.

The interlocutors also touched on questions linked with UN activity. They shared the opinion that the role of that international organization has recently been much more tangible than before, especially in those areas where it is a question of settling regional conflicts. Nevertheless, full use is still not being made of its potential—the weight of certain countries' policy is dragging it back.

A.A. Gromyko noted that if we sit idle with regard to the United Nations, we may succumb to political torpor. This must not happen; we must cooperate within the bounds of existing opportunities and use them as fully as possible. No one has yet invented a better international organization than the United Nations.

In Europe we are proceeding with you along the correct path of peace and we are in many respects shown our course by the document whose title bears the name of the Finnish capital—the Helsinki Final Act.

H. Holkeri stated that it will be the path of peace and trust.

The following took part in the conversation: on the Soviet side, A.G. Kovalev, USSR deputy foreign minister; and B.I. Aristov, USSR ambassador to Finland; and on the Finnish side, Heikki Talvitie, Finnish ambassador to the USSR.

#### **Seen Off on Country Tour**

*PM1509103188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
14 Sep 88 Second Edition p 4*

[TASS report: "On a Trip Around the Country"]

[Text] Finnish Prime Minister H. Holkeri left Moscow 13 September for a trip around the country. He is in the Soviet Union on an unofficial visit.

The visitor was seen off at Vnukovo airport by V.M. Kamentsev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and other officials.

The send-off party included B.I. Aristov, USSR ambassador to Finland, and H. Talvitie, Finnish ambassador to the USSR.

The Finnish and Soviet state flags were hoisted at the airport.

Prior to his departure, H. Holkeri visited the construction site of the engineering complex at the Tretyakov State Gallery being carried out by the "YIT" joint stock company and visited the construction site of the new circus building, work on which is being carried out by the "Polar" joint stock company.

In remembrance of the founder of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, the Finnish prime minister laid a wreath at the V.I. Lenin Mausoleum and also at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier by the Kremlin Wall.

On the same day Finnish Prime Minister H. Holkeri arrived in Tashkent.

The visitor was met at the airport by G.Kh. Kadyrov, chairman of the Uzbek/SSR Council of Ministers, and other officials.

#### **Visit to Uzbekistan**

*LD1509093288 Moscow TASS in English 1418 GMT  
14 Sep 88*

[Text] Tashkent September 14 TASS—Prime Minister of Finland Harri Holkeri is now familiarizing himself with Tashkent, the capital of the Soviet Central Asian Republic of Uzbekistan. Accompanied by his wife, he is on an unofficial visit to the USSR. The distinguished guest was received today by Gayrat Kadyrov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Uzbekistan.

The prime minister of Finland said that of indisputable interest to Finnish employers and businessmen were Gayrat Kadyrov's proposals concerning prospects of joint ventures, possibilities of delivery to Uzbekistan of equipment for two dairy plants, for fruit and vegetable processing factories.

Uzbekistan is the USSR's main cotton-growing centre. In the course of the talk the two sides outlined areas of cooperation, which are of mutual interest, also in that sphere. Discussed, specifically, was the proposal concerning construction of a woodworking enterprise on the basis of Finnish technologies, to use, as raw material, cellulose-rich cotton stalks and branches left after the harvesting.

"We are gladdened and reassured by the processes now taking place in the USSR, specifically in Uzbekistan", said Harri Holkeri. "Broader possibilities are opening for developing and perfecting trade-and-economic and scientific-and-technological relations between our countries. As to concrete areas and projects of cooperation, mentioned today, they are for sure to be brought to the notice of Finnish businessmen, and, I am sure, they will find a broad response in the business community", said the prime-minister of Finland.

The distinguished guest is also to visit the old Uzbek towns of Bukhara and Samarkand.

#### **FRG Weekly on Reasons for German Emigration**

*AU1409141188 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER  
ALLGEMEINE in German 14 Sep 88 p 4*

["R.O." report: "No Other Home Than the Soviet Union; for the First Time Discussion of Reasons for Emigration of Ethnic German Russians"]

[Text] Frankfurt, 13 September—The number of ethnic Germans moving from the Soviet Union to the FRG has tangibly increased. Even the Soviet press is now discussing the topic—for example, a report by the weekly NEUES LEBEN, the "central newspaper of ethnic German Soviet citizens," which is published by PRAVDA. In its edition of 31 August, which is available now, a question is asked that has never before been asked in this form by a publication organ of the multinational state: "Are there reasons for emigration?"

This question is based on the report by the permanent correspondent of NEUES LEBEN for the German Soviet citizens in the areas of Perm, Orenburg, and Saratov. He visited the town of Solikamsk at the Kama River (about 100,000 inhabitants) in order to acquaint himself with the situation of the 3,894 Germans who live there and their intention "to emigrate to the FRG"—which is expressly mentioned in the report. The report gives room to the statements of Aleksander Gavrilov, secretary of the town party committee; Edwin Grieb, chairman of the "International Education Committee"; Erika Albrecht, a worker from the cellulose and paper combine; and Pius Wagner, "expert for control systems" of this combine. The focal point of the interviews was—according to the introduction by the editor—"one single question: How can ethnic German citizens be assured of the opportunity to make a well-balanced decision about emigration?"

Gavrilov said that most Germans are conscientiously fulfilling their tasks. There are 3 Germans among the "20 pioneers of socialist competition, whose portraits are exhibited in the town gallery of workers glory: Aleksander Horsch, department head in the cellulose and paper combine; Vladimir Stieben, head of the Pedagogical College; and Vladimir Schleich, crane operator in the Ural forestry enterprise. A total of 963 Germans has received orders and medals." The great majority of Germans, who "have relatives in the FRG," are not thinking of emigration. For them "there is no other home than the Soviet Union."

Grieb responds to the statement that the number of emigrants has recently increased, according to information from the Solikamsk Passport and Registration Office: Last year "six families (27 people) emigrated to the FRG. Since the beginning of this year, however, 10 families (35 people) have emigrated." Grieb says that the increase is because people have emigrated "who were forbidden to leave the country before for one reason or the other." The number of those "who travel to the FRG to visit their relatives" has increased sixfold. The consequence is that the number of would-be emigrants is no longer rising. Now the people have the opportunity to get to know the way of life in the West at close proximity. Grieb states that his experience shows "that the would-be emigrant has to look around very thoroughly in the FRG before he makes this weighty decision." In this respect "the new, simpler exit regulations have already had a positive effect."

Asked whether "family reunification has to take place in the FRG," the committee head says that there are two main reasons for Germans to emigrate. They hope to "get ahead" in the FRG. Even though there are no destitute persons among the Germans in Solikamsk—"on the contrary, many have their own cars, comfortable apartments, private homes, and country houses—in the FRG one immediately receives a lot of money. The standard of living in the FRG is higher than here; therefore the emigrants are not bad off from the material point of view, and some of them are using their money

very generously, indeed. I do not want to characterize such people as money-grabbers—no, they simply want to have first-rate things because, after all, they live in this world. Furthermore, they are willing to do any kind of work." But the emigrants do not think about why the Bonn government, which normally holds on to every pfennig, is paying thousands of marks to the emigrants as reparation for the fact that in the USSR they suffered from the war unleashed by Hitler. Recently other tendencies have also emerged. In a television talk "with so-called late emigrants" in May, the FRG president stressed that the emigrants should search their hearts very thoroughly before they finally decide to emigrate. The authorities are not able to give the desired aid to everyone who arrives in the country, so that the emigrants have to resign themselves to increasingly "count on private charity."

In the FRG the birth rate has decreased. To a certain extent, "the FRG Government is also taking this into consideration when it expends considerable means so that the emigrants from the Soviet Union can settle in the FRG. In short, it wants to improve the situation in the FRG at the cost of another country."

There is, however, a second reason for emigration. A considerable number of Germans said that they wanted "our children to master their mother tongue, and for this there is no opportunity here." In this connection, Erika Albrecht explained: "My family's application to move to the FRG has already been rejected eight times. Recently I stated at a staff meeting: I want to go to a country where everyone speaks German and where my children will also learn German." Although there are schools in Solikamsk where German is taught, this is not enough. Her son "had forgotten German before he started school, while he played with his friends outside."

Party Secretary Gavrilov said in this respect: "One can hardly say anything against this. We plan to open classes with intensive German language courses at several schools. Perhaps we will start with this in kindergartens. In any case, we want to tackle the problem of bilingualism in the same way as the other problems connected to the nationality policy."

In contrast, Wagner reports that he returned to Solikamsk in 1987. He "had lived in the FRG" for 11 years. The step was not easy for him. He broke up with his relatives. "We are strangers for them because we come from the Soviet Union. I went to the FRG to my mother and my brothers because I hoped I would be better off among the Germans, and also from the material point of view. Of course, there are many things there that we could learn and introduce here." Wagner thanked "the trade union committee and

the combine leadership, who provided a comfortable apartment for me; the collective that readmitted me; and the friends who I have won again."

Grieb added: "Unfortunately, the ethnic German Soviets were sometimes confused with fascists—especially immediately after the war against Hitler's Germany. This was done by people who did not have much political knowledge." The injustice has stuck in the people's minds. Injustices of this kind have also given rise to the desire to emigrate. "Today we ask ourselves

why young people from German families and their parents lightheartedly leave for another country. However, did we veterans do much to make them proud of their fathers and mothers who went through the camps here, in the northern Urals, together with members of other peoples in our country in Stalin's time?" The topic has to be widely discussed in the newspapers. The people, in particular the Germans, who gained merits in reconstructing the country "have to be given the awards they deserve. This would contribute to consolidating the multinational society in our town," Grieb said.



## Political & Social

### Further on Gorbachev Visit to Krasnoyarsk

#### Norilsk Tour Described

PM1509124388 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
15 Sep 88 Morning Edition p 2

[Special correspondents V. Gavrichkin and A. Shcherbakov report: "Concern for People Is the Guarantee of Renewal"]

[Excerpts] Krasnoyarsk Kray—On 14 September M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, arrived in Norilsk. Here he met with the inhabitants of the major industrial center in the polar region and inquired about their living conditions and questions on the development of the city's social infrastructure. In the second half of the day M.S. Gorbachev visited the Nadezhdinskiy metallurgical plant—the enterprise which gave a new lease of life to the Norilsk mining and metallurgical combine and also to the city itself, located beyond the Arctic Circle. [passage omitted]

During the numerous meetings and conversations with the city's inhabitants, workers at the combine, and party, soviet, and economic leaders, M.S. Gorbachev paid particularly close attention to the experience of the economic growth of the Norilsk industrial region, the development of its social infrastructure, and the problems arising here. Essentially, he noted, success has been assured by virtue of the fact that it proved possible here to concentrate in one and the same hands—the hands of the management of the Norilsk combine—the overwhelming majority of investment resources throughout all the stages of the development of the industrial center. The unity of management ensured also the unity of sector and territorial planning.

For instance, the cities of Norilsk, Talnakh, and Kayrkan were built simultaneously with the industrial capacities. They were not only built in accordance with a single plan; most importantly, an integrated life-support system for all the people living on the territory of the industrial region was created. To be specific, a unified centralized system for the construction and distribution of housing and social consumption funds was created and unified decisions on questions of transport, trade, and consumer services were adopted. This favorably distinguishes the Norilsk region from other development regions in the north. Today, when a course has been set toward the decentralization of economic management, toward enhanced independence not just of individual enterprises but also of major territorial-industrial formations and collectives, Norilsk's experience is very valuable.

Especially valuable is its experience in the solution of social and consumer service problems, M.S. Gorbachev emphasized. This was the main topic of Mikhail Sergeyevich's conversations with the inhabitants of Norilsk. As a result of trends which were common to the country as

a whole, the inhabitants of Norilsk were unable, at the time, to prevent the "fitful" nature of the development of sectors' infrastructure. The construction of basic production capacities frequently proceeded ahead of everything else. So we have come close to fully satisfying the population's requirements here only in terms of public catering enterprises; in Norilsk and Kayrkan also in terms of polyclinics; and in Norilsk as regards kindergartens. However, the housing problem remains acute. Only 75 percent of families have individual apartments. There are not enough places in kindergartens and schools, and there are not enough trade premises and sports facilities, especially in Talnakh and Kayrkan. Yet, as the demands as regards comfort in a northern city are much higher, the living standard here must be higher than in cities located in more favorable climatic zones. Can this be achieved?

During one of the meetings with the inhabitants of Norilsk, when the conversation had essentially come to an end and everyone was going back to their machines, someone said:

By and large we have no business complaining: In winter, during the frosts and blizzards, we need not go out for weeks and we have everything....

Naturally, even here there are more than enough problems. In their conversations with the general secretary the inhabitants of Kayrkan spoke about the shortage of housing, kindergartens, and certain consumer facilities. Both in Kayrkan and Norilsk the northerners' problems of returning to the "mainland," difficulties with housing exchanges, and the construction of cooperative apartments were discussed. There are also difficulties of another kind. It is not always easy for members of Norilsk workers' families to find jobs, especially if they live in the satellite cities. There were complaints about unjustified cuts in wage rates. The problem of pensions for northerners was raised. In this context M.S. Gorbachev said that a new law on pensions is in preparation and will be subjected to a nationwide discussion. Ecological problems were raised in a critical tone. Difficulties with subscriptions to newspapers and journals and other pressing questions were mentioned. [passage omitted]

The day before, meeting scientists at the Krasnoyarsk Branch of the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences, M.S. Gorbachev spoke about the importance of the role which science is called upon to play in the development of the colossal natural potential of the kray. The exploitation of the wealth of Siberia and the Far East is totally unthinkable without reliance on the latest achievements of scientific thought and the most up-to-date technologies—as a rule, waste-free and ecologically clean technologies, moreover. This is a task of utmost importance for the whole cause of restructuring. Only new approaches and unorthodox solutions can produce the necessary acceleration as regards the development of Siberia's potential.

To what extent this is correct and accurate was borne out by our trip to the Nadezhdinskiy metallurgical plant. [passage omitted]

Here at the Nadezhdinskiy plant M.S. Gorbachev had a heated and meaningful conversation with the workers. The topic of conversation was the labor collective and its council, the processes of democratization which are under way in society, and the restructuring of the political system in the country. Now, M.S. Gorbachev said, labor collectives have been invested with broad rights of which they must resolutely avail themselves. Workers' self-management, democratization, the granting of real power to the soviets—this is the high road of restructuring.

After the meeting with workers and engineering and technical staff in the shops of the Nadezhdinskiy metallurgical plant on 14 September, M.S. Gorbachev returned to Krasnoyarsk.

#### More on Talks at Plant

PM1509142988 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 15 Sep 88 Second Edition p 1

[Special correspondents Yu. Nikolayev and A. Shchegolev report on CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev's 14 September activities in Norilsk area: "People Warmed by Concern"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The visit ended with a trip to the Nadezhdinskiy Metallurgical Plant. Here a technology combining what would appear to be the impossible—fire and water—has been reproduced for the first time in the world. One of the plant's workshops is simply called the hydrometallurgy shop. People also work in a new way at the new plant. People here were some of the first to transfer to team forms of labor organization and to boldly introduce into life elements of economic accountability [khozraschet]. All the conditions have been created here for fruitful recreation. A culture and health complex is located next to the workshops. Without leaving the site you can relax in a courtyard by a fountain, work out in the sports hall, watch movies, or play billiards or chess. This is surely why there are no problems of cadre fluctuation at the Nadezhdinskiy Metallurgical Plant. In a conversation with enterprise workers and engineers M.S. Gorbachev shared his thoughts on how to better organize the activity of labor collective councils and develop democratization processes.

A lively debate arose about the principles of forming labor collective councils and selecting and replacing leading cadres. The general secretary said that haste and lack of thought must not be tolerated in this responsible matter. Over 3 years most ministers and party committee secretaries at all levels have been replaced. Not all of the new officeholders justify the hopes invested in them. So, we must rely more boldly on public opinion and develop democracy further in resolving cadre questions.

The Nadezhdinskiy workers, like all people in Norilsk, have promised to take an even more persistent part in restructuring in response to the party's concern.

In the evening the CPSU Central Committee general secretary returned to Krasnoyarsk. He was accompanied on his trip to Norilsk by: Yu.P. Batalin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; O.S. Shenin, first secretary of Krasnoyarsk CPSU Kraykom; V.I. Sergiyenko, chairman of the krayispolkom; and the leaders of a number of ministries and departments.

#### Further Press Reportage

PM1509160588 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA  
PRAVDA in Russian 15 Sep 88 p 1

[Report by TASS special correspondents N. Zheleznov, V. Kulikov, A. Petrovskiy, Yu. Khots, L. Shvedova, and V. Shishlin: "Over Here, Mikhail Sergeyevich! The CPSU Central Committee General Secretary's Meetings With Norilsk Working People"]

[Text] Norilsk, 14 Sep—The 3d day of M.S. Gorbachev's working tour of Krasnoyarsk Kray brought him to Norilsk, which lies inside the Arctic Circle. The city grew up around 50 years ago in the Taymyr forest tundra and is now a major industrial center in the north of the country.

The first stop was in the young city of Kayerkan. In conversations with the inhabitants the general secretary asked about social matters, the northerners' views of the prospects for the development of the city and the environmental protection problem. He expressed satisfaction with the new demographic trends in the far north. Workers and specialists used to work at the mining and metallurgical combine on contract and return "to the mainland," but now they are increasingly staying there.

The entire Norilsk population of 250,000 seemed to be out on the streets of the city to welcome Mikhail Sergeyevich. He had barely entered the city when he got out of the car in a square and was totally surrounded by people.

I have long dreamed of coming to your area, he said. On behalf of the Central Committee and the government I want first of all to tell you that we value your labor very highly. The work you are doing here is enormously important. I have learned a great deal about Norilsk. But it is better, as they say, to see once than to hear a hundred times. I also know you have many problems.

Voice: There are problems, particularly environmental conservation.

M.S. Gorbachev: I was told about this. At yesterday's meeting at the Krasnoyarsk scientific center we examined very closely many questions of paramount importance to the development of the region, including the ecology problem. It is very acute in Krasnoyarsk, and particularly so in Norilsk. But it must be remembered

that they are problems that cannot be solved at a stroke; even science does not know how to do that. But when the problem is clear we will find the money and then the situation must be rectified without delay. The question of preschool institutions also came up. I didn't know you were short of kindergartens.

Voice: Yes, yes, we still are....

M.S. Gorbachev: I told the leaders of the kray, of Norilsk, and the association that it is a very bad mistake to have a shortage of places in children's institutions in a kray like yours. What we agreed was that the problem of preschool institutions must be resolved.

"Over here, Mikhail Sergeyevich"—wherever the general secretary stopped the people of Norilsk would issue the invitation.

People also made requests that the city soviet or enterprise is entirely capable of satisfying.

Mikhail Sergeyevich, a middle-aged worker said, I don't want to talk about trivial matters, it's embarrassing; but, unfortunately, I must. For 6 years now they have been dumping slag with metal swarf around my home and it stays there—it tears your shoes to shreds and you are frightened to let the children out.

M.S. Gorbachev: What I will say to you is that at the moment you are making poor use of restructuring. You must shake your leaders up.

Voice: I want to address another topic. Forgive me, but the switch to the new pay conditions is being incorrectly implemented in my opinion. The actual strategy is right, but the tactics are wrong. It is not being done on the basis of new technology....

M.S. Gorbachev: Every collective now earns its own money and makes its own decisions. Anyway, that's how it should be: The money must be earned! Not received from somewhere on high, from some social security place. The labor collective must operate as follows: If it has accumulated some money it should switch to the new system; if it is not ready it does not switch. It is a matter for you; you choose....

What do you think of our policy?

Voice: It's correct.

M.S. Gorbachev: The policy is worked out on the basis of working people's suggestions. And it can only be implemented with your participation.

There was yet another meeting with the people of the city on Talnakhskaya Street. There was a good choice of products in the stores—venison, beef, poultry, dairy products—considering that the suburban hothouses and subsidiary plots cannot supply the entire city and Norilsk's main "truck gardens and livestock units" are situated 2,000 kilometers further south, near Krasnoyarsk.

The CPSU Central Committee general secretary ended his stay with a meeting at the Nadezhdinskiy Metallurgical Plant. It is the world's biggest modern nonferrous metals smelting facility.

The visit to the enterprise began with a detailed conversation with metallurgical workers. The first question was about nominating the the labor collective council. Workers made observations on the election of the council chairman.

M.S. Gorbachev: If you think the election was not carried out properly, have a meeting and another vote. It is in your hands. What I think is that if the labor collective council had been formed properly the workers would have fewer questions. You decide, comrades, why you voted for someone who was being imposed on you.

The Central Committee and the government have issued a law which authorizes working people to actually to take the matter into their own hands. And what do you do? Are you waiting for us to come and hold the meeting for you?

Voice: Will the differential restrictions be lifted for "polar" workers too?

M.S. Gorbachev: I have been asked this question before. The AUCCTU, the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, and Gosplan must look into it. One way or another the differential takes into account the actual conditions in which a person works and lives and, on the other hand, it takes into account the country's real potential.

The conversation then touched on the topic of cutting the managerial apparatus. M.S. Gorbachev said: Countrywide it comprises 18 million people. For 127-127 million working people. Some 2.5 million are in ministries and departments and the rest are at enterprises. You will know from the papers that at some enterprises and in kolkhozes and sovkhoses the managerial apparatus has been nearly halved in connection with the switch to new management methods. As for the ministries, the picture is one of cuts of 700,000 managerial jobs. The apparatus is being cut at Central Committee, kraykom, and obkom level. Perhaps it will be cut less at raykom and gorkom level, where it is so small anyway,

The metallurgical workers asked about cadre rotation during the new report-and-election campaign in primary party organizations.

M.S. Gorbachev: The elections that have taken place in just some Krasnoyarsk Kray primary party organizations showed that 40 percent of primary organization secretaries were replaced and 60 percent in shop and party groups. So what we agreed on at the 19th party conference is already working. People are nominating those whom they trust.

Voice: Young cadres have to be forged.

M.S. Gorbachev: I will answer this question, too. Some 60 percent of ministers are new. Among obkom, gorkom, and raykom secretaries there are even more new people—over 80 percent. And among primary party organizations secretaries even more. That is in 3 years.

Voice: Sometimes they recommend whom to elect.

M.S. Gorbachev: So you don't elect him. You nominate your own person. If you see that the wrong person has been elected, if he is working for himself and is remote from the people, settle the matter. If you see something wrong at a plant, at a combine, see who the boss is. Invite someone to visit, whoever—a minister, someone from a party body—and ask the question. One worker sent me a letter in which he wrote: "Mikhail Sergeyevich, give the command to open fire on the headquarters."

Voice: Right.

M.S. Gorbachev: What do you mean, right? We are carrying out restructuring and are responsible for not splitting the country into camps, for not causing confrontation between people. We all know about the practice of "firing on the headquarters" in China. For 15 years after that they couldn't understand what they had done.

Let us not repeat that: Let us not destroy the house and kill everyone in it, and then ask ourselves: What have we done?

Is that the way to deal with the country that is answerable to socialism? We cannot solve today's problems using the methods of 1937; only in the new conditions. It is through party elections, through soviet elections, through local elections that we must establish the fundamental paths of restructuring.

Do you think I, as general secretary, do not want to see all the problems solved as soon as possible? You can understand how nice it would be to reach agreement today and have everything fine and dandy tomorrow.

I know that everyone has one wish: to improve things as quickly as possible. I repeat, that is our common wish. But it must be done without making any foolish mistakes....

Voice: Tell us, do you like Norilsk?

M.S. Gorbachev: It's a fine city.

We have talked today not just about good things, but about shortcomings as well. That is natural. The good things are always with us. And you have something to be proud of: the city, and the way you live and work. But you also have problems that must be solved.

During a tour of the smelting shop, M.S. Gorbachev inquired about production techniques, labor conditions, and the metallurgical workers' everyday life. There were conversations with workers and specialists.

In the evening the CPSU Central Committee general secretary returned to Krasnoyarsk. He was accompanied on the tour of Norilsk by Yu.P. Batalin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; O.S. Shenin, first secretary of Krasnoyarsk CPSU Kraykom; V.I. Sergiyenko, chairman of the krayispolkom, and the leaders of a number of ministries and departments.

#### Visit to Abakan Reported

LD1509113288 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian  
0730 GMT 15 Sep 88

[Text] This morning Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, making a tour of Krasnoyarsk Kray, arrived in Abakan. Here is what our special correspondents report:

[Unidentified correspondent] At the airport, the CPSU Central Committee general secretary was warmly welcomed by representatives of the working people of Khakass Autonomous Oblast, and the leaders and veterans of the party, labor veterans, young people, and pioneers. The procession of vehicles set off for the town center.

Acquaintanceship with a very interesting and rich kray awaits Mikhail Sergeyevich. Khakass is a unique region. Here there is an abundance of sun and fruitful earth, high mountains, brimming rivers and lakes, a taiga rich in mushrooms, berries, and pine nuts.

As regards industry, well, one would first like to mention the Sayan territorial production complex which includes a few dozen enterprises, and for many of them, superlatives apply—the most major, the most up-to-date, the cheapest, or the most economical. Its power engineering center is the Sayan-Shushenskoye GES, which has no equals in terms of power engineering and economic indices.

But, as probably is the case in many parts of our country, the development of industry and that of the social sphere are not in step. The Central Committee general secretary will acquaint himself with all these problems. And so, it is central square, the procession of vehicles has stopped, Mikhail Sergeyevich has got out, and he has another meeting with the workers of Khakass Oblast.



[Begin recording] [Gorbachev] You know, one of the reasons why goods have recently been developing at one rate and money incomes at much more is because people have been (?fiddling). Workers go to the foreman and say, if you don't (?cover us) at 12 each, then we won't work.

[Unidentified woman] That's right.

[Gorbachev] (?So he covers them). But they have not earned 12. But if they earned say even 20, you understand, even 30—but if only they earned it. Work has to be paid for. Pay, that is earned pay. But what we have, left, right and center, has proven to be unearned. And the result (?of all this) is, let's print money. We (?can do that), print money. But what then? You go around with this ruble, but you want to use it for this or that, and it's not available. For this reason, one has to [word indistinct] for the final product [words indistinct].

(?But I like you). When we had a chat in Norilsk yesterday evening, (?they said how is this) that a new wage scale has been introduced but wages failed to go up? I say: And you, have you begun to produce better? Oh no, the work's the same! So why should there be increases? So the wage scale...[changes thought] Because, why? That is how it has been so far. A 5-year plan is in progress and the center gives out R3, R5 or R10 increments here and there. They distributed it, give increments, go and work (?and ask no questions). But now we have [words indistinct] and also good quality. And you would get it for working, for the final results, for the quality of work. [Words indistinct as crowd talks]

Let me put it bluntly [words indistinct] in Krasnoyarsk Kray, but the kray (?must) get things moving [words indistinct].

[Unidentified man] Mikhail Sergeyevich, a question.

[Gorbachev] Please go ahead.

[Man] Well, at the enterprise we have 1 million of profits, yes? Only (?10) percent remains for the enterprise. We take a loan from the state and we build housing and social, cultural and welfare amenities. And (?970) we give to [word indistinct] organizations for the (?upkeep) [words indistinct]. And what about consumer services?

[Gorbachev] Ah, consumer services?

[Man] Yes.

[Gorbachev] Well, this is what I think. Large enterprises can enhance their own development through profits, when the questions of norms have been resolved correctly. (?They then make a contribution to the state and the collective alike), to the funds, development, social matters, and so forth. As for small enterprises, it may well be that they will have to pool their efforts. The small enterprises will not arrive at such large sums right away

as to be able to build a house or something right away, in connection with the fact that the accumulation will take a few years. They should make use of credits and repay them.

[Unidentified man] [Words indistinct].

[Gorbachev] I will tell you this; your question is very important. You are for restructuring.

[Man] That's right.

[Gorbachev] Comrades, I have heard this everywhere. Moreover, you are solidly behind restructuring, in Krasnoyarsk, everywhere. But there are problems, and it is right that people are in a hurry to set them out. That is correct, so that the general secretary can get the feel of how vitally real it is and not just get standing ovations, as used to be the case. That is not the point. I...

[Man, interrupting] In Khakass, too, everyone is for restructuring.

[Gorbachev, chuckling] Everyone, eh? But those over there are silent. [crowd laughs] You wanted to say something about the KATEK [Kansk-Achinsk Fuel and Energy Complex].

[Unidentified man] Well, the social and [word indistinct] sphere there is not being addressed, there are very big [word indistinct].

[Gorbachev] That is correct.

[Man] Well, there is much reporting being done there at all levels, ministers come...

[Gorbachev, interrupting] No, no, no, no, no. They report the actual state of affairs. And my data I had even before I came to see you show that in KATEK, in KATEK—I said so yesterday—the nonproductive sphere only claims 18 percent of capital investments. This is bad, this is twice as little. This is the first problem. The second problem is that ecology is already assuming increasingly great proportions. If technical and technological issues are not resolved there in good time there will be a problem, just as it arose in Norilsk, and so forth. That is, you do have problems there, and it is necessary that order should prevail in this large region in which the country is interested, for it is a large power industry center [words indistinct]. It is necessary that development should be proportional and comprehensive. So we will talk about this and there will be changes. There, in Krasnoyarsk, Ministers Chazov and Mayorets already [words indistinct]. [end recording]

### Meets With Workers

LD1509143788 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian  
0800 GMT 15 Sep 88

[Excerpts] This morning Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, making a tour of Krasnoyarsk Kray, arrived in Abakan. Here is our special correspondents' report:

[Unidentified correspondent] [Passage omitted] Here in the central square the procession of cars has halted. Mikhail Sergeyevich has got out and is meeting with workers of Khakass Oblast.

[Begin recording] [Gorbachev] We have everything, huge resources, nature, land, people, an educated populace, everything. Only things have gone wrong in our machinery—economic, political and ideological machinery. That's what. All this had to be thought over. And so there have been many meetings and many conversations. We have had thorough and candid talks, and this is continuing.

[Unidentified man] [Passage omitted] The factories.

[Gorbachev] Wait a bit, wait. [crowd laughs]

[Man] [Words indistinct].

[Gorbachev] All the same, the job, how to do it, what to do—this also has to be.

[Man] One has to think how to do it.

[Gorbachev] That's just it, and it should have been sorted out 2-3 years ago so as not to drive the country into some....

[Man, interrupting] What?

[Gorbachev] Put it like this: The train was set on what seems to be the main track, only it's in a dead end, you understand, a dead end. No, we don't want to get out of one dead end only to get into another one. That had to be, but now the time has come. Now the reform is already reaching the enterprise; financial autonomy is reaching the enterprise and the scientific establishment. Now the reform is among the local soviets; the local soviets must now show what they are capable of.

There are changes in the party. Cadres are being changed, there are big changes in the cadres, a big change of cadres. Only yesterday in Norilsk I was saying...[changes thought] They were asking: Why are cadres not being changed? Well, I say: But you know, simply changing them without thinking anything over. [sentence as heard] Everything has to be done, and then time must somehow spot and put forward new people. People have gone and responded to these new causes. People will see. And moreover, that's how we want it. We want people to do their own electing at the enterprise. And in the party,

elections are being held. Oleg Semenovitch tells me that 40 percent of the secretaries of primary party organizations have been changed, and...

[Unidentified man, interrupting] In the workshops it's 63.

[Gorbachev] In the workshops they've replaced 63 percent of secretaries of party organizations. People can see who has what sort of attitude toward things and who has prestige. This is how it has to be in the soviets and, further, in the rayons and towns. So you should take a look. Time will show who is worth what. You must decide before you put someone in; where does he come from and what sort of person is he. Otherwise, he starts, and you take a look, and he takes a look. You have taken a look at each other, and time has been wasted, and it turns out that he shouldn't have been appointed in the first place. So mechanisms should be worked out so that everyone is involved.

It has come about that the people are alienated from the cadres; they are alienated from decisions. Some or other wage rates are introduced and no one knows anything. Somewhere a decision is made to build something and no one knows anything. But is it not the case that with socialism everyone should know and participate? It's the country of the working people. Of course, many distortions have taken place in our country regarding this and, comrades, all these must be smoothed out.

A great deal has depended on us. We have adopted decisions which now open up the opportunity for every collective to act. Tomorrow I want to state bluntly that restructuring isn't like a fried egg which is served for breakfast, which someone has cooked for you in the kitchen in some public catering establishment, served to you ready, and you only have to devour it. No. Go on, restructure yourselves. Restructure yourselves. If things are going badly in the rayon or in the town and you can see that the town soviet isn't lifting a finger, then gather in a session—you now have the right—and look at who is worth what. Even if it's a good person who has been working for 10-20 years, decide. That's your affair. [crowd cries: "That's right"]

You know, this doesn't mean that we have to get rid of everyone who is working today. No. Listen. Restructuring has come from those people who are living today. Are we to bring in people from Mars? Are we to bring in cadres? No, we have educated people. It must all be done, but we must resolve it ourselves. Whereas previously you bought a pig in a poke, now you have to decide yourselves. And then you will have chosen them—so help them!

[Unidentified man] Mikhail Sergeyevich, how will it be with the press? It has become difficult to subscribe to newspapers.

[Gorbachev] All the same, there will be no reduction, there will even be more.

[Unidentified woman] That's fine.

[Gorbachev] But there is no possibility yet of satisfying everything fully. It is envisaged, as I have been told, to commission about 500,000 tons of paper to last 4 years in order to eliminate the issue completely. You know, the pulp plant on Baykal had to be closed. A pulp plant had to be closed in the area of Leningrad, and pulp is paper. But it is also being increased by just 1.5-2 percent annually and the subscriptions go on. But it will be put right, now everything will be put right; a squeeze has been put on all the offices. Unnecessary paperwork has been calculated and everything unnecessary has been taken from that. They have redirected it all to the newspapers and magazines. Well glasnost, I think, comrades, glasnost, openness is needed to make people feel all right in this country. How can a person not be allowed to speak a word even if he is in error? Another thing is that we've forgotten how to exchange opinions with one another. When we start squabbling we cannot help calling each other names. [crowd laughs]

[Unidentified man] Soon we make enemies; public opinion is being shaped.

[Gorbachev] In dispute the truth is born, some people say, but if disputes seethe, the truth evaporates. [people laugh] So it is necessary to know how to listen to one another, to compare notes, and then on that basis come to a single correct opinion. But that's surely understandable. We are like children, as it were, in our childhood, on questions of glasnost. We are mastering it. Yes, we too, even for us in the Politburo, this activity of the people. We are looking at what is happening among the people and what we are to do in these conditions.

Comrades, everyone has to do it, in just the same way. All our cadres are now adapting themselves to the conditions of glasnost, democracy, and it is not so simple. To tell the truth, the most difficult thing is just this.

After all, it is so much simpler when a man comes with a proposal, you listen. He doesn't like something, and you say go and get on with your own work. But we here know now what to do at rayon level, enterprise level, or kolkhoz level, or school. If the headmaster sends a woman teacher or someone packing, now you have to sit down and sort it out. All the same, I really think this is the right path. We will gain experience. Everything will fall into place, and we will get used to discussing the most complex problems normally and calmly. Then there will be fewer mistakes in all affairs. This is very important. And then, you know, if someone is not content, he is defeated by this (?crippling) incomprehension; he's not clear what is going on, because he cannot make it out.

But the first major incident—shall we say—was at the Yaroslavl factory, where 57,000 people work. Suddenly the workers refused to work. They were dissatisfied with the way matters were resolved. And what was the crux of

the matter there? It turned out that in order to attain targets, to fulfill orders, and in connection with this to obtain profit and allocations for social development, one had to work, apart from the normal working days, on Saturdays too, in the bargain. This was decided in some office, and there were no consultations with the collective. People became indignant. They gathered together and for 3 days they played for their stakes [bankovali] and yes, lent their support to the director. They said: Why didn't you come with this proposal and tell us? And he said that, you know, productivity is needed to have big production. We have come to lag behind as far as our technical measures are concerned; there have been upsets. Then those who were guilty of these upsets were put in their place and were given a dressing-down. Everything that had to be done was allocated. But so long as the technical measures remained unimplemented there was nothing that anyone could do. Then they arrived at their decision; that is how it is going to be. The works got going. But in this case everyone knew what had taken place.

Well, as a matter of fact a question can, you know, arise out of thin air. A decision may have been made correctly, but if people do not know, they receive it like this: What on earth is that? And I think that this is incorrect, things must not be done in this way in our country, in a socialist country. Well, it is quietly, quietly now. But now, indeed, as you have said, at present deeds are needed, comrades. We have had a chat, determined what is to be done in the economy, the soviets, the party, the social sphere, and international affairs as well. Now the policy must be translated into life everywhere. Now that it has got going, it affects millions, everyone. [end recording]

#### Further Radio Report

LD1509220288 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian  
1100 GMT 15 Sep 88

[Excerpt] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, continuing his tour of Krasnoyarsk Kray, visited Abakan today. Our special correspondent reports:

[Unidentified correspondent] All the papers here today are printing reports about Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's meetings with residents of Krasnoyarsk Kray. His present trip is not based on the romance of travel or curiosity. We are worried about how things are going in Krasnoyarsk Kray, the leader of our party said, and people are indeed hastening to talk about their concerns. And his first conversation in Abakan in Khakass was also about problems which have now become acute:

[Begin recording] [Gorbachev] We need action now, comrades. We have talked about and determined what needs to be done in the economy, in the (?rural) soviets, in the party, in the social sphere, and in international affairs. Now all these policies must be implemented. And now that they have been set in action, they concern millions of people, they will concern everyone, even the workers. And remember that it is not only bureaucrats

who are standing in the path of restructuring—there are also many workers. And on the collective farm, people have become accustomed to the cycle taking its course.

They don't worry about what the harvest was like. But the cycle has taken its course and they give the money for the norm and the money is in people's pockets, but the harvest isn't there.

[Unidentified man] [Words indistinct].

[Gorbachev] This is the trouble. So they produce a television here and receive the money, but 40 percent of the televisions come back as faulty. But the money is already in people's pockets. And I can enumerate it like this when the question arises: Okay, they've got their money, the product isn't there, there's no final product—who needs that kind of money? And we can feel it. I shall talk about it tomorrow. You know this is one of the reasons why the output of goods has been developing at one rate recently, but monetary income has been developing at a far higher rate—because earning have been inflated. The workers come to the foreman and say: If you don't get us a rate of 12 rubles, we won't work. So they get the rate. But they haven't earned 12. Let them get 20, say, or 30—but only if they have earned it. You don't get anything for nothing. Salary means money that has been earned, but in our country, it has been thoroughly unearned. And as a result, well—why not print money? We could do that, we could print money. But what would happen then? You go to buy something with that ruble and what you want isn't there. There's a gap, there's a gap. That's why we must pay for the final result of labor. This is the meaning of financial autonomy.

Restructuring isn't so easy—it is taking place among workers everywhere—it's not so easy, comrades. But they don't like it. Even yesterday in Norilsk, we were talking and someone said: How has it come about that they have introduced a new pay scale but the pay hasn't increased? And I said: Have you started to work more? Oh no, it's the same work. But why should you have an increase? Because of the pay scale. Why? That's how it has been until now. The 5-year plan passes and they give us an increase—in some places 3 rubles, in others 5 and in others 10—from the center. They made the allocations, increased the work, but then asked no questions. But now we are saying: Give us a good quantity and you will be rewarded for this. What other way can it be?

[Unidentified voices] That's the only way, you're right, Mikhail Sergeyevich.

[Gorbachev] We encounter this very thing ourselves: When we go into a shop we encounter it; when we go to the services sphere we encounter it. It all comes back to haunt us. Where else would it go? We will suffer and it will be painful, much, but it will turn out all right. I am convinced that restructuring is necessary for us and that, through our common efforts, we have found the right paths. Not everything is clear here.

[Unidentified man] There are many big distortions.

[Gorbachev] I will say bluntly that there have been many distortions, especially in Krasnoyarsk Kray.

[Unidentified man] You were talking about this yesterday in Norilsk, that it was essential for the chairman of the soviet to be a worker. But here they've elected a director. (?One hundred per cent here voted for a director to be chairman.) Is this permissible?

[Gorbachev] In the final analysis, it's as you wish it to be. But we in the Politburo believe—and we have discussed it in the Politburo—even that a director must show initiative himself and say: Comrades, you know, to ensure that there is an opponent from among the workers, so that we may compare our points of view, let's elect the most prestigious worker to the soviet. Did you wish to say something about the Kansk-Achinsk fuel and power complex?

[Unidentified man] The matter of the social sphere isn't being resolved there very well.

[Gorbachev] That's right.

[Man] They issue a lot of reports there. There are visits on a ministerial level.

[Gorbachev] No, no, no. They report what is there. Before coming here, I saw data which showed that only 18 percent of capital investment at the Kansk-Achinsk fuel and energy complex goes to the nonproductive sphere. That is bad. It's half what it should be. That's the first thing. And the second problem, which is already growing, is that of ecology. If they do not solve the technical and technological questions there soon, then there will be a problem such as that which has arisen at Norilsk and elsewhere. So you do have problems there and there ought to be order in that great region in which the whole country has an interest—it is a great power center. It should develop in an even-handed and comprehensive manner. This will be the subject of discussion and there will be changes. We have already instructed Minister Shchadov and Minister Mayolets about this in Krasnoyarsk.

[Unidentified man] Mikhail Serageyevich. I wish that the ministers could have greater authority. Sometimes the comrades come here and make promises, then they go away and nothing has changed. This kind of thing happens.

[Second unidentified man] We must also ensure that our words carry weight—we sometimes also make promises but don't fulfill them.

[First unidentified man] Of course, we do that as well.  
[end recording]



[Correspondent] There were conversations on the street and in the oblast committee of the party. [passage omitted]

### More Visits, Interview Noted

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[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] The tour of the Krasnoyarsk Kray by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev is continuing. This morning, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee arrived in the capital of the Khakass Autonomous Oblast.

[S. Slipchenko, identified by caption] One can reach the central part of Abakan from the airport in just 5 minutes. A descending aircraft can be seen from the windows of houses, from the streets of the town. A warm welcome was prepared here, even more so because the guest was on the Arctic shore, north of the Arctic Circle, in Norilsk, only yesterday. [video shows the plane landing, a line of people waiting to greet Gorbachev, Gorbachev walking down the steps of the plane to the welcome of local leaders and young pioneers]

[Woman in crowd] It is good that you have come to our...

[Gorbachev, interrupting] Siberia.

[Woman] Siberia. There was a time when we grew good harvests. We had good varieties. One wishes that we had had them still. We even competed with Kuban. We used to have excellent varieties, excellent grain.

[Gorbachev] I am going to speak tomorrow of how foodstuffs used to be shipped from Krasnoyarsk to the center over there, the center of Russia.

[Woman] Yes.

[Local official] That is true. [video shows Gorbachev shaking hands with a worker]

[Worker] Aleksandr Grigoriyevich Kudryavtsev, worker of the Abakanvagonmash Production Association.

[Gorbachev] I beg your pardon?

[Kudryavtsev] Abakavagonmash, the production association.

[Gorbachev] Is that not the wagon works that has been under construction for quite a while?

[Kudryavtsev] Right, the one that has been...for years.

[Gorbachev] When is it going to be completed at last, what is your impression, what do you think personally?

[Kudryavtsev] It begins to look as if in the next 5-year plan it will be drawing to a close, rounding off, in the 13th one.

[Gorbachev] When was the decision to build it made?

[Kudryavtsev] Well, in 1971...long ago!

[Slipchenko] There are many problems in the Sayan territorial and industrial complex indeed, and the building sites in which they are breaking records not only in terms of scope but also in terms of the time they take are also numerous here. Here is what is said here nowadays: Karsnoyarsk Kray is large, but one cannot get to know it without getting to know Khakassiya. We will show our riches, but we will not forget our grievances and will share our problems. [video shows the procession of cars heading for the town's central square, where a crowd of people is already seen waiting for Gorbachev]

The first meeting in Abakan is taking place at Pervomayskaya Square, the town's central square.

[Voices from the crowd] Good morning, Mikhail Sergeyevich!

[Gorbachev] I am glad to see you. As we rode by, I could see many young people in the street, and I think: Is it because the average age is so young? As for your land, it is good.

[Voices] Good, good, the land is very good and fertile.

[Gorbachev, nodding and smiling] Good land, good nature. Tell me, how do you see, from the vantage point of this abundant land, the things that have been taking place lately? Has perestroika reached you or not?

[Voices] It has! We support it entirely...but there are still many problems.

[Gorbachev] I believe that things have only just starting moving.

[Woman] Yes, of course.

[Gorbachev] There have been many rallies, much talk. We have discussed it thoroughly and we continue to...

[Man, interrupting] There should be more deeds than words.

[Gorbachev] You just wait. [laughter]

[Man] One should have hope here.

[Woman] Yes.

[Gorbachev] Incidentally, with regard to deeds, one should also think over what to do, how to do it; this is also necessary.

[Man] It must be thought out, how to do it.

[Gorbachev] Exactly, it needed 2 or 3 years to be sorted out, in order not to bring the country to some sort of a predicament. What has depended on us—and that is a lot—we have made decisions that would enable each collective to act. Tomorrow I am going to put it bluntly and say: You know, perestroyka is not like fried eggs they serve for breakfast: Someone in public catering or in the kitchen cooks it and serves it to you ready, so the only thing you have to do is just get it down, no! Go ahead, restructure yourselves, restructure yourselves.

If things are not right in your rayon or town, and you can see that the town soviet does neither one thing nor another, get together for a session—you have been given the right—and see for yourselves who is worth what. Handle it; this is up to you.

[Woman] Right...right...right.

[Man] Mikhail Sergeyevich, what is going to be done about the press issue? It has become difficult subscribing to newspapers.

[Gorbachev] Nevertheless, there will be no cuts and there will even be increases.

[Woman] That is good.

[Gorbachev] As to meeting the full demand, it is not possible for the time being. As you know, a pulp enterprise on Baykal had to be closed down, a pulp works had to be closed down in the area of Leningrad, and that is paper, after all. The growth there is just 1.5-2 percent per year, but the number of subscriptions has gone up.

It is being sorted out. The squeeze has been put on all the offices. Unnecessary literature has been singled out and everything that is unnecessary has been removed. It has been redirected to newspapers and magazines.

Well, comrades, I think that glasnost and openness are what are needed so the people in the country will feel all right. Now, indeed, as you have said, what is needed are deeds, comrades. We have talked and determined what has to be done in the economy, in the rural soviets, in the party, in the social sphere, and in international affairs. Now it is necessary to put all of this policy into practice.

[Announcer] Although the region has a strong industrial base, broad fields and strong state farms, the first place that Mikhail Sergeyevich went to in the oblast is a place that is sacred to every Soviet person—Shushenskoye.

[A. Tikhomirov, identified by caption] The procession bypassed Minusinsk on its route and from this spot the road leads off to where 91 years ago the 27-year-old Lenin reached the site of his Siberian exile. He arrived in Minusinsk by boat.

This is Shushenskoye, 80 km from Abakan. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev is on the square in the center of the former village of Shushenskoye. [video shows cars driving through countryside, arriving in village] [passage omitted]

The tour began at the home of the peasant Zyryanov, Lenin's first apartment in Shushenskoye. [video shows wall charts, books, other museum exhibits]

[Gorbachev] These are well-known correspondences? [Words indistinct]. Exactly, exactly. Yes, yes, yes [words indistinct]. [Gorbachev, reading from book] The quantity of labor, the quality of labor, the liberation of labor in Europe, land use. Personal use of one's own land. These were also written here?

[Curator] Yes. These are Vladimir Ilich's letters [words indistinct].

[Tikhomirov] The love with which everything has been preserved and recreated here in the commemorative museum is remarkable. It is the fruit of a large amount of study and research and also a human touch. Here is one detail: In front of the porch of the Petrova house, exactly the same pansies, mignonettes, stocks, phloxes, and sweet peas have been carefully planted as the Ulyanov family cultivated on this same handkerchief-size plot of ground. A general picture of Shushenskoye as it was then has been reconstructed with great care—the peasant homesteads with their domestic paraphernalia, the building that housed the local authorities, with its prison and shops. The CPSU Central Committee general secretary also visited these. [video shows house interior, flowers in garden, street of wooden houses, Gorbachev and entourage walking down street]

This is the Vladimir Ilich Lenin Monument on a small commemorative square. Mikhail Sergeyevich laid flowers at the monument. [video shows Gorbachev laying basket of flowers at foot of Lenin statue]

[Tikhomirov, speaking to camera, with Gorbachev and entourage listening in background] Here among the exhibits I saw side by side the party's first draft program and what the 27th congress had to say about it. The idea enshrined there is that communists cannot have a vanguard role in a general sense: This role is expressed in specific actions. I think that in all the almost 30 works that Lenin wrote in this period this idea is glaringly evident. What a discrepancy there has been between words and deeds for many years. In principle, that is the case to this day—it is noticeable on this trip.

[Gorbachev] You have found a good thought of Lenin's there! I recalled another thought actually, contained in one of the works here that provided a spur for our musings today, for our interpretation of the present age, today's imperatives I would say, of the things that contemporary life has presented us with—and not just us, but the whole world. I refer to one of these works,

relating to the drawing up of the program of Russian social democrats, in which Lenin expressed the idea—which actually derived from the framework of Marxist tradition, it deepened this tradition, I would say—of the priority of the interests of social development over the class interests of the proletariat.

I encountered this phrase somewhere when I was reading some work, and then I went back to the work, to Ilich's works, and I began to read and reflect on it. This idea immediately struck home. Look what richness there is in Lenin. In general, when you think about it, what a profound dialectic there is here. Then when you go back and start to sum up Marx's ideas on the subject, you indeed end up with the conclusion that in coming out onto the proscenium of history, the proletariat is expressing not just its own interests but also the trend of the historical process, its progressive trend, moreover. In this sense, the interests of this class completely coincide with the interests of the working people, and in a broad sense with all progressive interests in a given society. This Marxist tradition and idea rang out here. We have thought to ourselves: In our age, look at the pressures that human civilization is under. A question, a problem arose, whose significance we pondered and which has been expressed in the formula of the priority of general human values.

[(?Tikhomirov)] A single, integral world.

[Gorbachev] Hence, of course, however contradictory it may be and for all the most diverse systems that coexist in it. Despite this, it is the only civilization that we have so far. Probably all the constituent parts of this civilization bear a responsibility for its preservation. This is already a priority they must take into account, each one of them, even on the basis of common sense, without referring to the ideological aspect for the time being. But, you see, present-day civilization is an interrelated world. It has become cramped and is experiencing such burdens: the nuclear threat, ecology, scientific and technical progress, tension with resources, with how one should correctly divide up labor and resources, preserving nature, the earth, and so on. Just see how deep, so to speak, this thought looks, I would say.

In connection with this, I am very happy to visit this place where the thought was expressed by Ilich, because it has fertilized our deliberations about the contemporary world, the world in which we live, and has taken the form of the new thinking which, I believe, has now been accepted in the world, and has given all progressive forces an impetus for their deliberations. I will even say not only progressive forces, but realistic forces. Awareness and understanding of the interrelated nature, for all its contradictoriness, of this world in which we live is growing deeper and deeper.

I wanted first to mention what I recalled, here, and now I am returning to that thought, that Leninist thought you repeated here. Indeed, you are right, and today's trip

confirms it. Do you know what I would just like to say? From this situation people look in different ways at one and the same situation, and I have tried—and you have probably detected it while listening to me—to express my own point of view. Yes, the first 2 to 3 years were indeed necessary to get to understand things in general.

What happened to our country, to all of us? We were not simply brought here on a business trip from another planet or another state with a mission requiring us to carry out a revolution and restructuring here in the Soviet Union. No! We are all from the same era, we are all children of our own time—I have repeated this more than once. First, the fact that restructuring was born within ourselves means that we have a potential, and we have preserved it in spite of everything that has fallen upon all generations. I do not want to return now and make a historical digression in order to make assessments, especially because we have done it and are continuing to deepen it. We are doing this, in the first place, in order to know our own history, because nothing arises in a vacuum: Each layer of culture and each layer of social development arises on the basis of what preceded it.

It absorbs in a dialectic way everything progressive that originated there, rejecting everything that impedes and hampers. So now with perestroika, we must get to know our history, interpret it, and in this sense we must carry out large-scale intellectual work. This is not the business of some single person or of a group of scientists or a group of politicians. This is the business of our entire society. We had to start this intellectual work, we are carrying it out, and we have developed it. We already have achievements in the sense of an understanding of our society, what route it has traversed, what has happened to us. We believe that we have not lost the impetus given October and Lenin, and by the revolution in the first stage of its development under Lenin's leadership, despite the fact that we went through serious trials both internally and externally.

We also see deformations and mistakes that have, of course, had an effect on our development and are still having an effect, and that make it impossible for us now to develop to a full extent the potential which I believe our society has, both by virtue of the fact that it is a vast country, that its people are educated, and the fact that so much is contained in socialism that we are only getting down to developing it.

Yes, so 2 to 3 years were needed to comprehend and interpret all this. Getting down to business without having gone into it, and furthermore proposing a policy, to put forward aims and set tasks before a society such as our vast society, the first socialist state, involves a special responsibility both before the entire world of socialism and before the entire world, because of the weighty role played by the country. It was necessary to go into this.

Perhaps some even believe that we have dragged out this period. Perhaps some even believe that we got carried away and were drawn into discussions and that we are quite unable to change gear and get on the road of practical business. I will say that these people are to a certain extent right, but, on the other hand, I see that we need to continue and go on studying our society. We have not yet gotten to the bottom of everything. But we have acquired the main thing during these years.

Now we need deeds, especially from this present stage onwards. I want to speak in particular about this tomorrow and I do not want to express these ideas to you here now, but indeed the difficulty and special nature of this stage now consists in the fact that this whole policy, which in passionate discussions, arguments, conflicts, sometimes took on a dramatic character, and we have not spared one another. [sentence as heard] So, but perhaps drastic changes, you know, require one to sharpen one's thinking and gird one's strength of will in order to arrive at meaningful conclusions. We need that.

The analysis was meaningful, the reasoning was meaningful, and the policy was meaningful. I think we have that kind of policy. More than that, I am convinced of it, that we have such a policy. It will become more profound. It will be enriched in all spheres. Life undoubtedly, this... [changes thought] I deeply respect Lenin for this reason above all, that he always took life into consideration. Take the 5 years from November, 1917, until he was plagued with illness. How many changes did he introduce into the development of revolutionary thought, not fearing to be called an opportunist by the way, or a revisionist, which, incidentally, they did indeed call him?

This happened in our society, in our party, but he was a man who stood tall, of course. He was a phenomenon that comes into the world once in a century, in 1,000 years. Everything, you see, particularly later, everything was confirmed by events. Take the Brest peace treaty. He was virtually on his own, but it turned out as Lenin said. Take NEP [New Economic Policy]. What a change, when extremely devoted communists did not want to dissent from Lenin and put an end to their lives. It was, one must understand, it was a real drama. Anyway, it came about, and look what a change it was and how it led the country out.

What happened with NEP? Not now. This is not a theme for this conversation. But what changes these were! We needed just such a change, just such a change, you know, on its scale, with its degree of significance for our destiny. These decisions that we are making are just such as those, just such. We are talking about a revolution, about the destiny of socialism. Now we need deeds, deeds. It is at this point we are starting to fall behind. You see, everything is not so simple. We have all come to an agreement as far as the policy of restructuring is concerned, and that there is no alternative to it. Now it

has started and has come into our family, into each labor collective, to each one of us, inside us into our mind and heart...and it turns out that it is not easy.

[Tikhomirov] I have been taking part in the tours ever since Kuybyshev, and I can see the changes in the dynamics of people's emotions, in their conversations, in terms of the subjects they raise. There is less euphoria now, but more truth is spoken instead.

[Gorbachev] I am convinced that what we have is a different society, and I am proud of it. That is the most important result of restructuring. When they say that restructuring has not brought anything, it has brought the most important thing. We have a policy that is criticized from all directions, but no one can offer anything else. That is first.

Second, we have a different mood, a different stance, a different attitude to the destiny, the country, taken by our people.

That all is... [changes thought] As to the rest, we have it. What else is needed is good peaceful conditions; we are also working toward that end. We must strike the wide road sooner or later. Right now is the hardest period of all. If someone says that it is only the cadres who are to blame, I will say the following: True, they are guilty of many things both in the past and even today, not all of them have joined in properly yet, but if someone tries to blame everything on the cadres, I will say no, it is not only because of the cadres, but also because of each of us, in each labor collective. This is not that simple. Our people are also used to certain stereotypes, certain approaches, certain attitudes to their work. That is also, you know, a major and deep change, because now restructuring has reached millions of people. It was hard enough to elaborate, assess, and put forward, and it is even harder to implement. It is here that the Leninist thought should arm us. After all, it is a vanguard party indeed, which also means that the vanguard role of the communists should display itself now as never before.

[Tikhomirov] In practical deeds.

[Gorbachev] In practical deeds. That is why I can say as soon as we start lagging behind in any area, we can see that the cause gets bogged down. The party cannot lag behind. It should truly be that political vanguard. How can it be, if it piles everything up on its back, from cement and bricks up to, so to speak, major domestic and foreign policy issues? No, it should really get down to deciding policy, cadre policies, to organizing the masses and providing the ideological support. It should be able to sense the feelings of society, to see all the processes, make timely amendments, and enrich the policies. It should be side by side, together with people, discuss, draw them in, involve them in all of these processes. It is here that the principal difficulty lies. The party too has been going through a very crucial period, and things have not been going easily here either.



At the present time the party is also going through a very crucial period. Nor is all this proceeding in a simple way. I have repeatedly said: See when the reports and elections are in progress how the communists have (?become more) demanding. There are also still many such meetings being held the way they were 10 years ago. All this exists, and we see it and know all about it. This is simply to say that not everything is proceeding yet as we would like.

However, regarding 40 percent of the secretaries of primary party organizations the communists, or rather, in 40 percent of primary organizations the communists have decided that they need other people. Over the 2 years they have already looked at how a person conducts himself and what position he has, and this is already the determining factor. Moreover, there have been secret ballots and there have been as a rule several candidacies. At the level of party group bodies and workshop party organizations, more than 60 percent, or rather 63 percent, have put forward others. This means that the processes of realization are taking place. With difficulty, but they are taking place.

[Tikhomirov] The processes are taking place among us journalists, too. Incidentally it was precisely here that the foundations of ISKRA were laid.

[Gorbachev] Yes, indeed.

[Tikhomirov] Also, the celebrated PRAVDA, and not just PRAVDA, but AGITATOR too.

[Gorbachev] Even those who were guests at Ilich's house here later became, some of them, the creators and distributors of ISKRA. Yes, indeed.

[Tikhomirov] This organizational work to my mind is in the forefront for our future.

[Gorbachev] You know, altogether, since we are speaking of Ilich, the press should be true to Ilich and his wishes in respect to the fact that after all, you know, he spoke as a collective propagandist, collective agitator, and collective organizer. It is now time for practical work. This means that it is necessary to report this idea and these deeds and in good time elevate front-ranking experience so that it becomes our property. It is now very important to find out how to work. This is frequently agonizing for everyone. This is frequently so not because a person is conservative and backward. No, he has not yet found his place. It is this quest for the way that it is now necessary to work that is difficult. The press too is seeking itself. It will, I think, be more and more profound, competent, and responsible. Sometimes, of course, there is much that precisely gives rise to...[changes thought] Incidentally, you lay yourselves open in connection with these blunders, and it is a good thing to remind you of this. That is right, too. Altogether it cannot be, if we have had zones closed to criticism and control (?only) in the party, state, and industries, and we

are now opening these up, is there now to be no control over the press or something? This will not happen in our country. Society will not permit it.

[Tikhomirov] If a press law is adopted, let it please be not so much pressure directed against journalists. Let it work both ways.

[Gorbachev] Yes, certainly.

[Tikhomirov] Otherwise, there will be measures in it such...

[Gorbachev, interrupting] Now, now.

[Tikhomirov] ...as monetary fines.

[Gorbachev] Good, good. [laughter] We will decide it democratically. There you have it. It will be done democratically. Democracy must operate for the press, too.

Comrades, this is a difficult, complicated, and not easy time, a time during which our destiny is shaped, but it is a great and happy time for those taking part in this. All the same, I think we have the strength not only to blow the whistle but also to move along the tracks of restructuring. So, I have told you everything I can. Even more than you expected. [laughter]

[Tikhomirov] Thank you. That was a good interview. I think it must be the effect of the air at Shushenskoye. [laughter]

[Gorbachev] Ilich's spirit. [laughter] [video shows Gorbachev's party walking along]

[Announcer] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev made an entry in the museum's visitor book. [video shows memorial plaque on a timber building, Gorbachev signing the book.]

The fields of the Lenin-Krupskaya sovkhos and training college start right on the outskirts of Shushenskoye. This is one of the 63 sovkhoses in the oblast. Altogether they now bring in some R70 million in profits. There was one farm in the oblast losing money, but they sold it by auction, as they say. Mikhail Sergeyevich stopped by the first section—in all there are four of them here—right near the men who are working in the field of the apprentice team. Of course, the conversation was about lease-contracting, equipment, and young people in the countryside. [video shows fields; Gorbachev talking to a group of men and boys in overalls]

[Man] We train agronomists, engineers and vegetable storage and processing technologists; that is all the skills needed in our production. There is a demand for these skills.

[Gorbachev] So now you ought to be going (?from here) to head lease collectives. Are you going to?

[Woman] He is a deputy chairman in the class.

[Gorbachev] Or have you not made your minds up yet?

[Woman] He is the deputy chairman of a (?leasing) kolkhoz.

[Man] Deputy chairman of the Sibiryak Kolkhoz.

[Woman] Andrey [words indistinct]. [laughter]

[Gorbachev] Andrey [words indistinct] I thought they were students. So he has made it to a deputy chairman. [laughter]

[Man] So we, Mikhail Sergeyevich, organize the apprentice sections under the leasing method. That means they are on full financial autonomy, they work toward end result. We have four apprentice production sections like this.

[Gorbachev] What do you have here, Andrey, what do you have at your disposal? How much land do you have?

[Boy] Well, we have 69 hectares of arable land. We grow crops such as wheat, corn—we use the corn for greet material, for fodder, potatoes. We also have several hectares lying fallow, but [words indistinct] the crop cultivation team is not the only one in our farm, we have three teams there. We also have a stockbreeding team and a 12 hectare orchard that we have taken. We have leased all this from the Sibir Solkhoz, as well as our equipment.

[Gorbachev] How long have you leased it for?

[Boy] This year we are going to pay off the lease. We have been paying it off for 2 years now and this year we ought to pay it off. That's it.

[Gorbachev] Perhaps you will even break away? [laughter] What equipment do you have?

[Boy] We have complete agricultural equipment, two tractors, now it is even three tractors. We have a tracked (?ST-4, Bolgarets).

[Gorbachev] The first thing required in leasing is to work out how much you need, not to have more of them but as many as you need. I have noticed that that is what happens in leasing collectives: They reduce their tractor numbers by half, motor vehicles even by a factor of three. If they need to do something, some seasonal work, they say to the director, No, you keep it. We'll take it for 2 hours, or for 2 days.

[Boy] That is how we took (?this) combine, just for a period of time, for 1 day.

[Gorbachev] Do you work things out like this?

[Boy] Yes.

[Gorbachev] That is the way. Watch out they don't get one over on you. [laughter]

[Crowd] [Words indistinct]

[Gorbachev] Well, there we are! And they are just getting started. How much profit (?did you make)?

[Boy] Last year, we made a profit of R20,000, and this year about R40,000 is planned.

[Gorbachev] How much does that work out per hectare? R40,000 and...

[Man, interrupting] 69 [hectares]. [Words indistinct] R800. R800. Yes. [Words indistinct] profitability this year is 150 percent, Mikhail Sergeyevich.

[Gorbachev] What about you?

[Man] Our overall profitability with regard to production on the farm as a whole is 42 [percent].

[Gorbachev] What about them?

[Man] Theirs is rather more.

[Man] That is the way it should be!

[Gorbachev] So who is teaching whom? [laughter]

[Man] We are all learning from such examples. (?We are all learning together). You cannot do it any other way.

[Gorbachev] What do you think of lease contracting?

[Man] Today if...Well, economic ways of managing production must probably include that. Today we probably have no other path to follow, no other way.

[Gorbachev] In real terms? It is now clear ideologically that you are in favor.

[Man] In real terms, in real terms, today we have transferred all the main production—from this year onwards—to lease contracting.

[Announcer] In the Khakass Autonomous Oblast, nearly all the farms operate through lease contracting. Its advantages are not yet clear to many in the kray, and so it has to be explained.

[Gorbachev] Through lease contracting, some people say, well, what is going on? Are we abandoning the kolkhozes and sovkhozes? No, on the contrary, we are revealing what it is possible to reveal through internal lease contracting, to reveal the sovkhoz's potential. Even if some people go on trying to prove that it can be done with large-scale, bit units, nothing comes of it. Wherever

there is small group lease contracting—or a family or a group or team or something. (?they can be taken right away). Moreover, the increases come quickly. They come quickly.

[Announcer] When the conversation switched over to technology, Mikhail Sergeyevich recalled that he was himself a former combine-harvester operator. He went over to a new vehicle. It was produced by the Krasnoyarsk combine works, and designers and engineers talked about it. [video shows the combine harvester, with Gorbachev and crowd standing beside it] He was mainly interested in the opinion of the man who worked with it, the combine operator Aleksandr Vasilyevich Zhelob. It was not enough for him to just talk about the machine: He also invited Mikhail Sergeyevich into the cab to try it and drive it for a while. Mikhail Sergeyevich said: I can hardly drive off myself now, but you go ahead, and I will watch.

These are the pictures that we shot in that field. [video shows Gorbachev sitting in the cab of the combine]

Another stop on the land in Shushenskoye Rayon, the village of Kazantsevo. [video shows country road seen through a car's windshield, then Gorbachev standing with another crowd]

[Gorbachev] Now those who want to have a private garden or orchard, are they given land? What? With what? Well, you know, if we put the question this way: If people in the countryside have to get their food from a shop and not provide for themselves, where will we end up? Well? Where are we to go from here? Well, you have to grow things on the land—especially Minusinsk apples....

[Man, interrupting] Tomatoes?

[Gorbachev] Tomatoes, watermelons, plums, everything.

[Man] Melons?

[Gorbachev] So this is what I think. When you say everything is moving slowly and with difficulty here, that means that someone is blocking the road. Well then. In circumstances in which such powers are now being given you for the labor collective, can you not take hold of the person responsible and give him a good shaking if he does not get cracking here. If he is not keen on perestroika, but, on the contrary, prefers stagnation, the longer the better. Come on now!

If it were necessary to travel down from Moscow to organize perestroika here, then we would not be making any headway. This would be a wretched business, comrades, a dreadful state of affairs. Let's get cracking. Get cracking yourselves. That's it.

[Announcer] Sayano-Shushenskoye GES. It is precisely this GES that feeds power to dozens of works and combines in Khakassiya. Construction of the cascade of stations has been going on for a long time, for over 2 decades. There were years when financing of construction almost ceased. Even though the power engineering workers have now already completely recouped expenditures on the construction of the GES, there continue to be quite a few problems here. [video shows reservoir and dam, Gorbachev walking from his limousine to the crowd]

[Gorbachev] Good day, comrades!

[Crowd] Hello! Hello!

[Gorbachev] We have arrived at last. You probably have something to tell me.

[Man] Yes, there has been a great deal of talk.

[Gorbachev] As you can somehow see, the debate about the hydropower has gotten under way somewhat, but the discussion must be serious, not a simple one. The discussion must be responsible because power is needed, all the same. But there are problems in connection with ecology, and problems have arisen with hydropower stations. It is perhaps the case that the methods of approach we have been using up to now may need improving or changing, but that we must use hydroresources—the cheapest resources—rationally and skillfully, but in such a way as not to inflict damage on nature, on the land, and fish resources; that is also a real problem.

[Man] [Word indistinct] I cannot.

[Gorbachev] If someone thinks that it happens like this now, that if we want a station it will be built at any price—well, it doesn't. Some among you, among you, hydrobuilders, say: Give us work to do, and that is all they are interested in.

[Man] (?We have been working.) [video shows Gorbachev smiling at this]

[Gorbachev] I think that (?you are right).

[Woman] If we [words indistinct] hydrobuilders.

[Gorbachev] Undoubtedly, these are vital, real issues and not farfetched ones. That power is needed is quite true. How can we live without power? It is also the case that in other countries these water resources are being used for these purposes from 40 to 70 percent: in Canada, in the United States, in Europe, in Sweden, etc. The view springs up in me that we are drawing up a national program of water conservation and for the conservation of energy. This stands out [words indistinct] and expensive program [words indistinct].

[Man] Mikhail Sergeyevich...

[Gorbachev, interrupting]. Now I will end. With regards to Krasnoyarsk Kray, here there are various matters: There are remote matters still requiring careful study to resolve them [words indistinct]. One part is clear but other parts are not yet clear. There are matters that are clear and they must be tackled. Therefore, probably, evidently for Krasnoyarsk it is necessary to draw up, directly, such a territorial (?program) of your own. Because nature in Krasnoyarsk Kray has been heavily damaged.

[Woman] I would simply like this question also to be... [drowned out by other voices from crowd].

[Gorbachev] What did you want?

[Man] Mikhail Sergeyevich, I have a question from a slightly different area. Your book, "Perestroyka: New Thinking for Our Country," has been published in the West: Is it going to come out in this country?

[Gorbachev] It has come out. Three million copies, comrades!

[Man] Well, it has not reached the backwater of Siberia [word indistinct].

[Gorbachev] Well, had I known I'd have wrapped up a few copies.

[Man] It will be 20 years before it reaches us.

[Gorbachev] Comrades, 3 million copies of that book have come out in this country [words indistinct]. What is your mood like, in general?

[Man] Our mining [words indistinct] the power ministry.

[Gorbachev] You must keep your spirits up in all events, comrades! I will tell you straight out that the hottest and most complex time for us is now beginning. We must now put this policy into practice. This turns out not to be simple.

[Man] Mikhail Sergeyevich, you have only helpers here in this matter. In this matter you have only helpers here.

[Gorbachev] Fine, fine. That is fine. In general, I must say that the restructuring is maintained by the support of the people. I can see this, because those who wish to trip it up, so to speak, there they are, but now already the people [words indistinct].

[Woman] They are getting fewer in number.

[Gorbachev] Fewer, fewer! There is the fact that now the road is opening up in the party too for communists to look at who is best for what, and at who should lead party organizations, both at the primary, rayon, and city level,

and even in the Central Committee. This is very important. The conference, you see, showed that the communists are not going to accept things as they are. Maybe in some places they have not yet had a shaking up, and maybe in some places they are still biding their time, so to speak. Never mind! It was quite a different matter a year ago. We want to create a situation in the soviets where electoral law is different, where there is competition, with several people, some sort of choice, so that people can really select leaders in life.

[Man] Well, delegates to the party conference were elected according to secret criteria.

[Gorbachev] Listen, after all, we thought up a way of holding elections. We are starting all this at once. We are now starting financial autonomy—how many mistakes? We are starting leasing—how many mistakes? How do we know how to do it? How do we know?

How do we know it? We have gotten wiser. We have had the conference, we have had elections to the conference, and now for the report-back elections things are different, and at rayon conferences things are quite different. Now the communists at primary meetings make their own proposals on who should go to the rayon committee. That is something different. We have envisaged this.

[Man] Could you tell us if there are antirestrictionists at the level of ministers, heads of main administrations, heads of associations?

[Gorbachev] I would say that...

[Man, interrupting] [Words indistinct].

[Gorbachev] No, I would say that the ministers are practically all new people by now. There are people who have not found their place. You know why they have not found it yet, even, I can tell you, under our influence? We say we have given the enterprise all the rights and it is supposed to be responsible for everything there.

On the other hand, we hold the minister to account, asking: What has been going wrong at your enterprises? You get it sorted out. That is, even we are still resorting to these methods. Why are we resorting to them? Because your financial autonomy has not yet started working properly and the results are not yet what they should be. But we have to live. There is shortage of this and shortage of that. We need more of everything, more goods, more results. So what we get here is that financial autonomy is being mastered, new methods are being mastered, there is democracy at the enterprise and on top of all that we go on issuing commands and monitoring. It is probably the era that we are in. Then the minister too starts interfering. You think: What is the matter, he is making our life miserable again.



It is true, by the way, that the situation has changed a great deal. They have been asking the leaders over and over: Give us independence, do not interfere. They got independence, they tried it. Now they are asking to come back, turn the wheel back, meaning, give us 100 percent state orders. Just a minute, what kind of independence is that? There are state orders for what the state needs and what is vital for it, you think about the rest. Conclude contracts with your customers and work on the basis of agreements. That is more difficult, they say, it is easier through Gosplan. You tie us through Gosplan to this enterprise and to that one.

The engineers gathered at the Council of Ministers and some 40 managers were persuading Comrade Ryzhkov that for the time being, for 2 years, the engineers should have completely different state orders. There were scientists there, all sorts, academicians, and they adopted not a permanent law but a temporary one, for 2 years, regarding state orders. You see how hard it is to restructure your thinking. It is not all simple, comrades. It has now reached every one of us and it is not all easy going. It has even started affecting the workers. A change of rates is in progress. In Norilsk they kept on asking me: Why, he says, have we got new rates and the pay stays the same? I answered: Have you started to produce more than before the new rates? He said: No, I do the same as before. So what are you supposed to be getting paid for? He said: There are new rates. So I said: Rates are rates, they are some kind of determined criterion, but you get paid for your work. Have you started to work more? Have you started to produce more? He said: No, so far it is like before. Perhaps there will be more. I said: Well, if it is like before then get paid like before.

[Man] Mikhail Sergeyevich...

[Gorbachev, interrupting] So you see how it is. Nothing is simple. Well then, he says, how can we produce more? Through productivity, and by bringing in new equipment.

Then there will be fewer of you because of technology, I say. Oh no, we have to keep our jobs, he says. So the whole thing begins. Why should they keep their jobs? There will be others. They do not pay extra for the harmful environment there, he says, and there are fewer allowances. So I would like to stay here. So do not touch me for the time being. I am working here for the moment. You can bring in the technology later.

You see how (?earnest he is). All of this is not simple, comrades, it is not simple. Are we going to try to break our people and our society across our knee? Then we might as well bring in capitalism, and break everything that way by means of the market, break everything across our knee. That would mean that the revolution was unnecessary, and everything that we have done up to now has been unnecessary. We could do it that way. But no. I am convinced all the same that socialism contains vast possibilities. It is a human system. The fact that it was twisted only shows how strong it is—they tried to

break it, but it survived. People believe this. The working class and the toiling people need socialism, it is their system. Perhaps some people would be suited by something else, but the people, the masses, need this system. I am convinced of this. This is the only way I know, and I think that it is also the only way you know. We were born and grew up and will continue to live in a socialist fashion. I am convinced that this system will still have its say. Our people will have their say.

[Man] What stage of socialism have we reached now?

[Gorbachev] It is not a question of stages. You have all gotten used to thinking like this—you are a young fellow, and all you are interested in is stages! [laughter] I believe that we are at the state of restructuring, that which we have so far created. There you have the stage we are at! [laughter]

[Announcer] This and very many other acute problems were discussed at meetings between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and hydro-engineering construction workers and power engineering personnel. [video shows Gorbachev talking to a group of workers inside; Gorbachev being shown a control room]

Also today, a conversation took place in Abakan between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and members of the obkom and representatives of the public. We have broadcast an account of the 4th day of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to Krasnoyarsk Krai. [video shows Gorbachev sitting behind table with two other men; shots of audience in a conference room; shot of building]

#### Lease Contracting Discussed

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[Text] During his stay in Abakan, the CPSU Central Committee general secretary had a meeting with the inhabitants of the Khakass Autonomous Oblast. Then, the general secretary arrived in the rayon center, Shushenskoye, where he visited the memorial museum and preserve of Vladimir Ilich Lenin's Siberian exile. He looked at the exhibits and laid flowers at the memorial to the leader of the proletarian revolution. Comrade Gorbachev then visited the Sayavo-Shushenskoye hydroelectric power station, one of the largest energy producing complexes in the country. On the way there he stopped at the fields of the Shushenskoye Lenin and Krupskaya Sovkhoz technical college.

This is the conversation that took place with the workers and management there:

[Begin recording] [Gorbachev] What do you think of lease contracting?

[Man] One could include the economic means for managing production in this, but probably today it is not possible to go down a different road.

[Gorbachev] But, what's the actual situation? It is now that ideologically you are in favor.

[Man] So far as lease contracting is concerned, the actual situation is that we started to switch over the lease contracting 6 months ago.

[Gorbachev] The situation today?

[Man] Yes?

[Gorbachev] To what extent is it lease contracting?

[Man] Well, we've now made contracts for the period up to the end of the 5-year plan so that there is a firm 5-year plan; so that we can, well...[man changes thought] Later on we'll continue, and then I think that we will start on the plan for a 10-year period. There's no other way.

[Gorbachev] That's correct. And in the long term we must develop lease contracting to the point where main centers (?are set up) which will offer technology and stock-taking expertise; where there are services, an oil depot and repair facilities; those conveniences which constitute the infrastructure.

Take any farmer in Canada or somewhere. He is the farmer, but he immediately joins a cooperative where repairs can be done, where there are spare parts, where there are chemicals; everything is there. What's more, he's in a marketing cooperative.

Everything here is coming together. You don't have to think up the idea for yourselves. Therefore we, by means of lease contracting [words indistinct] are taking a similar sort of step.

Are we going to (?abolish) the sovkhozes? No. On the contrary, we are unleashing whatever can be unleashed by a domestic lease contracting system; we are unleashing the potential of the sovkhoz. Now in those areas where small- group lease contracting is going—either a family or a group with a unit or something—there are fast rates of growth, fast. There too [word indistinct] in a year. They take the same [word indistinct] these were expended on the stock farm and on result [words indistinct] level of 1,000-1,500 kg.

[Man] We are training pupils in this way. We also make over land for lease contracting. In the autumn the final result is calculated and they distribute the profit among themselves.

[Gorbachev] If we take Andrey's kolkhoz farm and apply the situation there to you, then how much superfluous technology have you got?

[Man] A good deal probably. [laughter] Quite a lot.

[Gorbachev] They have not carried out an analysis. Probably a good deal. Think it out carefully. Winter is a time for, as they say [word indistinct] isn't it. We must do our calculations because before, you know, we kept on saying: We have not got enough! We have not got enough!

First let's look at the Rebinskiy Sovkhoz where there were 48 trucks and it wasn't enough. They asked for more from the town. Now there are 18 trucks, but each one is on lease to the driver. And they managed to do everything with these 18 trucks. Just look what is happening, comrades. This is all cost-effective. Never mind that. How much is being squandered on these vehicles?

[Man] That's right.

[Gorbachev] There were 56 tractors and now only 30 are left. We do not need so many tractors. We must consider combine harvesters. And incidentally even combine harvesters (?are hard to come by). [Word indistinct] for not just any harvesters but give us Dons. They took 3 of them instead of 10. Three, because there are 3 of them, and between 10 that means they use them so that each machine works for 3. And this means fewer losses and better quality, too, especially when the grain has been flattened. The specialists are even getting excited, excited. Not everybody wants to head a lease team. It means one has to work from dawn to dusk.

[Unidentified voices] And there's (?precise) calculation to do.

[Gorbachev] And as a result some try to force them out—those lease contract teams. I read about how the struggle unfolded in Omsk, and I was stunned. A whole village area fighting against family contracts. A whole village area because these people are earning and the others are simply being overpaid.

[Man] So we must be more assertive.

[Gorbachev] Yes. Anything can happen when it turns out that a sovkhoz—and there are many like this—makes a loss, but yet the peasant or collective farmer feels everything's okay, because it is made up, the losses are recompensed. The credit keeps coming in so the result is: Why strain yourself? The pay is still coming in even when that's my attitude. What does he want leasing for? What is all this? He's doing well on a loss-making farm. So it turns out that he is not producing anything; not providing produce for the country; that's the first thing, and secondly [words indistinct].

It is important that a person should earn his pay. And [words indistinct] a lot is (?wrong), has he earned it or not? That is the question to ask. And there are no results, you understand, but he is still getting his pay; who needs that? This is the most important thing. At a works, at a

construction site, the pay has been kept up, but the production is either not the full quantity or the quality is poor. On the kolkhoz they say we've done our bit, we've fulfilled the norm, so hand over the money.

The machine operators know what goes on. I am a machine operator myself; you can clock up hectares, on your combine you get paid for hectares of undergrowth, too, but meanwhile you are 3 or 4 quintals short at the threshing, you understand. Or when you are sowing, why [word indistinct] the sowing, I'm not responsible for the crop, I won't suffer because of this. [Words indistinct] everything is okay, the [word indistinct] is okay.

Very well, we have all got money, but then what? You have to go somewhere with this money. Where? To the market, to buy building materials, to buy a television—but then that's of poor quality, too. You buy it and curse, when in fact you have been working at just the same level of quality. So who are we cursing? We have driven each other into the corner, you understand. That's not what we need; we can't live like that. And in this case, the front-ranking farms are put in a difficult position and [words indistinct]. The profits are taken from the sovkhos and redistributed. They were taken, redistributed, and used to cover (?losses). But there has to be somewhere to take it from to cover the losses of others. And it is easier to get rid of the loss-makers and give everything to the front-ranker who will take it and perhaps produce cheaper and better commodities.

The next question is: What is to be dissolved? Then the question will be: How are we to work? (?If you want to work, there's work in lease contracting). [end recording]

Today, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee left Sushenskoye for Krasnoyarsk.

#### **Paper Cites TV Interview**

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[TASS report on USSR Central Television 15 September interview in Krasnoyarsk with M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee: "Taking the Road of Practical Action"]

[Text] Krasnoyarsk, 15 Sep—After looking around the exhibition in the "V.I. Lenin's Siberian Exile" memorial museum and estate, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev gave an interview to a Central Television correspondent.

Correspondent: There is a draft of the first party program on display in the exhibition. It contains an idea that strikes a common note with one put forward at the 27th CPSU Congress. A communist cannot perform a vanguard role in general; it is expressed in particular deeds. In my view, this idea is present in nearly all the 30 works V.I. Lenin wrote here. Did you find it was confirmed on your present trip?

M.S. Gorbachev: You have found a fine Lenin idea. But I remember another that provided the impetus for our current reflections, for an understanding of the current period. I am talking about one of the works relating to the elaboration of the Russian social democracy program. In it V.I. Lenin put forward an idea that is squarely in the Marxist tradition—on the priority of social development interests over the proletariat's class interests. One sees again the wealth of Lenin's legacy. Indeed, the proletariat, on coming to the center of the historical stage, no longer expresses only its own interests, but the overall direction of the historical process, in particular its progressive traits. And in this sense the interests of this class coincide completely with the interests of working people and, broadly speaking, with all the progressive interests of a particular society. This Marxist idea came out here. But today look at the stress human civilization is undergoing. There have been problems that we have comprehended, and this comprehension has developed into the formula that common human values take priority.

Despite all the contradictions in our civilization and despite the fact that the most diverse systems coexist in it, it is the only civilization we have. And clearly, all the components of this civilization have a responsibility to preserve it. It is a priority that everyone must recognize, if only out of common sense, irrespective of the ideological aspect. But today's civilization is an interrelated world, one that has become cramped and subject to various stresses: the nuclear threat, ecology, scientific and technical progress, pressure over resources, the correct division of labor and resources in order to preserve nature and the earth.

I am happy to have visited the place where Ilich put forward this idea, because it crystalized our thoughts on the modern world, on the world we live in. And this developed into the new thinking which, I believe, now has world acceptance. It was a mental stimulus for all progressive forces. And not only progressives, but realistic bourgeois forces as well. There is a deepening awareness of the interrelated nature of the world we live in, for all its contradictions. That is what I wanted to convey here.

Which brings me back to the Lenin idea you reiterated here. It was indeed confirmed by the present trip. I would put it this way: People view the same situation in different ways. And I have tried, as you will probably have realized, to put my point of view. Yes, indeed, we needed the first 2-3 years to actually understand what had happened to our country, to us all. We did not come from another planet, we were not on a mission from another state with instructions to stage a coup and implement restructuring in the Soviet Union. No. We are all children of our own time, of our society. I have said this over and over.

First, restructuring was a product of ourselves; we therefore have the potential, and we have preserved it, despite all that has befallen all the generations. At this present

moment I do not want to go back over this and make evaluations, particularly as we have made them and are continuing to amplify them. We are doing this in order to know our history, because nothing arises out of a vacuum. Each stratum of culture and each stratum of social development takes shape on a previous base. It dialectically absorbs all the progressive elements that were created there and rejects everything that impedes and inhibits. That is the way we must comprehend our history now, in our restructuring. In this sense we must do a great deal of intellectual work. And it is not something for one person, for a group of academics, or for a group of politicians to do. It is a matter for our entire society. We have embarked on this intellectual work and there are already results in the sense of understanding our society, what path it has followed, what has happened to us. We have not lost the impetus provided by October and Lenin and by our revolution at the first stage of its development under Vladimir Ilich's leadership. We have not lost the impetus, despite the severe ordeals, internal and external. But we can also see the distortions and the errors that, of course, have affected our development and are still affecting it, and are preventing the full blossoming of the potential that our society possesses. Socialism itself possesses such potential that we are only just beginning to explore it. It took 2-3 years to appreciate and understand all this. You cannot take something on without understanding it. Before proposing a policy and presenting a society such as ours—the first socialist state, which has a special responsibility both to socialism and to the whole world by dint of its international prestige—with objectives, it was necessary to have a fine grasp of everything.

Maybe certain people think that this period has gone on too long, that we have gotten carried away and gotten involved in debates and are incapable of changing gear and taking the road of practical action. Perhaps these people are right to some extent. But, on the other hand, we must continue to study our society. We have understood the main elements, now we need practical action. This is the feature of the present stage, the policy we have elaborated in passionate debates, in arguments, in clashes of opinion, which have sometimes been dramatic.

We have a clear-cut policy. It will be deepened and enriched in all areas by life itself. V.I. Lenin always took life into account.

Just think back to the first 5 years following November 1917, until he was crippled by illness. The amount of changes Vladimir Ilich made to the development of revolutionary thinking without fearing that he would be called an opportunist or a revisionist.

People like Lenin come along once every century, perhaps every 1,000 years. Lenin's correctness was subsequently proved. Look at the Brest Peace. Lenin stood almost alone in the debates on this question. And yet everything worked out according to Lenin.

Look at the New Economic Policy [NEP]. What a turnabout that was! Some Communists, even the most dedicated ones, were unwilling to clash with Lenin and took their own lives. The drama of it all. But things worked out. And look at the results that were achieved!

The subsequent fate of NEP is not the topic of our conversation, but turnabouts were certainly achieved. We need just such a turnabout now, in terms of scope and importance. We are talking about a revolution, about the future of socialism. Actions are needed now. This is where we are beginning to lag because everything is not that simple.

Ultimately we all agreed on the issue of the policy of restructuring, we agreed that there is no other alternative. It is now part of our daily life, it is within each and every one of us, in our minds and hearts.

Correspondent: It did not prove easy to achieve. Starting with your trip to Kuybyshev, I can see people's moods changing in the conversations and the topics which are raised. There is less euphoria, but what is said is more truthful.

M.S. Gorbachev: I am convinced that our society is already different. This is the paramount result of restructuring. It is untrue to say that restructuring has produced nothing. It has produced the main element: policy. Admittedly it is sometimes criticized from various sides. But nobody can suggest anything else. This is the first point.

Second. People have a different mood, a different stance, a different attitude toward the future, toward their country. This is the main point.

We have to get out onto the main highway. Now is the most difficult period. If someone were to say that cadres are to blame for the mistakes and difficulties, I would reply: Yes, they are largely to blame, both in the past and in the present. By no means have all of them really gotten involved. But if someone were to say that everything is up to the cadres alone, I would disagree. It is not just up to the cadres. It is primarily up to each and every one of us. People have gotten used to certain stereotypes and approaches, to certain attitudes toward work. A major and most profound turnabout is also needed here. Restructuring has affected people by the millions. By no means is everyone capable of grasping it and appreciating it at once. It is even harder to implement it.

Here we come back to Lenin's ideas about the party. Our party is truly a vanguard, and this means that Communists' vanguard role must be played in restructuring more than ever before. The party cannot lag behind. It must really be society's political vanguard.



But how can it be a vanguard if it takes on everything—from cement and bricks right through to major issues of domestic and foreign policy? No. It must properly concern itself with political issues, cadre policy, the organization of the masses, and ideological work; it must sense society's moods and perceive all processes. And it must promptly make adjustments, enrich policy, stand with people, and involve them in restructuring.

Our party is now living through a very responsible period. Nothing comes easily. I have said this repeatedly. Look at the report and election campaign now under way. Communists have become so demanding. True enough, there are also many meetings held in the way they were held 10 years ago. We realize this. Not everything is going the way we would like it to. Communists in many primary party organizations are of the opinion that different people must head them. Over the last 2 years they have had a chance to see the way people behave and the positions they have taken. And now elections are being held by secret ballot. Moreover, as a rule there are several candidates to choose from. Therefore, processes of self-realization are under way. With difficulty, but under way.

Correspondent: They are also under way among us journalists. Incidentally, it was here in Shushenskoye that Lenin's approach to the party press, toward ISKRA and its organizational role, took shape. This task is now coming to the forefront.

M.S. Gorbachev: The press must be the way Ilich imagined it: collective propagandist, collective agitator, collective organizer.

Now is the time for practical action. This means that it is necessary to translate this idea of Lenin's into action, to disseminate advanced experience in good time so that it can be made available to all. It is very important at this time to realize how the work should be done. This can be agonizing. Often not because someone is conservative or backward. No. He has simply not found his place yet. He is still seeking the way to do his work now. The press is also seeking. In my view, it should be more profound, more competent, more responsible. At times there are, of course, many things that cause annoyance. Incidentally, you journalists are made vulnerable by your own mistakes. You are properly reminded of this. And justly. We are opening up zones for criticism within the party, the state, and the sectors, and so the press cannot be immune to criticism. Do you expect our press to be exempt from monitoring? This will not happen. Society will not allow it.

Correspondent: A Law on the Press is being prepared. It would be nice if it were not biased only toward pressure on journalists.

M.S. Gorbachev: Certainly.

Correspondent: But various sanctions and monetary fines are already being suggested....

M.S. Gorbachev: Quite, very good, very good. (Laughter)

We will solve this question democratically. Democracy must also work for the press.

These are difficult and complex times, but they are also great and happy times for those who participate in restructuring.

In my view, we have the strength not only to blow the whistle but also to set the entire train of restructuring in motion.

Correspondent: Thank you for the interview.

### More on GES, Rural Visits

PM1609122188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
16 Sep 88 Second Edition p 1

[Report by special correspondents N. Krivomazov, A. Chernyak, and G. Yastrebtsov: "Living and Working in a Leninist Manner; M.S. Gorbachev's Stay in Krasnoyarsk Kray"]

[Excerpts] Abakan-Shushenskoye-Sayano-Shushenskoye GES—The test of time is the hardest but also the most reliable test. Far from everything and far from everyone passes it. Leninism has. Today we speak particularly exactly of the need for a return to Lenin, to his ideas and thoughts.

The Krasnoyarsk land is closely linked with Lenin's name. Here in Shushenskoye Vladimir Ilich was in exile, thought about the creation of the party, and wrote over 30 works. Again and again we turn to him, reread him again, learn to live and work in a Leninist manner. This idea was repeatedly stressed yesterday by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, during his visit to Abakan, Shushenskoye, and the Sayano-Shushenskoye GES. [passage omitted]

At a meeting at the [Khakass] party obkom, first secretary G. Kazmin briefed the guest on the oblast party organization's work to fulfill the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th party conference. Among the country's autonomous oblasts Khakassiya ranks first in the summary of economic development indicators. And light industry accounts for almost half this volume. The situation in agriculture is improving.

M.S. Gorbachev inquired how the autonomous oblast felt. What problems of a national nature arise—after all there are 94 nationalities in the oblast? And each nationality has its own language and culture....

"Yes, we live in a multinational oblast," G. Troshkina, chairman of the Khakass Oblispolkom, replied. "But for me, a Khakass, as for my fellow countrymen, this has

always been a normal state of affairs. We live in harmony and the oblast's economy is developing stably. But I cannot fail to state now that it is essential considerably to enhance the role of the soviets, to raise their prestige, and to finally put real power in their hands. [passage omitted]

On the same day M.S. Gorbachev visited the Sayano-Shushenskoye GES. [passage omitted]

One worker showed the general secretary a large photograph:

"Take a look, Mikhail Sergeyevich, the GES reservoir is literally choked by the forest. A taiga sea!"

"Yes, the nature of Krasnoyarsk Kray has been greatly harmed. Science has missed an opportunity here. And, as you remember, these was a very keen discussion at the Akademgorodok. The GES has been operating and under construction for over 10 years now. Is that not too long?"

"It is a very long time," carpenter and concrete worker S. Sinitsa was convinced. "Had it not been for our appeal to PRAVDA, the Ministry of Power and Electrification would again have put off the end of construction to 'later.' Things are going particularly badly with regard to the contract. Is it not scandalous that work schedules for the month are issued only in the middle of the month?"

"That's right!" carpenter and concrete worker N. Ivashchenko from the team of Hero of Socialist Labor V. Poznyakov supports him. "The team contract is marking time, there is no clear-cut organization of labor, and there is a great deal of uncompleted work. Only concrete gives us money. If the matter is assigned to one team, another remains without wages." [passage omitted]

The general secretary did not leave a single question unattended.

"What is to happen with hydraulic power stations? We must investigate. It is not a question of hydraulic technology being the wrong direction. No. Hydraulic technology must be in harmony with nature conservation and with other sectors, because here too departmental interests have been put above everything else in order to make the project cheaper. By excluding nature conservation work and making the project—a departmental project—cheaper, they have caused harm above all to nature. That is what we must avoid! And the 'Krasnoyarskgesstroy' collective should not be disbanded straight away."

The opinion that restructuring should be promoted more vigorously was voiced.

"I am in favor of that too," Mikhail Sergeyevich answered. "Of course we all want restructuring to proceed more rapidly. Everyone is impatient in Krasnoyarsk, in Norilsk, and here. And that is understandable.

But it must be done without rushing, it must not be done at any price. We must not commit follies in doing it. We must implement restructuring in a considered and businesslike way, deriving lessons from what is good and from what is bad."

M.S. Gorbachev visited the fields of Shushenskiy Rayon. [passage omitted]

M.S. Gorbachev was shown the new "Kedr" combine (it is true the name has not been confirmed yet) from the Krasnoyarsk plant which is working here. [passage omitted]

"What is the machine like?" M.S. Gorbachev asked Shushenskiy Rayon combine test driver Aleksandr Vasil'yevich Zholob.

"It's a good machine, Mikhail Sergeyevich. Lighter than the previous model. Reliable. Some 15-20 percent more productive. The cabin is at the axis of movement and the engine is to the rear so that it is neither hot nor noisy in the cabin with its air conditioner. But you can assess it better for yourself."

The combine operator invited the general secretary to climb onto the foot plate and check the combine in operation for himself. The machine moved off. The Shushenskoye grain came out. And now there was a question for the general secretary.

"How do you rate it, Mikhail Sergeyevich?" the designer asked.

"You should listen to what the grain growers have to say," M.S. Gorbachev replied.

"The grain growers praise it. The only thing is the price of the new machine should be commensurate with its quality and productivity," A. Yemelyanov, director of the sovkhos-technical college, said.

The combine operator asked:

"Mikhail Sergeyevich, we know that you began your career as an assistant combine operator. Which harvest do you particularly remember?"

The general secretary recalled the difficult grain harvest of 1948 and how he and his father were working on a combine. Two family crews, two fathers and two sons. They threshed—the figure was easy to remember—8,888 quintals. The fathers received Orders of Lenin, the sons Orders of the Labor Red Banner.

"When I visit my home village I always meet with the machine operators," Mikhail Sergeyevich said. "I must admit that even now when the harvest begins I cannot sit in my office...."

M.S. Gorbachev visited the "Siberian exile of V.I. Lenin" memorial museum and preserve. [passage omitted]

**Khakass Trip Summarized**  
*PM1609142188 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA*  
*in Russian 16 Sep 88 Second Edition p 1*

[Special correspondents Yu. Nikolayev and A. Shchegolev report on CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev's 15 September activities in Krasnoyarsk Krai: "Ilich's Undertaking Today"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Restructuring... We would not be mistaken if we point out that this was the word heard most often on the 4th day of the stay on Siberian soil. M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Shushenskoye took place at precisely midday. But even in the morning, during the flight to Abakan, the capital of Khakass Autonomous Oblast, there was talk of restructuring.

The first prolonged conversation with working people was held on 1 May Square. Someone said:

"In some places and in our area restructuring is proceeding slowly, and in others it can't be seen at all."

In response to his interlocutor Mikhail Sergeyevich noted that the success of restructuring depends on the activeness of each and everyone. It must not be thought that restructuring is a fried egg that you will be brought for breakfast, he joked. Of course, it is easy to imagine a person sitting at the table waiting for someone to prepare something in the kitchen instead of starting to prepare it himself. So one must expect that it is better to set about things for yourself. We have seen that the ispolkom does not resolve any urgent questions—convene a session and decide for yourselves how things are to be. The people have greater rights now, yet few people have learned to make use of them. Some people say: More business, less discussion. But you must think for yourselves how to do this!

Later, when giving an interview to "Vremya" in the old village of Shushenskoye, M.S. Gorbachev said that some people are indeed talking about the lengthy time taken for restructuring. Quite possibly, they are right to some extent. But, he stressed, we simply needed the first 2-3 years to understand what was happening to our country and to all of us.... We are all children of this time, we are all children of our time.

Restructuring has given us a most important thing: It has come to millions of people, taken control of their thoughts, and compelled them to assess objectively and critically everything that has been done. It is not only leading cadres who are to blame for the problems that have accumulated in our society—there are many people in labor collectives in our country who have grown accustomed to particular stereotypes and who do not want to look at the world in the new way....

But let us return to the discussion on 1 May Square. M.S. Gorbachev recalled one of his conversations in Norilsk. People complained to him: We have introduced a new wage scale here but wages haven't increased. People say there is confusion. I asked, Mikhail Sergeyevich said, whether the results of work had changed here. No, the answer came, we are working in the same way.

That is the essence of the matter—for many years we noticeably got out of the habit of earning our wages and grew accustomed to a salary increase automatically following a change in wage rates. The so-called "pay inducement," when people were paid not for specific actions but for simply coming to work, was a real scourge. Pay must only be given for the end result and wages must be earned—that is the immutable law of our days.

The general secretary's simple way of dealing with people and his sincerity evoked an equally sincere benevolent response from Siberians. They wished Mikhail Sergeyevich health and firmness in continuing the course of restructuring. This was what happened in Shushenskoye itself and during the stop on the fields of the V.I. Lenin and N.K. Krupskaya Sovkhoz and Technical College, and in other places covered in the course of the visit.

Mikhail Sergeyevich inquired as to how relations between people of different nationalities are taking shape here.

"We live harmoniously," those assembled replied.

This was also confirmed by G.A. Troshkina, chairman of Khakass Oblispolkom, at a meeting at the party obkom held soon after M.S. Gorbachev's arrival in Abakan. The representatives of 94 nations and ethnic groups live on the territory of the oblast, she reported. They cultivate arable land, work at industrial enterprises, and construct housing as if they were a single Siberian family.

More than 10 percent of the autonomous oblast's population of 600,000 are native inhabitants. They are represented in party organs and soviets of people's deputies. Many are teachers, doctors, cultural and art workers. But there are few people from Khakass Autonomous Oblast among the technical intelligentsia. [passage omitted]

...On the road again. This time to the power engineering workers and construction workers at Sayano-Shushenskoye GES. A frank and impartial discussion took place once again here at the foot of the station. For we all know that the country's largest GES has become, alas, a sorry example of construction schedule overrun, and that things are going poorly here.... But what about ecological problems and conserving the priceless Siberian nature?

Mikhail Sergeyevich said the following words in farewell to the gathering:

"A most ardent and complex time has now arrived.... Actions and strenuous work are needed now."

The response:

"We will assist you in this question!"

...It was late in the evening when the general secretary went to the airport. En route he passed through the village of Sizaya. Yet another stop.

"Thank you for coming to see us, Mikhail Sergeyevich," the peasants said.

"Thank her," he replied greeting a woman carrying a loaf of Siberian bread. "I saw the bread and couldn't pass it by. I just couldn't. Thank you for your labor, your kind hearts, and for your faith in our common cause."

#### Activities, Meetings Reviewed

PM1609120188 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
16 Sep 88 Morning Edition p 1

[Special correspondents V. Gavrichkin and A. Shcherbakov report: "Asserting the Revolutionary Spirit of Restructuring. M.S. Gorbachev's Visit to Krasnoyarsk Kray"]

[Excerpts] Abakan-Shushenskoye-Sayanogorsk—M.S. Gorbachev was warmly welcomed by Abakan's residents 15 September. A meeting took place at the Khakass party obkom. M.S. Gorbachev then visited the Lenin museum and park in Shushenskoye, saw for himself the life and work of the collective of the V.I. Lenin and N.K. Krupskaya Sovkhoz and Technical College, and toured the construction site of the Sayano-Shushenskaya GES, the Siberian power industry giant. [passage omitted]

It was no accident that M.S. Gorbachev raised the subject of grain and food supply matters at the very start of his stay in the Krasnoyarsk region, while still at the airport, and also en route to Krasnoyarsk during his brief stop at the rayon center of Yemelyanovo. This problem was also raised during M.S. Gorbachev's conversations with Abakan's residents.

This subject is particularly topical here. After all, Khakassiya enjoys as many sunny days per year as the Crimea. True enough, crop farmers here suffer the most severe droughts. But if reliance is placed on irrigated crop farming, if thrifty and energetic work is done, and if the irrigation network is expanded, Khakassiya's fields and primarily the Minusinsk Valley could certainly become a thriving garden. And this must happen. This would be in the interests of not only the southern rayons but the entire kray.

Now that the autonomous oblast's rights have been considerably expanded in all spheres of activity and primarily in the economy, a lot depends on enterprising

work by local management organs. It is necessary not just to create the semblance of work but to solve specific questions affecting people's most immediate interests.

During the meeting at the CPSU Obkom, M.S. Gorbachev asked about interethnic relations in Khakassiya, which is inhabited by representatives of more than 90 nationalities and ethnic groups. He noted that the country has progressed a long way in the sphere of developing ethnic relations, but quite a few problems have accumulated and await solution. [passage omitted]

The steady stream of people allows no grass to grow over the path leading to Shushenskoye today. The "V.I. Lenin's Siberian Exile" commemorative museum and park, opened here to mark the leader's birth centennial, has already been visited by more than 4 million people.

M.S. Gorbachev toured the museum and asked about the new documents and exhibits. In the course of conversations with residents of Shushenskoye, tourists, and memorial complex personnel he said that he had come on a pilgrimage to places associated with Lenin.

It is important for us not only to protect and preserve this memory; today we must restore Lenin's teaching, which is eternally alive in its development, in all its fullness and might, and use it to consolidate and assert the revolutionary spirit of restructuring.

Much here in Shushenskoye is linked with Lenin's name. In the course of his tour M.S. Gorbachev stopped in the fields of the V.I. Lenin and N.K. Krupskaya Sovkhoz and Technical College. [passage omitted]

The question of leasing relations is exceptionally important for agriculture's development. It was raised on numerous occasions during M.S. Gorbachev's meetings and conversations with people in Krasnoyarsk Kray. There was talk about leasing relations also in the field at the sovkhoz and technical college, where M.S. Gorbachev and machine operator A. Zholob tried out the new "Kedr" combine produced by the Krasnoyarsk plant. The leasing team led by N. Abramchik, whom M.S. Gorbachev also met here, in the field, this year produced 38 quintals of grain per hectare using irrigation. This is considerably more than the sovkhoz average yield.

M.S. Gorbachev had a memorable exchange with A. Veprev, director of the kray's famous "Nazarovskiy" Sovkhoz, at the conference in the USSR Academy of Sciences Siberian Department Krasnoyarsk Branch. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev asked A. Veprev, who had taken the rostrum: Will we manage to ensure food supplies for people in Krasnoyarsk Kray? No, the director replied, we will not manage it if we stick to the old-style economic management, if we continue to support "recumbent farms" at the state's expense, and leasing will not help either—it will wilt under the pressure of formalism and administrative-style management until we give the land to peasants' families. In response



to this, M.S. Gorbachev remarked that it was V.I. Lenin who brought the term "working peasant family" into circulation. And we must revive and recreate this type of family. This is not an easy process, because our country has been virtually depeasantized.

To all intents and purposes, Krasnoyarsk Kray has still done no serious work on either leasing contracts, or leasing as such, or questions concerning the formation of agricultural cooperatives, or their associations. Even contract forms of labor organization are still mainly "on paper" here. [passage omitted]

...Back on the road. We were on our way to Sayanogorsk. Just above the city stands the famous Karlov Range and the impressive Sayano-Shushenskaya GES dam.

If Abakan is the capital of the Sayany Territorial Production Complex, the hydroelectric power station is its heart, capable of pumping along its arteries—the high-voltage power transmission lines—electricity running to a total of 6.4 million kilowatts. [passage omitted]

The construction of the Sayanskiy hydroelectric power center will be completed in 2 years' time. All 10 units of our country's largest GES are already working for the national economy and have supplied it with more than 110 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity. The GES has already recouped its construction costs.

M.S. Gorbachev toured the Sayano-Shushenskaya GES, saw for himself the progress of work at the final stage of construction and the emerging problems, and met and conversed with the builders of the hydroelectric power center.

M.S. Gorbachev returned to Krasnoyarsk the same evening.

#### Further Press Report

PM1609153188 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA  
PRAVDA in Russian 16 Sep 88 p 1

[Unnamed TASS special correspondent report: "At a Crucial Time We Turn to Lenin: M.S. Gorbachev's Meetings With Working People in Krasnoyarsk Kray"]

[Text] Krasnoyarsk, 15 Sep—There are places which are particularly dear to each Soviet person. They include Shushenskoye, with its "V.I. Lenin's Siberian Exile" memorial museum and estate. The restored historical layout of the village, now protected, enables you to absorb the atmosphere of the life of the future leader of the October Revolution, who lived in Shushenskoye village between 1897-1900. Today M.S. Gorbachev visited the memorial complex.

The visit began at the house of a peasant, A.D. Zyryanov—this was V.I. Lenin's first apartment. The layout of the room was very simple. A table with a homemade tablecloth, locally made chairs, a kerosene lamp with a

green shade, a bookshelf, a wooden bed, and a Dutch oven. It was here that Vladimir Ilich got used to his "Shushenskoye chair." He worked a lot.

The setting is equally modest in Ilich's second apartment—in the house of peasant P.A. Petrova—where he went to live when Nadezhda Konstantinovna [Krupskaya] and her mother came to join him in exile. There, too, the time was subordinated to the strict schedule of intensive work on articles, brochures, and reviews and on preparing for publication the manuscript of the book "The Development of Capitalism in Russia." Very important party documents were produced in Shushenskoye, such as the "Protest of the Russian Social Democrats" and "Draft Program of Our Party," over 30 works in all.

The concern of the museum's workers to preserve these places where Lenin lived is impressive. One further detail: In front of the porch of Petrova's house they have painstakingly planted pansies, mignonettes, stock, phlox, and sweet pea, which the Ulyanov family kept on this selfsame patch of ground.

M.S. Gorbachev laid flowers at the V.I. Lenin Monument.

In the museum's comments book the general secretary made the following inscription:

"I am deeply moved by my visit to Lenin's memorial in Shushenskoye village.

"First of all I should like to thank all the people of Shushenskoye for everything they are doing to preserve Ilich's memory. When you see for yourself what Vladimir Ilich did during the years of exile you are struck by the scale of his creative activity and Ilich's supreme devotion to the revolutionary cause.

"You note with pride that his plans and scientific vision have become reality.

"The work begun by Ilich is part of our lives today. It is being continued in our restructuring. Once again at this crucial time we turn to Lenin. Lenin's thought, Lenin's example—they are our tremendous wealth and our guideline in our revolutionary deeds at the crucial stage in the development of Soviet society."

Before bidding farewell to Shushenskoye, M.S. Gorbachev gave an interview for Soviet television. (The interview is being published in the press.)

Wherever the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee went during the 4 days of his working visit to Krasnoyarsk Kray and whomever he met, everywhere you notice that people are drawn to a man to whom you can talk in a comradely and candid way.

And not only about the affairs of the country, which is living through a period of breakthrough now, but about the joys and, more often, the concerns—of the city, the settlement, even the individual family. And it was no surprise to anyone that during a meeting in Shushenskoye Rayon today the women who crowded around Mikhail Sergeyevich told the general secretary with an equal degree of responsibility not only their personal sorrows but also their anxiety for the fate of renewal.

One woman said bluntly: Nothing has changed in Kazantsevo, where we live, Mikhail Sergeyevich. You must come here more often.

The reply was a metaphor in the form of a joke which nonetheless reflected the main condition for the success of restructuring—the political activeness of the people.

But do you think, M.S. Gorbachev said, that restructuring is like a fried egg which is presented to you on a platter.

The participants in the following dialogue, which took place in the same rayon in a field belonging to the Sovkhoz and Technical College named for V.I. Lenin and N.K. Krupskaya, are not the kind of people who wait for restructuring to descend on them from on high.

Here he met with farm leaders and machine operators working on the grain harvest. A group of young people stood out from the crowd.

The general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee turned to one of them and asked where he was from. From the conversation it emerged that he was from the "Sibiryak" training kolkhoz which was set up 2 years ago on the neighboring "Sibir" Sovkhoz.

Mikhail Sergeyevich talked interestedly with 10th-grade student Andrey Vlasov, deputy chairman of the "Sibiryak" farm.

M.S. Gorbachev: I can see what a clever one you are. You've managed to become a deputy chairman. (laughter)

Andrey: We are organizing student links on the basis of the lease method. They are working on full economic accountability.

M.S. Gorbachev: What have you got, Andrey? How much land do you have at your disposal?

Andrey: We have 69 hectares of plowland. Wheat and corn are growing there. We use the corn as green matter, for feed. We are still growing potatoes. There are several hectares of fallow land. But we don't only have a crop-farming team. There is a stockraising team, too, and we have taken on a 12-hectare orchard. This is the 2d year we have been paying for it, this year we will pay under a lease.

M.S. Gorbachev: Then you'll set up on your own? (laughter) The first thing you need with a lease is to work out what is required for normal working and how much. What happens with leasing collectives? The number of tractors is halved, the number of vehicles is cut three-fold. If there is some seasonal work to do they say: We'll do it in 2 hours or 2 days and you do your calculations so that they don't trick you. How much profit do you make?

Andrey: Last year R20,000, but this year we are planning on around R40,000.

M.S. Gorbachev: How much per hectare is that?

Andrey: Profitability this year will be 150 percent.

Mikhail Sergeyevich asked about the history of the creation of the Sovkhoz-Technical College. Director A.G. Yemelyanov said that this training farm was formed in 1975 on the basis of the V.I. Lenin Sovkhoz and the N.K. Krupskaya Technical College. There are more than 800 students there, mainly in agricultural disciplines. The farm has 8,840 hectares of plowland sown to grain and feed crops and vegetables. Profitability is 42 percent.

M.S. Gorbachev: I don't understand, who teaches whom? (laughter)

Voice: We all learn from living examples like this, we are all educating ourselves, there is no other way.

M.S. Gorbachev: But how do you view the lease contract?

A.G. Yemelyanov: There is no alternative today.

M.S. Gorbachev: It is clear that ideologically you are in favor. What about in practice?

A.G. Yemelyanov: Beginning this year we have transferred the main production to the lease contract.

M.S. Gorbachev: How long is the term of the lease contract?

A.G. Yemelyanov: We think it should be for 10 years.

M.S. Gorbachev: That is the right way.

Voices: There can be no other.

The discussion turned to trust in man. When the things that are important to the country are discussed from a position of truth, M.S. Gorbachev said, our people will understand any situation and will meet it halfway. All that is necessary is to respect them, that is the main thing.

...Out in the sovkhos-technical college's field a new grain-harvesting combine, the "Kedr," created by Krasnoyarsk machine builders, is undergoing its factory tests. This "ship of the fields" catches the eye because of its unusual design and its silver and red paint. The general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee went up to the combine and asked detailed questions about it.

An account was provided by V.P. Gavrilov, general designer of the Krasnoyarsk Grain Combine Harvester Production Association. He said that the "Kedr" is a fundamentally new model and most of the mechanisms used in it are the result of original methods. The pressure exerted by the unit on the soil has been considerably reduced and grain losses have been cut.

M.S. Gorbachev made the acquaintance of combine operator A.V. Zholob, who was working with the "Kedr." He liked the new machine, noted the ease of operation, servicing, and refitting, and the high reliability. Then he invited Mikhail Sergeyevich into the cab.

...The road from Abakan to the Sayan foothills winds along the steep right bank of the Yenisey River. The steppe landscape imperceptibly gives way to the bewitching greenery of the gorges and the multicolored marble of the crags rising above the road. The bulk of the Sayano-Shushenskoye GES dam fits well in this majestic setting. Complete harmony, it would seem. But...at the foot of the GES there was an urgent discussion with the hydroengineers. Things are not easy at the Sayano-Shushenskoye station, as the whole country knows. The country's largest GES has unfortunately become a sorry example of a construction schedule overrun. The finishing work has not been completed yet. After discussing Sayano-Shushenskoye's urgent business with the hydroengineers, M.S. Gorbachev visited the station's machine room and talked with workers. No matter how much urgent work they have to do, everyone wants to talk with the party leader about matters affecting the whole country. The discussion centered on protecting Siberia's precious natural life and on cooperatives. Finally, do the construction workers have the right to demand the unconditional election of their working representative as a raykom bureau member? Every question receives a thorough answer.

...Another day of the trip is over, and not for the first time the program schedule proves to be hypothetical. It was not until late evening that the general secretary left for the airport. En route was the village of Sizaya. That meant another stop.

"Thank you for coming to see us, Mikhail Sergeyevich," the villagers said.

"Thank her," he replied greeting a woman carrying a Siberian round loaf. "I saw the loaf and I couldn't pass by without stopping. I just couldn't. Thank you for your labor, for your kind hearts, and for your faith in our common cause."

In Abakan M.S. Gorbachev met with members of Khakass CPSU Obkom Bureau and the Soviet Oblispolkom.

#### **'Big Speech' Expected**

*LD1609071288 Moscow TASS in English 0710 GMT 16 Sep 88*

[Text] Krasnoyarsk September 16 TASS—Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, has begun his meeting here with senior executives of party, local government and economic organisations and representatives of the public of the Krasnoyarsk territory.

They are holding a lively, interested discussion of problems facing the territory and the whole of the country.

Anyone of those present can take the floor after naming himself.

The meeting is chaired by Gorbachev who is expected to deliver a big speech after representatives of the Krasnoyarsk territory take the floor.

The general secretary is expected to return to Moscow tonight.

#### **Yerevan Rallies Noted; Strike Call 'Ignored'**

*AU1609082088 Paris AFP in English 0802 GMT 16 Sep 88*

[Excerpt] Moscow, Sept 16 (AFP)—Students in the Armenian capital Yerevan boycotted classes Friday but most workers ignored a strike call by Armenian nationalist leaders, Armenian journalists told AFP from Yerevan.

The nationalist Karabakh Committee which had called for the one-day strike in solidarity with striking workers in the Azerbaijani region of Nagorno-Karabakh, Friday held a rally in Yerevan's central Opera Square attended by "several thousand" people, Yerevan residents contacted by telephone said.

A journalist from the official news agency ARMENPRESS said that transport was working normally in Yerevan and factories in the city of 1.1 million were also operating. Only "a few people in one or two plants" had downed tools, the official said.

Students from local institutes and schools had boycotted classes, he said.

Mass rallies attended by up to 150,000 people had been held in Yerevan on Wednesday and Thursday in support of the strike action.

In Stepanakert, the main town of Armenian-dominated Nagorno-Karabakh, the local population continued to observe a week-long strike begun on Monday to press for the reunification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia and a number of other demands.

These include the removal from the region of some 2,000 Azerbaijanis who had fled from neighbouring Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh during inter-ethnic unrest between the Muslim Azerbaijanis and Christian Armenians.

A Stepanakert Communist Party official told AFP that transport was paralysed Friday and all shops were closed except for food stores.

Soviet official media have not reported the latest wave of strikes in Stepanakert and the resumption of mass nationalist demonstrations in Armenia which first began last February. The Kremlin last July rejected the Armenians' demand for the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. [passage omitted]

#### **Gerasimov Confirms Strike**

AU1509131188 Paris AFP in English 1304 GMT  
15 Sep 88

[Excerpt] Moscow, Sept 15 (AFP)—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said Thursday that a new wave of strikes had gripped the main town of the disputed Azerbaijani region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Asked at a news conference for details of strike action by the Armenian majority in Stepanakert and industrial action in the Armenian capital Yerevan planned for Friday, Mr. Gerasimov replied: "There are strikes in Stepanakert, but not in Yerevan. But in Yerevan there are demonstrations at Opera Square."

He did not elaborate. [passage omitted]

#### **Armenian Plenum Berates Republic Leadership**

PM1509115588 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
15 Sep 88 Morning Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Persistently Overcoming Stagnation Phenomena"]

[Text] Yerevan, 13 Sep—Party organizations' tasks in overcoming stagnation phenomena in the economy and the social sphere and in improving the ideological and moral atmosphere in the republic were discussed by an Armenian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum held in Yerevan.

The main speaker—S.G. Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee—and the other speakers in the debate noted that the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat and Bureau have failed to work out and implement new political approaches to the resolution of acute problems in the economic, social, and spiritual spheres or to psychologically alter the mood of complacency and self-satisfaction following the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum.

National-income and labor-productivity growth rates in the republic have fallen. A great many problems have built up in machine building and the construction complex, and the shortage of housing is still apparent. Supplies of products, goods, and services to the republic's population are unsatisfactory.

It was noted that the state of the environment is generating serious concern. Air pollution in Yerevan, Kirovakan, Razdan, and certain other cities is several times higher than permissible norms. The ecological situation around Lake Sevan remains acute.

The plenum participants devoted major attention to questions of the ideological work of political, international, and patriotic education. It was pointed out, in particular, that abnormal phenomena such as embezzlement of socialist property, corruption, bribery, favoritism, and violations of the principles of social justice have taken root in the republic.

The rallies, demonstrations, and strikes generated by the events in Nagorno-Karabakh destabilized the situation and allowed irresponsible people to step up their activities.

Making a principled assessment of the problems that have accumulated, the plenum participants outlined from a position of great demandingness ways of speedily overcoming these problems and accelerating restructuring in all spheres of social life. It was stressed that the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau and party gorkoms and raykoms should raise to a qualitatively new level the standard of the republic party organization's work in line with the demands of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th all-union party conference. It is necessary to resolutely eschew everything tangential and formal in party life and to assert a businesslike and constructive style of work everywhere. We must strive to ensure that all party organizations and labor collectives live for restructuring.

The plenum noted that primary party organizations have a great deal to do in providing ideological backup for restructuring. The republic's Communists must make the utmost effort to improve the ideological and moral climate and to shape in working people a Marxist-Leninist philosophy, high political standards, and active civic stances.

G.P. Kharchenko, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Party Organizational Work Department, took part in the plenum's work.

#### **Paper Examines Nagorno-Karabakh Situation**

LD1509124888 Moscow TASS in English 1230 GMT  
15 Sep 88

[Text] Moscow September 15 TASS—Aleksandr Guber, a correspondent of the Soviet weekly NEW TIMES, who has just visited Nagorno-Karabakh, shares his opinion about the nature of the region's problems in an article



headlined "Nagorno-Karabakh: The Burden of Problems, Real and Imaginary". The article is published in the latest issue of the weekly.

The problem of Nagorno-Karabakh has not been resolved—such conclusion can be drawn from the article.

All Armenians I spoke to in the region are firmly for Nagorno-Karabakh's seceding from Azerbaijan and joining Armenia, Guber writes. But, on the other hand, the Azerbaijanians who live in the region as unanimously come out in favour of the region's remaining part of Azerbaijan. "I shall express the general impression: The sense of proportion is beginning to fail representatives of the two sides, even the best ones. Any, even the most trifling conflict is viewed by them in the light of inter-ethnic relations", the journalist writes.

There has occurred a serious confusion of notions in the minds of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, the correspondent goes on. They regard all the predicaments befalling them as "ill will of Baku" (the capital of Azerbaijan). It is precisely in this light that the people in the region view the consequences of the command-and-bureaucratic methods of management, officials' bribery, planning and supply miscalculations, and lack of attention to the social sphere. "The former leadership of Azerbaijan is guilty in the eyes of Nagorno-Karabakh population. But is it blamed only by them?" The correspondent of the weekly asks a rhetorical question.

He describes how the representative of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Supreme Soviet in Nagorno-Karabakh and his staff "do everything to take the issue out of the deadlocked emotionally-charged ethnic situation into the channel of a practical solution to Nagorno-Karabakh's concrete socio-economic problems, of which quite a number have piled up". Many of the problems are pressing, although they have not been tackled for years before. It is very good that the session of the regional soviet of people's deputies discussed in a businesslike manner and planned out practical measures to solve precisely such problems, they weekly says. The correspondent cautiously refers to this as a "sign of realisation".

"To tell the truth", he specifies, "I have seen not so many signs of realisation so far. But still the two peoples are gradually coming to realise the truth: Real ethnic idea cannot be chauvinistic, infringing the rights and dignity of other peoples".

**Nationality Recording System on Passports Scored**  
*PM1509115788 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian*  
*14 Sep 88 Morning Edition p 3*

[Article by R. Lynev: "Try Rectifying a Passport Entry on Nationality, Even if It Has To Be Rectified"]

[Text] The nationalities question. In fact this is not one question but many. Each of which is not simple in itself. For instance, take the following question: How to reflect

the nationality of USSR citizens' in their passports. Many readers suggest simply writing: "USSR citizen." They suggest that a number of problems connected with the notorious "point five" will thus be eliminated. Well, this way of putting it has some merit and we will obviously have to return to the question. But to judge from IZVESTIYA's mail and the figures from sociological polls, many people today are perturbed by something quite different: How to alter or add detail to entries in a passport which reflect nationality? Thus, to judge from letters and appeals to local and central organs, Crimean Tatars want to be distinguished legally, in their passport entry, from other Tatars. The Meskhetian Turks are in favour of not being classified as any other nationality. Representatives of small peoples—Bukhara Jews, Tats, and Krymchaks—are against being classified as Jews on the basis of passport information and the (Judaic) faith of their ancestors.

In addition statistics reveal the following process: According to the 1926 census there were 194 ethnic units, as scholars call them, in our country. But according to the last census, in 1979, there are just 100 peoples. Where have the others, almost half the total, "disappeared" to?

Ethnographers explain that in the late twenties there was an active process of the consolidation of peoples close to each other both "generically" and territorially. This took place particularly rapidly in Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Siberia.

It also happened that the "enlargement" of some peoples at the expense of other, smaller, peoples took place during the census under the influence of some local leaders anxious thus to raise the prestige of their own regions.

The following point should also be noted: During the 1926 census anyone could indicate for himself the nationality to which he belonged. It was on this basis that the entry in the paragraph on nationality was made. This procedure was not repealed with the introduction of the passport system in 1932. But later, in 1938, a person who received a passport could indicate his nationality only on the basis of both his parents or, if the marriage was a mixed one, of one of his parents. This administrative enshrinement of one nationality once and for all did not, of course, coincide with real life or the ethnic processes taking place in it. And the result was that while a Tajik living in Tajikistan was a Tajik his brother in Uzbekistan frequently "became" an Uzbek, at least according to his passport.

There was finally another factor that it is shameful to recall today but which can in no way be forgotten: The expulsion of whole peoples from their homes. This tyranny was also often enshrined in passport information on nationality. It has now been denounced. But even today in Kazakhstan only one-third of those Meskhetian

Turks are legally considered to be Turks in their passports. The others are obliged to do the rounds, to write to prove that they are not the people they were once ordered to be but Turks. Like their kinsmen in Kirghizia, Uzbekistan, and the North Caucasus, they see in the recognition of this fact one of the main conditions for the restoration of justice.

Just think: One entry in your passport and you are deprived of the right to be considered a son of your own people. Just one formality and, without being guilty of anything toward that people, you are legally as it were cut off from them and you are faced with a whole series of humiliating situations when you have to give explanations for the entry in your passport and persuade people to put more trust in your words than in the passport entry...

Just one entry and it can determine so much in life. And the result is that the entry is the primary thing while the man is derived from it. And indeed, what has been written with a pen cannot be cut out with an ax.

As though the tension created in inter-nation relations recently had not made us feel how vulnerable national dignity is, how explosive is the imposition on people of a nationality other than the one they treasure, the one in which they take pride. Why create tension artificially? And where would the snag seem to be? How can you forbid a man to be what he is by artificially regulating the national makeup of the country and distorting the true picture?

But it has turned out that it is not all that simple. There are two approaches to the matter. One is scientific—recording the nationality the person indicates, irrespective of whether it coincides with the nationality on his passport. It continues to be used in censuses. The other approach is the administrative one. It is reflected in the "Provision on the passport system in the USSR" approved by the government 28 August 1974. It indicates: "The passport entry on nationality is in accordance with the parents' nationality. If the parents belong to different nationalities, then when a passport is first issued the nationality is recorded on the basis of the nationality of the father or mother, depending on the wishes of the passport's recipient. Subsequently the nationality entry cannot be changed." We must agree that the provision changes nothing by comparison with the late thirties. "Cannot be changed"—and that's all.

How can this "passport assimilation" be countered? Perhaps if desired nationality can be changed with one's passport? Alas, the provision states that the passport can be changed only if:

- there is a change in surname, name, or patronymic;
- an inaccuracy is established in the entries;
- it is unfit for use.

Finally, it is possible to try to prove that in terms of nationality, language, and culture life has made you a different person from the one recorded in your passport. But in that case procedure requires that you submit evidence on your birth with the entry of your "new," "more detailed," nationality.

All this, of course, smacks of an absurdity which it is high time we removed by coming closer legally and de facto to the norms of the multinational socialist rule-of-law state. Its prospect is not only attractive, it compels us to make these changes. And the sooner they occur the better.

**News Conference Exposes Ukrainian Nationalists**  
*LD1509031088 Moscow Television Service in Russian*  
*1900 GMT 14 Sep 88*

[Text] [Announcer] In Kiev today a news conference took place for Soviet and foreign journalists organized by the Union of Journalists and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ukraine, on the completion of a joint operation by the Soviet and Polish organs of state security to uncover subversive activity of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists [OUN] within our country.

Vladimir Lazarevich Chernyy, the chief of the Information Bureau of the Ukraine Foreign Ministry, chaired the news conference and reported the results of the disclosures. He noted that among the anti-Soviet and foreign centers carrying on active subversive activity against the USSR, OUN members are notable for their particular extremism and hostility, the nucleus of which was formed from former Banderites whose anti-Soviet activity began as early as the forties and continued during the war years. The spy centers of the FRG, England, and the United States—the countries where these people live today—generously support their activities.

Now they quite often try to take advantage of the atmosphere of openness and democratization in our country, and in particular in the Ukraine, in order to achieve their aims. It must be admitted that sometimes they find accomplices and helpers, especially among the inhabitants of the Western oblasts of the Ukraine and among emigrants abroad. Taking advantage of any opportunity, the members of OUN, the foreign-based units of the OUN, send nationalist literature, newspapers, magazines, and broadsheets with tourists, private individuals, and business people. Their sole aim was and remains to overthrow Soviet power in the Ukraine and to create an independent, free, and so-called synodic [sobornyy] Ukraine.

For many years the work has been carried on to uncover and eliminate the agents of the OUN in our country by Vysotskiy, a Ukraine KGB Colonel, and Major Aleksandr Minkowicz of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs. All this time, for more than 20 years, Colonel Vysotskiy has dealt with the members of OUN. First Lvov doctor Svyatoslav Ignatyevich Panchishin, then

the young journalist Yuriy Ivanchenko, as Soviet patriots who had won the trust of the leadership of OUN, worked alongside him and helped in making the disclosures. Colonel Vysotskiy is speaking:

[Begin recording] [Vysotskiy] One of the major aspects of the subversive activity assigned to the foreign-based units of the OUN by Western special services is penetration into the Ukraine and the organization of illegal channels of communication with individual, nationalistically oriented elements with the aim of creating, as the Banderites themselves put it, organizational cells and groups of the nationalist underground. They were also to carry out a varied range of hostile actions and to collect and send abroad political and espionage information. In this connection, in the organs of state security, measures were taken to protect Soviet people from provocative acts on the part of the foreign-based units and to suppress attempts to enlist politically immature individuals in illegal activity.

The operation, which is being discussed today, was devoted on the whole to carrying out these tasks. Its essence consisted of the following: As early as the end of the sixties, one of the ringleaders of the foreign-based units of the OUN, Dmitriv [words indistinct] living in London in the full knowledge of the special services, recruited to carry out the assignments of the Banderites, Tomasz Bilinski, citizen of the Polish People's Republic, Ukrainian by nationality, while he was on a foreign business trip in one of the capitalist countries.

Bilinski, or Adam as he became known, undertook a journey to the Ukraine on the instructions of the center. In the city of Lvov, he met personally the son and daughter of the ringleader of the OUN underground groups, Shukhevich. By their mediation, he got in touch with doctor Svyatoslav Ignatyevich Panchishin, who is present here, passed on the greetings of old friends living in the West, and informed him that they were counting on his help. During repeated meetings, which took place within the USSR and Poland, Bilinski, on the instructions of the Banderites, began to energetically work on Panchishin in a nationalist spirit and more or less recruited him for work in the foreign-based units of the OUN. A series of new assignments were allocated to the Soviet citizen, in particular, the collection of information of a political and economic nature, and the study of the system of customs and passport checks on the Soviet-Polish border. He was also charged with selecting a reliable person in Kiev with the aim of creating in the capital of the Ukraine, an illegal group with connections to the foreign-based units of the OUN. Svyatoslav Ignatyevich must be given his due because he correctly assessed the actions of the banderite recruiter and with no hesitation reported what had happened to KGB organs. In this way the plans of the bosses of the OUN foreign-based units became known as well as the identities of their accomplices whom they had recruited—Bilinski, or Adam, in Poland, (Miron) in Lvov, and (Slavutich) in Kiev. I hope that the representative of the

Polish PR's Ministry of Internal Affairs, Comrade Minkowicz, who is present here, will tell us in more detail about Bilinski and his accomplices in Poland.

[Minkowicz, in Polish with superimposed Russian translation] In returning to the operation being discussed today, I would like to stress that the efforts of the banderite center of the OUN and of the patrons behind it were channeled to a nonexistent mythical organization in the Polish People's Republic and the USSR. (Esther), Gordon, (Miron) and a number of others got entangled in internal quarrels in which an important role was played by the division of financial resources which the OUN center sent for the needs of the nonexistent organization. Poland did not become, as had been planned by Stetsko and then Oleskiv, a reliable bulwark and springboard for hostile actions by people of Ukrainian nationality in the USSR. [end recording]

[Announcer] Then Svyatoslav Ignatyevich Panchishin, a doctor from Lvov, spoke.

[Begin recording] [Panchishin, in Ukrainian with superimposed Russian translation] Together with other people who had been deceived, I went abroad. After a certain time, life led me away from nationalist inclinations. Criminal charges were brought against me. But later my criminal conviction was expunged and it has never interfered with my life and fruitful work. I received an education and a profession. I became a doctor. The reason why people were interested in me was clear. It was clear to me what the Banderites wanted from me. I knew what plans and intentions they had. And naturally it would have been simplest for me to quietly send away these uninvited guests. But I decided to reveal their plans and intentions. Soon I became acquainted with an OUN emissary. This was Tomasz Bilinski. Instructions and orders began to arrive from the foreign center as well as literature, material aid, and various equipment—film equipment and photographic equipment, which I was to use. As you can see, the OUN foreign organizations make active use against the USSR of all sorts of methods and means, undermining friendship among peoples. And in connection with this, such an attitude causes indignation among Soviet people.

We were given the task of collecting information about military sites and about scientific and state institutions. Our group was given a new task: to step up subversive activity in the Ukraine during the democratization and restructuring taking place in our country.

To sum up, I can say that the organs of state security with our help managed to cut short this activity.

[Correspondent] APN. A question for Comrade Yuriy Aleksandrovich Ivanchenko. Yuriy Aleksandrovich, from the material shown at this news conference, one can draw the conclusion that the leadership of the foreign-based units of the OUN made attempts to establish secret contacts with influential Jewish organizations, to



be precise with Zionist organizations and, in particular, talks were conducted on the subject of joint subversive actions or about the possibility of these, with the Jewish Defense League. However, it is well-known that the Banderites and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists are distinguished by extreme anti-Semitism. In this connection, how can you, as someone who knows these matters from the inside, explain this metamorphosis, this change from extremely anti-Semitic positions to attempts at cooperation with extreme Zionist organizations?

[Ivanchenko] The question is understandable. The reply to your question can be found among these exhibits on the stands. But I can also say that at one time the head of the OUN foreign-based units Stetsko said that the Jews in the West are now the most organized force and have at their disposal large material resources. That is, in essence, they are prepared to make any metamorphosis, to engage in any mimicry as long as they can obtain material resources for their anti-Soviet and hostile actions.

[Correspondent] RHEINISCHE POST, FRG. A more or less personal question for Panchishin and Ivanchenko. My question is: Are you not afraid of some sort of retribution from OUN supporters.

[Ivanchenko] I would answer you in the words of Shevchenko. [passage omitted in Ukrainian] I do not think that there is any need for us to expect any punishment while we live here at home. [end recording]

[Announcer] Hundreds of items of material evidence were presented here at the news conference showing the subversive actions of the foreign services of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists on the territory of the Ukraine and Poland. These shots were taken at Warsaw airport at the moment when various espionage information was being handed over to OUN bosses abroad. [video shows three women and one man approaching a stationary car; a Polaroid camera being examined, a polaroid film case containing miniaturized typed sheets]

See what is stuffed inside the things that are being handed over. Video equipment, film for motion and still pictures, lists, instructions, and, of course, money in a variety of foreign currencies. The journalists at the news conference were able to examine all of this. [video at various times showed the display stands at the news conference; they held printed books and leaflets, radio and camera equipment, and a suitcase containing currency]

#### IZVESTIYA Carries Report

PM1509140188 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
15 Sep 88 Morning Edition p 6

[Own correspondent N. Baklanov report and Lev Korneshov article under general heading: "Who's Who in the OUN Center Abroad and What This Center Does"—first two paragraphs are Baklanov report]

[Text] A news conference began in Kiev's Zhovtnev Culture Center at 1100 today, 14 September, organized by the

Ukrainian SSR Foreign Ministry and the Ukrainian Journalists Union and devoted to hostile activity against the USSR and the Polish People's Republic by the extremist center of reactionary Ukrainian emigres known as the "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists [OUN] Units Abroad."

Soviet and foreign journalists were addressed by staffers of the USSR KGB and the Polish People's Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as by Soviet citizens who were engaged in a long-term counterintelligence operation against the nationalist center's gangleaders which, over a period of almost 20 years, made it possible to monitor and totally neutralize attempts by the Bandera people to establish nationalist underground links in the Ukraine and to promptly block and wreck their plans to organize and carry out anti-Soviet activities.

It was simply unbelievable: Speakers at the Kiev news conference also included:

Svyatoslav Panchishin, member of the Central Command (in other words the leadership) of OUN Units Abroad, chairman of the "OUN Supreme Court" for the Ukraine, and leader of the "Security Service" for the region (again the Ukraine), decorated "for services rendered" with nationalist awards like the OUN Gold Cross and the Stepan Bandera Medal;

and Yuriy Ivanchenko, leader of a "nationalist underground group" in Kiev, awarded the OUN Gold Cross.

We will not keep our readers in suspense any longer: Svyatoslav Panchishin is a physician from Lvov, Yuriy Ivanchenko is a journalist from Kiev.... We would also like to apologize for having to use quotation marks around many words in this article—it is impossible to manage without them. To start with, let us explain the background of the OUN Units Abroad, a totally extremist terrorist organization of Ukrainian nationalists abroad.

This story began a long time ago. Sometime in the late sixties Ilya Dmitriv, one of the OUN Units Abroad gangleaders, informed his masters that Polish citizen Tomasz Bilinski, of Ukrainian descent and related to R. Shukhevich, former gangleader of the OUN underground in the Ukraine, was traveling on official business in the West.

Ilya Dmitriv is gangleader of the "Union of Ukrainians in Britain" and member of the OUN Units Abroad Central Command. Born in 1906, a native of Lvov Oblast, a professional Ukrainian nationalist codenamed "Rubizhnyy," he is engaged in secret service work against the USSR and the socialist countries.

Dmitriv—"Rubizhnyy" was given the "OK" to recruit Bilinski and met him.



Tomasz Bilinski, who chose the codename "Adam," was given several assignments, but the most important—as he was repeatedly reminded—was to establish illegal contacts with Ukrainian citizens who could be recruited for subversive activity against the USSR.

Shortly afterward Bilinski—"Adam" traveled to Lvov, where he met relatives of R. Shukhevich, former gangleader of the OUN underground. They had several conversations concerning the choice of a possible candidate for the "position" of leader of the underground organization in the Ukraine. Finally they decided on Svyatoslav Ignatyevich Panchishin, a highly respected physician in Lvov. Several facts were taken into account. Svyatoslav Ignatyevich grew up in the family of members of the West Ukrainian intelligentsia. Svyatoslav's uncle Markiyani Panchishin, a famous professor of medicine in Lvov in the past, was elected USSR Supreme Soviet deputy in 1939. But when the OUN set up a puppet "Ukrainian State Administration" during the Hitlerite occupation, the professor had agreed to join it.

These past events have to be recalled because they affected the life of the professor's nephew Svyatoslav. When the Soviet Army was approaching Lvov, the nationalists "advised" Svyatoslav to leave for the West—there was only one thing in store for Markiyani Panchishin's nephew "under the Soviets," they told him.

This was how Svyatoslav ended up in Vienna, where he went to university.

Years passed, and S. Panchishin had long since returned to Lvov—his mother, by the way, had never left—and gained high esteem both as a physician and as a man.

"I had already forgotten the existence of the OUN 'fighters' for 'independent' Ukraine," Svyatoslav Ignatyevich said, "but they had obviously not forgotten me."

Evidently, Panchishin's life story encouraged the OUN to trust him. Svyatoslav Ignatyevich well remembers his first conversation with Bilinski:

"The OUN group had not changed in the least. Nothing had changed in their views and tenets, in their fierce hatred of anything not just non-Ukrainian but simply non-Bandera. True enough, with their inherent political mimicry, they had introduced new terms in their vocabulary: 'Free World' instead of 'New Order,' 'struggle for democracy' and 'human rights' instead of 'elimination' (in other words 'physical destruction')...."

Following this conversation, S. Panchishin acted the way he should have acted when encountering an enemy.... By that time Polish security organs had already briefed their USSR colleagues on the frenzied activity of Tomasz Bilinski and his recruit Janek—"Gordon." It was jointly decided to embark on a long-term counterintelligence operation. S. Panchishin agreed....

Svyatoslav Ignatyevich, a strictly peaceable and civilian-minded person, found it hard to get into his new role as "underground group leader." He was probably helped by his profession—after all, a physician cannot afford any mistakes.

As he gained more and more of the Bandera "center's" trust, S. Panchishin started receiving more and more instructions, directives, literature, and radio, moviemaking, and photographic equipment from abroad. Money also started coming in, both Soviet rubles and foreign currency. Give the bosses of the OUN Units Abroad their due—they spared no expense because the physician from Lvov and his "fellow conspirators" were becoming a trump card in their mutual relations with Western special services and other nationalist groups and groupings torn apart by rivalry. That was no joke—an underground network in the Ukraine!

S. Panchishin's assignments were getting more complex at the same time. The demands were primarily for information—military, political, and economic—but he was also asked to give the names of "dissatisfied" people and was given persistent instructions to send "appeals" and "declarations" on behalf of the Ukrainian "underground" to the West and to Western countries' missions in Moscow. There were transparent hints that it was unimportant whether this "underground" existed or not, as long as the "appeals" were made.

Svyatoslav Ignatyevich was leading a strange life: He treated patients, he remained a kind and good person as far as friends and acquaintances were concerned, but at the same time he received emissaries "from over there," compiled "information," kept sending reports on "jobs done," and in short was gradually gaining a reputation as a cautious, experienced, and... reliable fighter for an "independent Ukraine."

An excuse was found to travel to Poland. While there, S. Panchishin was favored with personal meetings with emissaries from Stetsko himself.

Yaroslav Stetsko was for many years head of the OUN Units Abroad. He was born in Ternopol Oblast in 1912. He was engaged in active nationalist work on Polish territory until 1937, spent the next 3 years in Germany, Austria, and Italy, settled in Germany in 1940, was proclaimed head of the "Ukrainian Independent Government" in Lvov in 1941, and was an Abwehr "consultant" (codenamed "Basmach") during the war. From 1946 he was gangleader of the so-called "Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Peoples," and following Stepan Bandera's death also became head of the OUN Units Abroad "Command" in Munich. He died in 1986.

Yaroslav Semenovich Stetsko was a high-flying anti-Soviet bird of prey. Nobody knows whether he loved anyone, but he did hate many people. Stetsko outlined his "creed" in his autobiography: "...I uphold the principles of extermination of the Jews and the expediency of

applying the German methods for the extermination of Jewry in the Ukraine, ruling out their assimilation...." This rampant fascism and racism was received by the President of the United States in 1983! And the U.S. President had this to say about Stetsko and others of his ilk: "Your struggle is our struggle, your dream is our dream...."

The emissaries had lengthy "intimate" conversations with Svyatoslav Ignatyevich, and received with obvious satisfaction his reports about the "growth" of opposition attitudes in the Ukraine, about his group's activities, and so on and so forth. They consulted Panchishin on the tactics of "struggle" and instructed him to seek fellow conspirators with utmost caution, but persistently. During one of the meetings Panchishin was confidentially informed that his "underground group" was under the direct leadership of Oleskiv, the movement's Number 2 man at the time.

Vasiliy Oleskiv, born in 1924, a native of Ternopol Oblast, and a professional nationalist, fought in the SS "Galizien" Division, fled to the West in 1944, after the war trained agents and sent them to the territory of Soviet Ukraine, and was for a long time head of Bandera's "Security Service" in the "Union of Ukrainians in Britain."

Stetsko finally died in 1986 and the next "Grand Assembly" of the nationalists in October 1987 appointed Vasiliy Oleskiv to replace the "grandfather," which was how the old bandit was dubbed in coded letters to Panchishin. In his closing speech at the "Assembly," the newly hatched head of the "Command" called for armed struggle against the Soviet Ukraine which, of course, would require "tremendous sacrifice on the battlefield." Strictly in line with its leader's directives, the Bandera newspaper HOMIN UKRAINY, published in Canada, placed all hopes for the Ukraine's "liberation" on a third world war "as another, maybe the last, maybe the luckiest chance" and, totally unperturbed, went on to proclaim: "Even if one-half and maybe even more of mankind were to perish in this war, this, in our view, would still not be too high a price to pay...." These words were borrowed from "statements" by former bandits from the so-called Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

Vasiliy Oleskiv personally advised S. Panchishin to pick a "reliable person" in Kiev to organize "information gathering work" in the Ukrainian capital.

Svyatoslav Ignatyevich nominated journalist Yuriy Ivanchenko as a "conscientious patriot." The "Center" gave its consent. It was particularly pleased that the "patriot" was a journalist, in other words in a good position to gather information, establish contacts, and travel.

A little while later Ivanchenko had a visitor from abroad. It was Janek-"Gordon." Having conveyed greetings from "distant friends," he started a tedious process of testing the water, even though Yuriy Aleksandrovich

could see that "Gordon" was in a great hurry to recruit him. Yu. Ivanchenko soon received from "Gordon" an invitation to visit Poland. That was where the decisive conversation took place. "Gordon" declared without beating around the bush that he had already notified the nationalist center of his interlocutor's agreement to cooperate, backing it with information supposedly received from Yu. Ivanchenko, and so there was no point in refusing.

"I described you as a victim of Soviet terror; bear that in mind...."

Ivanchenko was nobody's fool in any way, but sharp practices have always been and still are used by the Bandera people.

On the day of his departure from the Polish People's Republic, Yuriy Ivanchenko was introduced to the "chief"—T. Bilinski. "Adam" used lavish phrases to counsel the new convert and waxed lyrical about his organizational contacts with the gangleaders of the OUN Units Abroad—Yaroslav Stetsko, still alive at the time, Vasiliy Oleskiv, and Ilya Dmitriv. Bilinski was indeed appreciated: In recognition of the successful establishment of the "network" in the Ukraine and other "out-standing services to the Command," "Adam" was promoted to the rank of deputy to the "Command chief," Ya. Stetsko himself, and was awarded the Gold Cross and the Stepan Bandera Silver Medal.

...There followed year after year of what could be described as routine work for S. Panchishin and Yu. Ivanchenko. Bilinski came to visit from Poland, bringing money, equipment, instructions, and nationalist "literature." All of these were also coming in via other channels. There was so much "literature" that at times it was being taken in by weight. What tasks were assigned to S. Panchishin, Yu. Ivanchenko, and their "fellow conspirators"? This can be seen in one of the written instructions: "It is necessary to widely disseminate leaflets and appeals encouraging the Ukrainian population to take organized actions against the existing system in the republic; to gather and transmit to the nationalist center important information, especially military information about the deployment of military units, types of weapons, and locations where strategic missiles are stationed."

The nationalist center was very interested in the names of "dissidents," disgruntled people, and "fighters for human rights"—it asked for the most detailed information. They were relying largely on fanning of national hostility—they tried to give national hues to any conflict that came to their notice.

In short, those entrenched abroad were interested in many things, and they were unstinting in their praise for S. Panchishin's and Yu. Ivanchenko's activity and in the reimbursement of expenses as long as they received the

information they wanted. The impression some of the "instructions" gave when read between the lines was: If there are no facts, invent them....

The nationalist center was continuously sending top-secret documents to the Ukraine and supplying information about the state of affairs within the "movement." It goes without saying that the chekists now had perfect knowledge of what was happening inside the OUN Units Abroad and other hostile groupings.

Yuriy Ivanchenko was given an assignment to organize the publication of an underground newspaper, the titles from which he was asked to choose were either SAMOSTIYNAYA UKRAINA or SAMOSTIYNOST, and he was told not to worry about equipment. Indeed, a special "Roneo-270" electric-stencil duplicating machine with waxed paper and other accessories arrived soon afterward from Munich, hidden in a secret compartment.

They met and saw off a steady stream of "representatives" from abroad, including some highly important personages. For example, Ya. Stetsko's personal envoy Igor Shpernal arrived from the United States. Among other things, he brought along an "address" fabricated deep inside the nationalist center, and asked them to put some touches of local color to it and send it back to the West in order to confirm the existence of a nationalist underground in the Ukraine.

It is hardly necessary to list all the adventures in this operation. But I would like to cite just one extract—from the Seventh "Grand Assembly" "resolution" on organizational-cadre questions:

"The ethnic characteristic of OUN members must be disgust at and hostility toward Ukrainians who do not support the ideas of nationalism. The OUN's ethnic imperative to people in this category is: Attempt to convert them to the ideas of an 'Ukrainian Independent Synodic State' and service to the Ukrainian nation, or destroy them unconditionally."

These are not empty words. Material that came to Yuriy Ivanchenko's attention testified to the intentions of the OUN Units Abroad gangleaders to switch to "more acute" forms of struggle: "Combat units" are being formed from among fanatic nationalists, paramilitary youth detachments are being trained at the "Soyuzivka" Camp, and other special camps have been set up where Americans of Ukrainian descent who fought in the Vietnam war are being recruited for training.

...Panic set in among the Bandera people when all their secrets came out into the open. Facts are facts: For 2 decades now the "stormy activity" of the OUN Units Abroad in the Ukraine was not mere fiction, it was actually monitored by those responsible for our country's state security. More than 20 emissaries who arrived here on U.S., British, FRG, and French passports have been detected and neutralized. "Literature" and

"equipment," together with large amounts of Soviet and foreign currency, are now in reliable hands. It is especially important that the Bandera people's tactical and strategic designs have been neutralized and a quiet life has been ensured for Soviet people who, for various reasons, had come to the notice of nationalist "services." The emissaries from abroad failed to reach them....

Never mind, the "game" was played according to all the norms and rules of the high art. It is useless to ask the inveterate bosses of OUN Units Abroad to reflect on the results. But surely, those who sponsor them must learn at least some sensible lessons?

**Public Polled on Party Conference TV Coverage**  
*PM1609091788 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian*  
*10 Sep 88 Morning Edition p 7*

[Sociologist Sergey Belyayev report under the "TV and Us" rubric: "In the Mirror of Sociology"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Recently the Central Television First Program showed a documentary television movie entitled "Listen, Comrade..." taking us back to the events of those summer days when the 19th all-union party conference took place in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses and the time right after it finished. The USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting Letter and Sociological Studies Main Editorial Staff carried out a straw poll at 16 of the capital's enterprises. It was interested in workers' attitude to the way in which broadcasts covered the party conference. We think that you will be interested in finding out the results of this poll. Sociologist Sergey Belyayev says:

A total of 532 industrial workers took part in the study in accordance with the sociodemographic pattern of Moscow's population. CPSU members and candidate members, Komsomol members, and nonparty members accounted for 28, 12, and 60 percent respectively. The overwhelming majority—84 percent—saw the party conference as an event that indisputably affected their vital interests and views. CPSU members and also workers aged 50-60 followed the conference materials particularly attentively. Now a word about Central Television's coverage of the work of the conference. When we began to find out in more detail from which specific programs they obtained information, it proved to be mainly from "Vremya." More than one-fourth of those polled also watched special programs like "Diary of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference" and "At the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference." Approximately the same percentage followed the course of the conference from the city's "Good Evening, Moscow!" television program.

There was yet another important element. We wanted to discover not only the audience reaction to various television programs but also workers' attitude to one of the main political slogans of the day—the implementation of the principles of glasnost.



A total of 23 percent of those polled agreed that the programs fully accorded with the above principles. The stance of the remaining 77 percent proved more critical. More than half of the workers noted that the principles of glasnost were only partly implemented in Central Television's programs. They considered the main reasons for this state of affairs to be the incomplete exposition of conference speeches, which were, in their opinion, sometimes excessively edited. It emerged that the worker television audience expected more detailed accounts in the recent reportage from the Kremlin Palace of Congresses.

The shortcomings were also noted to include the lack of a special (technical) channel providing a direct relay from the Kremlin Palace of Congresses and the unfortunate (in view of industrial enterprises' work shifts) choice of time to show thematic programs. Nonparty members and young people were especially prone to "faultfinding." A total of 29 percent of those polled gave a positive—without any reservations—assessment of television's work of covering the party conference, whereas 9 percent gave an extremely negative assessment.

Of course, we also wanted to find out one way or another the attitude of workers themselves to the state of restructuring and to the main reasons impeding its development. More than half figured that there are still many people in their labor collectives who have not welcomed restructuring, who oppose it. They see the stance of the representatives of their enterprises' administrations as the main factor retarding restructuring processes in production. In the opinion of 44 percent of those polled, a number of these leaders are characterized by conservatism in thinking and bureaucratic tendencies in management style. Workers believe the second—in terms of significance—reason impeding restructuring to be people's unwillingness and inability to work with full return and the third to be lack of material interest. When we asked: "In your opinion, did the party conference give restructuring a new boost?" 41 percent of workers answered not too categorically: "I hope that's the case." But 12 percent stated their conviction that the conference produced real positive results.

The results of the poll were discussed at one of the Central Television chiefs' traditional extraordinary meetings and were deemed extremely interesting and instructive. Nothing of the kind had previously occurred on television. Central Television had never even covered party conferences before. That is why it is difficult to overestimate the experience of this complex and intensive work that has been accumulated and analyzed. Maybe the greatest benefit derived from the poll we carried out is that we were able to establish the level of relations between Central Television and viewers at a time when events of vital importance for everyone are taking place in the country.

### **PRAVDA 'Dialogue' With Readers Assessed**

*PM1309112188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian*

*10 Sep 88 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Viktor Grishin under the rubric "Frank Discussion": "Reader-Newspaper: Dialogue Continues"]

[Text] The traditional fall meetings of PRAVDA journalists and the authors' aktiv with the newspaper's readers have begun. This year the very first of them were held at the largest industrial enterprises in an oblast center—Kirov—and also at labor collectives in the cities of Novovyatsk, Kirovo-Chepetsk, and Slobodskiy. On the instructions of the editorial office I took part in them and I want to share with the readers the subject of the discussions, the disputes, and the thoughts.

I have taken part in this kind of meeting on several previous occasions. They generally took place in an interested fashion for the good of the cause. But the current meetings are distinguished from the previous ones by some special lack of constraint, the straightforwardness and principled nature of the participants' opinions, and bold nonstandard thoughts. Hackneyed routine was replaced by sincere human polyphony. This took the form of animated, committed, and sometimes acute conversations about our life today, restructuring, and how the press and PRAVDA in particular could help the party even more actively in renewing all the life of society and in fulfilling the historic decisions of the 27th party congress. Whatever the audience, the main character at the meeting was a thoughtful person, a citizen who had possibly not yet grasped something but is an honest, sincere, and true patriot of his plant, factory, city, and country.

Listening to readers' speeches and rereading numerous notes, you think over and over: What a huge impression the 19th all-union party conference has left in people's minds and to what a new and high level glasnost, openness, and democracy have raised all of us. Every question, piece of advice, and remark from the readers can be said to have been steeped in the ideas and decisions of the party conference. Unfortunately, there is no opportunity to name the authors of the numerous statements since this was an impromptu dialogue—I was not able to note down the speakers' names. I will talk about the most topical things, where possible, using words close to those that were heard straight from the hall or taken from my notes.

It was gratifying to hear that, in the opinion of the majority, PRAVDA is becoming increasingly attractive and the readers like a great deal of its contents—for instance, the "PRAVDA Fridays," "Pages of History," and analytical articles on problems of party life and social policy and the development of the agro-industrial complex. People say that they read with interest our editorial articles, selections of letters "Thoughts on a



Most Pressing Matter," "Mailbag from the Localities," "Life as It Is," and "Readers' Debating Rostrum." The comments, advice, and proposals are most varied.

"We were delighted to read your newspaper's political portraits of Deng Xiaoping, R. Gandhi, and other foreign figures," a reader said at the meeting at Kirov's 20th Party Congress Machine Building Association. "I would like to see a political portrait of our leader M.S. Gorbachev there too." What do you think, another reader asked, aren't there rather too many negative articles in our press now? Haven't our scientists and social scientists—from whom we expect intelligible articles expounding and clarifying the party's stance today on disturbing questions of Marxist-Leninist theory—lost their heads in this situation? Our thinking was shaped under the influence of the command-edict method, and the restructuring banner bears the words: "New thinking." Tell us that that is the case.

Glasnost and dialogue with the readers have obtained permanent status in the newspaper, and this has appreciably enlivened it. But debates are needed along with a lively exchange of opinions not on trifles but on major problems. What problems? The upcoming reform of price formation, for instance. Debates on how we will elect deputies to organs of state power in the future. Pension funds. Discussion of how to fill the market with goods in wide demand in a short period and how to conquer lack of culture and boorishness in the service sphere. And many many other things.

In the opinion of most of the participants in the meetings, the newspaper is particularly lacking in analysis of the practical work of restructuring. They figure that PRAVDA writes a great deal about large-scale problems but is poor at teaching people to live and work using positive examples. A concrete analysis of restructuring is the most necessary of all now. Readers advise us to take a typical enterprise of average dimensions: What is being done there and how, and how is success being achieved—put the economic calculations and computations in the newspaper... Sometimes a correspondent says ecstatically that imported equipment has been introduced somewhere at an enterprise, but does this mean that our Soviet equipment simply doesn't appear in our country? How do things stand with the fulfillment of the program on machine building that has been adopted?

People say: We want to know about innovative experience and put it into practice; we want to study it in greater depth and derive as much use from it as possible. Show us above all interesting life in the USSR, so that both we and the world can know not only the bad but the good truth about our country. People should write about life abroad, but preferably about things that can be usefully imitated. In short, find room in the newspapers for stories about our good, upstanding, native home. Show us our people's spiritual life—we will all be the richer for it.

The editorial bureau is rightly criticized for the fact that the newspaper carries few gripping features on Communists, party leaders, or real leaders of restructuring. People want to read trenchant, well-argued articles and features about the state of criticism and, in particular, self-criticism in the party's various components. Why has PRAVDA been less frequent in coming to the defense of Communists adopting firm party positions on restructuring? Show us how specific secretaries or party committee members are displaying their truly combative qualities in this struggle. Young people now entering the leadership of party organizations should learn from the examples of the work of the boldest and most experienced—those who are unafraid of any experiments or difficulties.

Alarm can be heard at meetings with readers everywhere about the fact that party committees are unwilling to part with authoritarian-edict work methods. Many memorandums, notes, and reports are still written. And there is far less personal contact with people. Mounting the rostrum, party workers will state with dismay: "I won't keep my job, I could be kicked out any time" instead of giving a worthy rebuff to demagogues. Need it be said that this "conclusion" will not work today!

Whatever the subject at the meetings the talk was candid. People said the following, for instance: You journalists love to eloquently describe Moscow fairs and the well-stocked vegetable stalls. But is that necessary? You'd do better to think about whether this annoys readers. After all, we know that the food situation in the capital is incomparably better than that in the surrounding area.... Many people want to know more details about the changes in the work of the capital's party organizations after the CPSU Central Committee October (1987) Plenum.

Judging by a number of statements, not everyone is satisfied by the efficacy of articles in the newspaper. Replies to criticism are published after long delays, and certain speeches pass unnoticed altogether. The newspaper sometimes criticizes a ministry in a cutting and businesslike way but does not even give the minister's name. Is not this the reason why responses to PRAVDA criticism have recently started to be signed not by ministers but by their deputies and even administration chiefs. "We never saw such things in PRAVDA before," someone in the auditorium noted. Efficacy means disseminating everything good covered by the newspaper. For instance, there was the editorial entitled "Primary Party Organizations Should Step Up Their Work," but we readers do not know whether anyone actually used the work experience of the best primary party organizations described in it.

All labor collectives have expressed bewilderment and incomprehension about the imposition of quotas by the USSR Ministry of Communications on subscriptions for most newspapers and magazines in 1989. This action is

being called everything: "covert sabotage of the basic principles of glasnost," "one of the braking mechanisms which could stifle restructuring," and even "ideological sabotage."

This week similar meetings are being held in Perm Oblast. Readers' conferences in Leningrad, Kiev, the Donbass, and other cities, oblasts, and regions lie ahead. The "Reader-Newspaper" dialogue continues. It will undoubtedly help journalists to check that their newspaper is in tune with the country and to determine whether the press organ's voice today is consonant with readers' ideas, concerns, and interests.

**Reader Requests More Information About KGB**  
*PM1509094188 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian*  
*14 Sep 88 Morning Edition p 6*

[Letter from reader D. Genin under the rubric "Letters '...Not For Publishing'": "Secrets and 'Secrecy'"]

[Text] The bright time of democracy, glasnost, and new thinking has come. Thank God, people are not punished for an anecdote, for foreign correspondence, for speaking well of Western technology or, conversely, ill of our technology. A question then arises. If an automatic line is installed at a plant, the number of workers is reduced. The same happens at a ministry or other institution: The volume of work is reduced, the staff is reduced.

But what about "organs?"

Perhaps reorganization is also under way in the state security organs. It is clear that the specific features of the KGB require secrecy. Surely, however, not all data should be concealed. The MVD also has many professional secrets but news conferences at which militia leaders are quite open in informing journalists and the public about their affairs, including as yet unresolved problems, have begun to be held more often recently. This helps to strengthen the MVD organs' confidence and prestige. Why should similar briefing sessions not be held by KGB leaders? This would, first, rule out fabrications about their work and, second, would place it under the control of public opinion.

A recent PRAVDA interview with V. Chebrikov made it possible to learn more about the work of the KGB. But constant information for all is needed.

[Signed] D. Genin, Kiev.

**Estonian Daily Describes Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact**  
*WA18150035A Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian*  
*10 Aug 88 pp 2-3*

[Part One of article by Heino Arumae: "Once More About the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty as a Commentary on Former Commentary"]

[Text] Almost a year ago, on 18 September 1987, RAHVA HAAL carried a commentary about the Soviet-German nonaggression treaty or the so-called Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, concluded on 23 August 1939. The

commentary also touched on the secret supplementary protocol and, apparently for the first time in Soviet Union, quoted in public print the part dealing with the Baltic states.

Now, a year later, there is again a need to turn to the documents mentioned, to give them a more differentiating evaluation compared to that time. We'd like to do that in the form of questions and answers.

Question: What has changed within a year's time?

It is obvious that our society today is far from what it was a year ago. Innovation, openness, and democratization have markedly influenced the sociopolitical life, significant shifts have occurred in the awareness of the people. Not surprisingly, this is also reflected in the work of mass media. Only a year ago it was deemed necessary by some that all published materials be properly balanced, that criticism not be too sharp, that negative phenomena not dominate over positive achievements, etc. When dealing with the history of Soviet society, an author was not expected to give an objective analysis of past events as much as he was to rationalize and justify what actually took place; the habitual old was preferred to new ideas and new positions.

Question: Apparently this was also reflected in the commentary on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that appeared in September of last year?

Indeed it was. Not accidentally does the commentary contain words like: "Soviet authors who have analysed the course of negotiations are of the opinion..." that means that the author of the comments had to calculate what will "go through" and what will not, while leaving his personal opinion unsaid on many of the issues. On the other hand, the editors also preferred to publish only item of the supplementary protocol instead of publishing the whole text.

We should emphasize here that a critical examination of USSR's foreign policy of the Stalinist era is yet to come. While much is said and written in the mass media about a severe distortion of Soviet society between the years 1930 and 1950, seldom has there been a critical evaluation about the foreign policy of that time. The meager interest in the problem mentioned, among specialists in this field, is even more surprising considering that Soviet party and state functionaries, especially Foreign Minister E. Shevardnadze, has specifically called attention to some miscalculations and deficiencies in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

Since the foreign policy of every state is organically tied to its internal policy, we cannot really assume that the foreign policy conducted by J. Stalin would have been correct in every way. To test this thesis of a theoretical nature, a look into the circumstances surrounding the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact seems appropriate here.

**Question:** Before tackling the actual Soviet-German agreements, we should recall the prelude to reaching them.

In 1939, in the turmoil of events of that time, very little was known inside the Soviet Union about the negotiations with Germany; actually nothing was known. Not until 21 August did the Soviet newspapers announce that on 19 August, after long and successfully conducted negotiations in Berlin, a trade and credit agreement was signed between the Soviet Union and Germany.

The agreement mentioned was a complete surprise at the time. Relations between the Soviet Union and Germany had not only been cold over the years, but actually hostile. Besides, center stage at that time had been taken by negotiations between the military delegations of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France taking place in Moscow.

The real bomb of sensationalism, however, exploded on 22 August, when the Soviet press announced negotiations to improve political relations between the Soviet Union and Germany. According to IZVESTIYA it had become apparent that both governments wish to reduce tensions of political relations between them, eliminate the threat of war, and conclude a treaty of non-aggression. It was also announced that, to hold these negotiations, the German Foreign Minister J. von Ribbentrop will be traveling to Moscow.

**Question:** And what was happening behind the scenes at that time?

Now available authentic documents give, in summary, the following picture of the course of Soviet-German negotiations in 1939.

Negotiations between the two states started at the beginning of 1939 with an exchange of ideas about reaching a trade agreement. At first, the negotiations made no progress. By spring, however, it became apparent that interest in regulating Soviet-German relations was present in Moscow as well as in Berlin. Representatives of the Soviet Government declared on more than one occasion that the regulation of political relations is a prerequisite for solving economic problems. On 20 May, for example, V. Molotov said to the German Grand Ambassador Count Schulenburg that negotiations seem to be just a political game to Germany, and cannot advance because there is no necessary political base. Molotov was hinting that Moscow expects certain proposals from the German Government.

Berlin's aims at that time were all wrapped up with the projected campaign against Poland. For that it was necessary, above all, to eliminate the danger of a united front consisting of Great Britain, France and Soviet Union, to sabotage negotiations in progress between these states, and to secure the neutrality of Soviet Union as a requisite for unleashing the war.

Soon it was clear to Berlin what to offer Moscow. On 29 July, Count Schulenburg was told that, when it comes to solving the Polish question, Germany is ready to consider all the interests of the Soviet Union and to reach an agreement with Moscow in that regard. The same declaration was made for the Baltic Sea states, also known as the Baltic states. On 2 August, J. Ribbentrop told the Soviet charge d'affaires G. Astahhov that Germany wishes to revamp relations between the two countries and that, from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, there are no problems that could not be solved in the interests of both parties. On the Baltic Sea there would be enough room for both states, and an agreement could be reached about the future of Poland. In the course of the negotiations Ribbentrop made a cynical remark: "In case of any Polish provocation, we can settle the score with Poland in 1 week."

During the Molotov-Schulenburg negotiations on 3 August, the latter promised that, in case of need, Berlin would take a stand on the Baltic states that would protect the interests of the Soviet Union on the Baltic Sea. Molotov evinced some interest as to which states were meant by the Baltic states, and if Lithuania was among them. At the same time, Schulenburg reiterated once again that, while settling the Polish question, whatever form it takes, Germany is prepared to consider the interests of the Soviet Union and to reach an agreement with Moscow about that.

**Question:** What was the reaction in Moscow to Berlin's proposal?

First Moscow retained a position of wait-and-see and gave neither a "no" nor "yes" answer to the proposals of Berlin. Since negotiations were held concurrently with England and France on one side, and Germany on the other, it was possible to weigh with which of the two sides it was more advantageous to reach an agreement. These tactics drove Hitler and his retinue to sheer desperation. With the date of the projected Polish campaign approaching, there was willingness in Berlin to go very far indeed to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union. On 15 August, a proposal was sent to Moscow to receive the German foreign minister for conducting the negotiations. Since no positive answer was received, a new analogous proposal was sent in the name of Hitler himself. It was later determined that Hitler himself was also ready to fly to Moscow. This time Hitler's proposal was accepted in Moscow.

**Question:** How did the Molotov-Ribbentrop negotiations develop on 23 August?

Data about the Stalin-Molotov and Ribbentrop-Schulenburg negotiations is scanty to date, because the write-up of this discussion is missing among the documents of the German Foreign Ministry. It is known that Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow with ample authorization, and had no need to get instructions from Berlin on the basic issues. Namely, he had in his portfolio proposals relating not

only to Poland and the Baltic states, but also to areas of Turkey, more specifically the straits of the Black Sea. True enough, the agreement was reached without Ribbentrop having to bring up Turkey and its straits.

Existing data suggests that an agreement about both the non-aggression treaty and its supplementary protocol was reached, in principle, during the first opinion exchange lasting 3 hours. In fact, Ribbentrop telegraphed Berlin after the end of the said negotiations that signing is imminent for the secret protocol that will delineate the spheres of interest for both sides in the whole Baltic Sea area. It was also indicated that the Russian demand to retain the seaports of Liepaja and Ventspils in its sphere of influence is the deciding factor on what hinges the conclusion of the pact. Hitler's answer to Ribbentrop was short and clear: "Antwort lautet: Ja, einverstanden." (The answer is: yes, agreed.)

As this incident indicates, the intention in Berlin had been to shift the German sphere of influence further up north than it actually happened. It would seem logical to assume that in Berlin the intention first was to fix the boundary line between the spheres of influence of the two super-states at the northern border of Latvia, not Lithuania.

The negotiations resumed at 10 in the evening and concluded with the signing of the nonaggression treaty and its secret supplementary protocol. As mentioned before, the latter has not been found in our archives.

The text of the supplementary protocol of the Soviet-German nonaggression treaty, as published abroad, is translated as follows:

On the occasion of signing the nonaggression treaty between the German State and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the undersigned, fully authorized representatives of both sides, have discussed, in strictly confidential talks, the delineation of their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe.

These negotiations lead to the following result:

1. In case of a territorial and political reorganization of the area belonging to the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania will also mark the boundary between the German and the USSR spheres of influence. In this connection, both sides will recognize the interests of Lithuania in the region of Vilnius.

2. In case of a territorial and political reorganization in the area belonging to the state of Poland, the approximate boundary between the German and the USSR spheres of influence will run along the line of the Narew, Vistula and San rivers.

The question of whether or not preserving an independent Poland will serve the interests of both sides, and what should be the boundaries of that state, can finally be settled only in the course of future political development.

In any case, both governments will settle this question by way of an amicable agreement.

3. In southeastern Europe, the Soviet side asserts its interests in Bessarabia. The German side declares a complete lack of political interest in that region.

4. Both sides will keep this document in strict secrecy.

Question: How did the text of the supplementary protocol become known to the public?

Rumors about the existence of the supplementary protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact were spreading already in August 1939. Especially noteworthy is the fact A. Schmidt (Torma), the Estonian Ambassador to London, could report as early as 22 August (take note! one day before the pact was concluded) that talks at the Soviet-German negotiations were "not only about Poland, but also about the Baltic states. Namely, Germany had agreed to recognize the inclusion of Finland, Estonia and Latvia in a special Soviet sphere of influence."

On 25 August, the Estonian Embassy in Paris reported to Tallinn: "Rumors are afoot today that besides the treaty signed between the Soviet Union and Germany, there is a secret supplementary agreement, according to which the Soviet Union has a completely free hand to act against the Baltic states." Rumors about the existence of the secret protocol also reached the press of many countries.

The text of said secret protocol was found in the German archives in connection with preparations for the trials of major Nazi war criminals, and the photocopy of it was first made public at the Nuremberg trials on 25 March 1946, by Dr A. Seidl, defender of Rudolf Hess. The document was rejected by the court at the time, but it was soon published in numerous publications.

The alleged German language original of the secret supplementary protocol of the Soviet-German nonaggression pact is now in the archives of the Foreign Ministry (Politisches Archiv des Auswartigen Amtes) of the Federal Republic of Germany, in Bonn, and its facsimile copies have spread all over the world. It is apparently a hastily composed document, done on a poor quality typewriter, and it even contains typing errors. It would seem that J. von Ribbentrop and V. Molotov did not sign a specifically formulated agreement, but a sloppily concocted project. Considering that said document was prepared in the course of some very short negotiations, this is not at all surprising.



In some circles the authenticity of the text of the supplementary protocol is being questioned. Questions could arise as to whether or not this is a real original, are the signatures of J. Ribbentrop and V. Molotov genuine, etc. It's about time that Soviet specialists also join this dispute.

Question: How should the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact be evaluated today?

This is an extremely complicated problem that is undoubtedly causing clashes of opinion and discussions. The non-aggression treaty cannot be viewed or evaluated apart from its supplementary protocol but, in the Soviet Union, the latter has been talked and written about only tangentially up until now.

In evaluating the pact, it is impossible to get around the question of whether it was a forced move or not, i.e. did the Soviet Government have to make the agreement with Hitler out of actual necessity or was it a matter of free choice. Up until most recently, a unanimous position has prevailed in the Soviet Union: The signing of the pact was inevitable. To support this position, two basic arguments are usually offered:

—Had the pact not been concluded, the Soviet Union would have fallen victim to the German invasion in 1939;

—The 1939 negotiations between the Soviet Union, England and France came to a stalemate, and the Soviet Union was threatened by the formation of a consolidated war front of imperialistic states.

Question: These arguments call for more detailed comments. Therefore, first of all: How about the assertion that the Soviet Union was threatened by the danger of a German invasion already in the fall of 1939?

This position elicits serious counter-arguments. An analysis of the size, armaments, war potential, war plans and other such factors about the German Army at that time would inevitably lead to the conclusion that, in 1939, Germany was indeed capable of crushing Poland, but was not prepared for war against the Soviet Union. One might recall that under the German military command at that time were 75 to 80 infantry divisions, close to 4,000 tanks and 3,950 airplanes. On the other hand, on 15 August 1939, the Soviet Chief of General Staff B. Shaposhnikov announced to the military delegations of England and France that the Soviet Union can put up, against an aggressor in Europe, 120 infantry divisions, 16 cavalry divisions, 5,000 heavy cannons, 9,000 to 10,000 tanks and 5,000 to 5,500 destroyer- and bomber planes. Even if these figures seem a bit inflated, they speak plainly about the relative strength of the forces.

But beyond the strength of the weapons, there are other significant factors to be considered. The German military command had not made the necessary preparations

for a war with the Soviet Union. There were no plans for such an action, the preparation of which later took close to a year. The German general staff lacked the experience of contemporary warfare that was, as we know, first gained in the Polish campaign, and especially in the West European campaign in 1940. As long as there was a Polish State, Germany lacked a favorable foothold for an attack on the Soviet Union. It is not logical that Germany would have started it in the fall. A consideration of these factors alone would render it inconceivable that there was danger of an attack on the Soviet Union in 1939.

It should also be considered that, as long as the Soviet-English-French negotiations were in progress, and the agenda called for a pact of mutual assistance between these states, Hitler would not have started the war.

Question: Therefore, we should also make some comment on the negotiations held between the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France in the Spring of 1939.

First we have to admit that the light shed on these negotiations in our historical literature so far has been extremely one-sided. Almost all of the works dedicated to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, and its history of diplomacy, as well as major research dealing with the Great Patriotic War and the outbreak of World War II, emphasize that the failure of negotiations should be blamed on the Western statesmen only, who did not take them seriously, but tried, behind the scenes, to reach agreement with Hitler, and to direct Germany's aggression against the Soviet Union.

### Part Two of Article

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11 Aug 88 pp 2-3

[Part Two of article by Heino Arumae: "Once More About the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty as a Commentary on Former Commentary"]

[Text] Only very recently, in our journalistic writings, have a few Soviet authors started to ponder about questions like: Did the Western statesmen have any real reasons to have reservations about the Soviet Union and to mistrust Stalin's politics; was Moscow ready, during the course of negotiations, for any kind of compromise, provided the assertions made by the Soviet side for terminating the negotiations were justified.

Naturally, the Soviet Government also had reason to mistrust the statesman types like Prime Minister Chamberlain and Foreign Minister Halifax. Certain Western circles did indeed favor the strengthening of Germany as a counter-balance to the growing might of the Soviet Union. It is also incontestable that the concessions made to Hitler by London and Paris, as symbolized by the Munich accord reached at the expense of Czechoslovakia, did not help to avoid the war, but to bring it closer.

At the same time we cannot say that there was provocation for war coming from London and Paris, with the objective of directing Germany first against Poland and then against the Soviet Union. Due to the guarantees given Poland and several other states, Great Britain and France themselves would also have become involved in the war. The Western statesmen were trying to avoid war at that time, and that purpose was also served by the negotiations held with the Soviet Union.

But, during the critical period before the war, London and Paris were still clinging to the traditions of Western diplomacy that did not correspond to the situation at hand. The action taken was slow and hesitant, no necessary resolution was shown, and efforts were still made to avoid the excessive sharpening of conflicts. Yet, significant success was reached in the course of the Soviet-English-French negotiations. The text for the mutual assistance pact was worked out, and an understanding reached that, along with the pact, an agreement stipulating concrete military obligations should also be signed. To curb aggression threatening the small states of Europe, a list of states to be guaranteed by the three major states was established in principle. There was also some progress in the question of guarantees for the Baltic states and Finland, which had risen to a position of importance during the negotiations. England and France gave up their initial negative position and agreed to guarantee these states in case of both direct and indirect aggression. The only thing left open was the determination of indirect aggression, because the English Government tried also to consider positions held by the Baltic states. In connection with the fact that London did not accept the Soviet Government's position regarding indirect aggression, it has been said that the Western statesmen tried to give the aggressor a chance to attack the Soviet Union through the Baltic states. But the Baltic states formed too narrow a gateway through which it would not have been possible to vitally endanger the Soviet Union.

Just about the only unsolved problem taken seriously at the negotiations of the three states was the question of how the Red Army can stand up against Germany, if Poland and Romania refuse to let the Soviet troops through their territories. There was not enough time to solve this principally important, but complicated problem—the negotiations were interrupted beforehand. It is possible, of course, that an answer to satisfy all states involved could not have been found. But it is clear, in any case, that during the negotiations between the three states in the spring and summer of 1939, a lot was accomplished to bring divergent positions closer together, with the harmonized issues of the debate outnumbering the ones left unharmonized. For that, most of the concessions were made on the English-French side. We can assert for sure that as long as the three-state negotiations were in progress, and the Soviet-English-French mutual assistance pact remained a possibility, Hitler would not have started the war.

Question: What should one make of the assertion that, in the year of 1939, the Soviet Union was threatened by the danger of a united front of imperialistic states?

The assertion that, had the Soviet-German treaty not been concluded, a united front of imperialistic states would have formed against the Soviet Union, has often been used to justify the conclusion of the treaty. The authors of such assertions judge the controversies of that time one-sidedly, attributing primary importance to the antagonism between the Soviet Union and the imperialistic camp, and underestimating its extent within the imperialistic camp itself. Actually, the German-English conflict could be regarded as the basic conflict of the time.

In 1939, there were some unofficial attempts to overcome the antagonism between England and Germany at the expense of other states and regions, but these cannot be given any particular significance. The politics of Great Britain and other Western democratic states was not dependent on the subjective wishes of individual politicians, an anti-Soviet conviction, fear of the danger of communism, etc., as many of the Soviet authors assert, but on the actual interests of the state. The possibility that England, France, Germany and perhaps some other state would join forces against the Soviet Union, should be regarded simply as a theoretical type of speculation. The course of World War II also showed that England started supporting the Soviet Union, and not Germany. (By the way, a valuable article on this problem is written by historian V. Dashitshev. See LITERATURNAYA GAZETA 18 May 1988).

Question: Thus, Stalin was not faced with a forced move, but had a chance to choose between two different alternatives. Why was the choice made in favor of Germany?

The answer seems to be simple: in foreign policy, every government would proceed from the actual interests of the state and, in the circumstances of that time (we should especially emphasize—given the conditions of that time) an agreement with Berlin seemed to be more profitable than making one with London and Paris. Concluding a treaty with Great Britain and France would have made it necessary to sign a mutual assistance pact, that threatened to draw the Soviet Union into the war sooner or later. In contrast, a non-aggression treaty with Germany didn't threaten the Soviet Union in any way, and also made it possible for it to stay out of the war, or at least postpone it. Quite obviously, Moscow was also considering the fact that war between the imperialist states will weaken both fighting sides, which will strengthen the international position of the Soviet Union, and create advantages for expanding socialism's sphere of influence.

Besides, the supplementary protocol of the nonaggression treaty gave the Soviet Union some distinct advantages regarding the Baltic states, certain parts of the Polish territory and Bessarabia.

Obviously, concluding pacts of mutual assistance with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and having the Red Army move into the territories of these states, would not have been very likely without the preceding Soviet-German agreement. Same is true of the agreement made on 28 June 1940, on the basis of which Bessarabia went to the Soviet Union.

As far as Poland is concerned, the said supplementary protocol enabled the Soviet Union to annex some 190,000 square kilometers of former Polish territory, with a population of some 12 million. A majority of that population was made up of West Ukrainians and West White Russians, but there were also quite a few Poles.

Thus, the Soviet-German pact made it possible for the borders of the Soviet Union to shift westward to the extent of some 300 kilometers. Understandably, this was a significant achievement for Moscow.

Another positive for the Soviet side coming out of the Soviet-German pact was the fact that it caused a great confusion among the allies of Germany. In Japan, for example, there was even a crisis of the government, and the new government had an abrupt change of policy toward the Soviet Union. The war activity against the Red Army that had been going on since May of 1939, was terminated, and negotiations for peace commenced.

Considering all of these and several other factors, in the fall of 1939, the non-aggression pact and its supplementary protocol could be deemed advantageous to both Germany and the Soviet Union. In the context of later developments, quite different opinions could be possible. It is obvious that, from Moscow's point of view, not all the hopes in connection with the pact materialized.

Question: Does that mean that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty also had some negative consequences?

Certainly. It would be impossible to analyze all of them here, but let's pause at some of the more significant moments. Since the nonaggression pact cannot be separated from its supplementary protocol, they both merit a negative rating.

The most fatal consequence of the pact was that it upset the balance of powers between the major European states in favor of Germany and that, in turn, enabled Hitler to unleash World War II.

Historical experiences have shown that the most effective factor for preserving international stability, security and peace is the continued balance of power in a given region (today, of course, in the whole world) between the dominant states and groupings.

As far as Europe is concerned, a classical balance of forces between two power centers had developed toward the end of the 19th century: with Germany and its allies on one side, and England, France and Russia (later

Soviet Union) on the other. As we know, Germany's attempts to tilt that balance of power in its favor failed in both World War I and World War II. Between the two wars, when Germany strengthened, cooperation between the three states was the only guarantee for preserving peace. In the 1930's this fact was understood in Moscow as well as in Paris and London. It is time to admit that fault for the failure to create a collective security system, based primarily on the collaboration of Soviet Union, France and England, was not only with London and Paris, but also with the politics of the whole Stalin regime—both internal and foreign.

In addition to that, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty caused tremendous confusion within the international communist movement and among the democratic public. So, communists from all countries had to follow the example of Moscow and the Komintern in praising the said treaty as a means of securing peace.

Due to the fact that Soviet Union deemed it even possible to make a friendship agreement with Germany, and that actual alliance relations developed between Moscow and Berlin, the situation of progressive forces and communists of many states became even more complicated. As is known, the friendship and border agreement, signed by V. Molotov and J. von Ribbentrop on 28 September 1939, publicly fixed the dividing of Poland, and set the borders between the Soviet Union and Germany. On the same day, Molotov and Ribbentrop signed two more secret supplementary protocols and a joint Soviet-German proclamation. In the latter it was noted that the German and the Soviet Governments "have finally regulated the questions rising from the collapse of the former Polish State, and have thereby created a solid foundation to a lasting peace in Eastern Europe." It was also noted that the aim of both states is achieving peace with Germany on one hand, and with England and France on the other, and emphasized: "If, however, the efforts of both nations bring no results, the fact will be confirmed that England and France will bear the responsibility for continuing the war, in which case the governments of Germany and the Soviet Union will consult with each other about the necessary means."

On 28 September, Molotov and Ribbentrop also exchanged letters touching on the Soviet-German economic relations. V. Molotov noted in his letter that the government of the USSR is, on the basis, and in the spirit of our jointly reached general political agreement, ready in all ways to develop economic and trade relations between USSR and Germany.

From the Fall of 1939 to June of 1941, the Soviet Union supplied Germany extensively with strategic raw material. At the same time, the outlets of mass communications were a lot friendlier toward Germany than they were toward England and France. Bold confrontations addressed to London and Paris became common, it was England and France who were pictured as the primary war criminals.

**Question:** It has been said that, by concluding the treaty, Moscow gained something very essential, namely time. Did time work for the benefit of Soviet Russia or Germany at that time?

This problem has also had a very one-sided treatment so far. The fact that the Soviet Union used the interim from 1939 till the attack of Germany and its allies in June of 1941 for intensive military preparations and modernization of armaments is undoubtedly of great interest. It was during that time that the T-34 tank, new types of airplanes, the contemporary anti-tank gun etc. were rooted in production.

At the same time we cannot forget what Germany did during that period. When, in the fall of 1939 there were 80 divisions at the disposal of the German military command then, in the spring of 1940, 120 divisions were deployed in Western Europe, while 10 weak divisions were left in Eastern Europe. On 1 June 1941, Germany had 214 divisions, 21 of which were tank divisions and 14 motorized divisions. During the same time significant qualitative shifts were taking place in the armament of the German Army. In 1939, more than one third of the tanks were of the T-1 type, that were equipped with machine guns only. The "Luftwaffe" that dominated the skies of France in 1940, was qualitatively something else than the airplanes used in the Polish campaign, etc.

But we should not only consider the quality and quantity of the opposite forces—there are other factors to keep in mind. The military and political events in Europe developed in favor of Germany unexpectedly fast. The assumption of Soviet leaders that Germany's war with England and France will be prolonged, in the course of which Germany will be weakened, turned out to be unfounded. In actuality, Germany did not weaken, but it strengthened. Hitler managed to get a good part of the industry and resources in Western Europe under his control.

Germany used the time to also draw Finland, Hungary and Romania into the war against the Soviet Union. The aggressor's forces were increased by more than 25 divisions. Also the fact that, thanks to the deployment of the allies, the front now ran from the Northern Arctic Sea to the Black Sea, opened up possibilities for the German military command.

These considerations alone will cast doubt on the assertions that time was working in favor of the Soviet Union.

**Question:** How should the term "sphere of influence," as used in reference to the Baltic states and Poland in the supplementary protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty, be interpreted?

This term can be interpreted in a number of different ways, but in the given case, the subsequent turn of events has given it a singular meaning.

One must admit that Hitler's offer to Stalin with reference to the Baltic states and Poland, was a skillfully calculated move.

There were influential persons, circles and organizations in Moscow between the years of 1920 and 1940, who considered independent Baltic states to be a temporary phenomenon, and their annexation to Soviet Union a normal course of events. This refers not only to the idea of a world revolution of Trotsky and his fellow thinkers, and the activities of the Komintern, but also considered here should be the convictions and practical activity of Stalin. According to an evaluation by the doctor of history D. Dashitshev, the basis of the Stalinist foreign policy was formed by ultra-left, Blanquist and Trotskist ideas, and an important place in Soviet Union's foreign policy has been assigned to the building of a Stalinist type of socialism wherever possible (see LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 18 May 1988). The basis for that kind of politics was making a contribution to the local revolutionary forces.

Speaking specifically of Estonia, V.I. Lenin remarked already in 1919 that workers will fell the bourgeois government there and create a Soviet Estonia, who will make a new peace treaty with us (Lenin, V.I., Works, Vol 30, p 280). The Estonian Communists also proceeded from the same principle. As we know, their chief aim was to assert the power of the working class and to unite Estonia with the Soviet Union. This stance was clearly expressed in the first and second programs of the ECP (Estonian Communist Party) held in 1920 and 1929 respectively. With the uprising of 1 December 1924, a direct attempt was made to achieve that aim.

Understandably, there was interest in Moscow for having the Baltic states plug into the Soviet system, not only for reasons of expanding the socialist sphere of influence, but also for more concrete economic, military-strategic, and even historical reasons. The fact that Soviet Union was seeking access to the Baltic Sea through the Baltic states has been confirmed by many Soviet statesmen, especially V. Molotov. By the way, Molotov also said to representatives of the Baltic states, in the fall of 1939, that "thanks" to the Baltic states, the Soviet Union is crowded into the Gulf of Finland, and that cannot be tolerated for much longer.

Speaking of the military-strategic factors, the supreme command of the Red Army had, already in 1918, considered the coastline of the Baltic Sea to be the natural boundary of Soviet Russia. In the 1930's, due to the threat of invasion, the strategic importance of Estonia and the other Baltic states increased even more in the eyes of Moscow.

Without considering all of these factors, it would be impossible to understand the development of events in the Baltic during the years of 1939 and 1940.

**Question:** According to the supplementary protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty, Lithuania should have belonged to Germany's sphere of interest. How did it get into the Soviet Union's sphere of interest?



Regarding Lithuania, two supplementary agreements were signed between Soviet Union and Germany. Namely, the whole of Lithuania went to the Soviet Union's sphere of interest on the basis of the friendship and border agreement's secret supplementary protocol between Germany and the Soviet Union, signed in Moscow by V. Molotov and J.V. Ribbentrop on 28 September 1939, and also a special agreement signed in Moscow by V. Molotov and Count Schulenburg on 10 January 1941. In return, certain areas of Poland (the voivodship of Lublin and part of the voivodship of Warsaw) were relinquished to Germany, and some material compensation was given also.

Question: How is one to explain that in the supplementary protocol even the future existence of Poland was questioned?

There are many unanswered questions in the history of Soviet-Polish relations, and a significant place among them goes to the events of 1939. Since blank spaces like this cause negative emotions among Poles to this day, and influence their attitude toward the Soviet Union, this problem has been discussed even at the meeting of M. Gorbachev and W. Jaruzelski. In 1987, it was decided to form a special group of experts to research the history of Soviet-Polish relations, and that would make more competent information available for future discussions on this subject.

For now, suffice it to say that Soviet-Polish relations between the two World Wars were very complicated. Obviously there was fault on both sides.

On one hand it's clear that the Polish Government was practicing a foreign policy that was short-sighted, had the ambitions of a big state, and was pointed against the Soviet Union. On the other hand, one should consider the difficult geostrategic position of Poland, placed between two super-states and also, that Moscow's attitude toward Pilsudski's Poland was, even if partly justified, partly also unjustifiably mistrustful and even hostile. For example, Molotov has called pre-war Poland the miscarriage of Versailles.

Since Berlin's attitude toward Poland was exactly the same, things went as they did.

Question: What kind of summary can we make of the foregoing?

The most significant conclusion, perhaps, would be that all these states, on whom depended the development of international events before World War II, made miscalculations and mistakes in their politics. The Soviet authors have, up until now, desperately tried to prove that mistakes were made only by the governments of the imperialistic states, while in the Soviet Union we have been able to foresee all things correctly, and act on them almost flawlessly. Yet, there is no divine foresight given to mortals, and serious miscalculations could not be avoided even in Moscow.

In the case of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, we can't avoid the question of political morality. As we know, in the case of super-states, the moral basis for foreign policy can often be of dubious value. But a deal like that made between Hitler and Stalin can be made only between dictatorially governing potentates, who have no need to consider the parliament, the people, public opinion or any ethical principles.

Stalin and his fellow thinkers did not proceed merely from the state's interest for providing security, but also from ambitions of a super-state.

Finally, I should like to remark that the circumstances surrounding the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty, and some other foreign policy events of 1939, are by no means clear, and in need of further research. Because of that, the formation of different opinions on the subject would be quite natural.

## Briefs

### New Oblast Formed

A new oblast has appeared on the map of Tadzhikistan, Khotlon. It has been formed out of the Kurgan-Tyube and Kulyab Oblasts. The large industrial town Kurgan-Tyube will be its center. It includes also 19 agricultural rayons, and the towns of Kulyab, Kalininabad, and Nurek. The first session of the Khotlon Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, which will discuss organizational questions, will take place on 27 September. [Text] [LD1509053888 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0400 GMT 10 Sep 88]

### TV Aerial for Latvia

An Mi-10K helicopter was used today to remove an aerial weighing many tonnes from the top of Daugavpils television tower. The same helicopter is now being used to install a new powerful aerial device. The inhabitants of Latvia's eastern areas will now be able to view Central Television's second program without interference. [Summary] [LD1509064688 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 10 Sep 88]

### Cooperative Issues Journal

Journalists in Frunze have organized the Soyuz cooperative. Today they put out the first issue of the news and advertising paper COURIER, whose main aim is to pass on information about the cooperative movement in the republic. The cooperative has been set up under the social and economic development department of the Frunze Ispolkom. It will help cooperatives and those engaged in individual labor activity with advice and news in the field, as well as helping them to forge links with lawyers and economists. A large part of the paper will be devoted to advertising and information about goods and services of cooperatives and raw materials. [Summary] [LD1609025588 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 12 Sep 88]